1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Russian forces have achieved a tactical foothold in Chasiv Yar's "Kanal" micro-district, enabled by a significant escalation in glide bomb usage, posing an immediate threat to the city's defense. Concurrently, a new threat is emerging on the Sumy-Chernihiv axis, characterized by increased cross-border probing and the first-time deployment of advanced Electronic Warfare (EW) systems designed to degrade Ukrainian UAV capabilities.

2. CHANGES FROM PREVIOUS REPORT

• Chasiv Yar Axis: Russian 98th VDV Airborne Division has secured initial positions within the "Kanal" micro-district (CONFIRMED). This represents the first confirmed Russian ground presence inside the city's formal boundaries.
• Air Threat: A marked intensification in the use of FAB-500 glide bombs has been observed against Ukrainian positions in Chasiv Yar, shifting from intermittent to sustained bombardment.
• Northern Axis: A notable increase in cross-border reconnaissance and probing attacks by Russian Dismounted Reconnaissance Groups (DRGs) has been registered in the Sumy Oblast.
• Electronic Warfare: First-time identification of advanced Russian EW systems, specifically the Shipovnik-Aero and Pole-21, deployed along the northern border. This is a new and significant change in the electronic battlespace for this region.

3. THREAT ASSESSMENT

• Air Threat (Chasiv Yar): SEVERE. The sustained and high-volume use of glide bombs to level defensive positions prior to ground assault is the primary threat to the stability of the defense in this sector. This tactic effectively suppresses Ukrainian strongpoints and facilitates Russian advances.
• Ground Assault (Chasiv Yar): HIGH. Russian forces are effectively employing small, well-equipped assault groups (8-10 personnel) immediately following intense aerial/artillery preparation. This tactic is proving effective at breaching forward defensive lines.
• Electronic Warfare (Northern Axis): HIGH. The new deployment of Shipovnik-Aero and Pole-21 systems presents a high threat to Ukrainian ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) and C2 (Command and Control) capabilities, primarily by disrupting UAV navigation and communication links.
• Infiltration (Northern Axis): MEDIUM (UPGRADED from LOW). The increased DRG activity along the Sumy border indicates an elevated threat of sabotage, reconnaissance of Ukrainian defensive layouts, and harassment of rear-area logistics.

4. OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

• Donetsk Oblast (Chasiv Yar): Over the last 24 hours, elements of the Russian 98th VDV Airborne Division, following intense aerial bombardment, conducted multiple company-sized assaults into the easternmost "Kanal" micro-district. Russian forces have established a lodgment and are attempting to consolidate their gains against determined Ukrainian counter-attacks. The primary Russian axis of advance remains oriented westwards towards the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal, which serves as a significant tactical barrier.
• Northern Border (Sumy Oblast): Multiple cross-border attempts by Russian DRGs were detected and engaged. These actions appear to be probing attacks designed to test Ukrainian forward-line-of-troops (FLOT) defenses, identify vulnerabilities in fortifications, and potentially fix Ukrainian units in the north, preventing their redeployment to more active fronts.

5. INTELLIGENCE GAPS

• Primary: The strategic intent behind the Russian Northern Grouping's increased activity and EW deployment. It remains unclear if this is a shaping operation for a future large-scale incursion or a feint to draw Ukrainian reserves away from the Donbas.
• Secondary: The status, composition, and combat readiness of Russian second-echelon forces positioned to exploit a potential breakthrough at Chasiv Yar. Understanding their capacity to sustain the assault is critical.

6. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (NEXT 24-48 HOURS)

• Chasiv Yar Axis (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The enemy will likely attempt to consolidate and expand its foothold in the Kanal micro-district. We anticipate continued, intense use of glide bombs to suppress Ukrainian counter-attack efforts and prepare for subsequent assaults aimed at reaching the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal line.
• Northern Axis (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): Russia will likely continue low-level probing attacks and reconnaissance missions along the Sumy border. The newly deployed EW systems will be actively employed to degrade Ukrainian ISR assets observing Russian force dispositions. A larger, battalion-sized cross-border raid to test Ukrainian response times is a realistic possibility.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

• Chasiv Yar Sector:
  • Prioritize immediate allocation of mobile Air Defense assets to counter the glide bomb threat and increase the risk to Russian aviation.
  • Direct fires and ISR assets to identify and target Russian forward command posts and logistics nodes supporting the 98th VDV's assault.
  • Expedite the preparation of secondary defensive lines west of the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal in case the current line becomes untenable.
• Northern Axis / Sumy Sector:
  • Increase ISR coverage (UAV and ground patrols) to monitor Russian movements and determine the intent of the Northern Grouping.
  • Immediately deploy specialized counter-EW teams and assets to the Sumy sector to mitigate the impact of the new Russian systems.
  • Review and reinforce ambush positions and minefields along likely DRG infiltration routes.

//END REPORT//