1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(CONFIDENCE: HIGH) Russian forces have escalated their offensive on Chasiv Yar to battalion-level mechanized assaults, securing a foothold in the eastern "Kanal" micro-district. This advance was enabled by a significant increase in glide bomb strikes and the deployment of new electronic warfare (EW) systems, which are degrading Ukrainian ISR capabilities and have necessitated a tactical withdrawal of some units to more defensible positions. The immediate threat to the city has become CRITICAL.

2. CHANGES FROM PREVIOUS

• Escalation of Assaults: Russian (RUS) offensive operations on the Chasiv Yar axis have intensified from company-level probes to coordinated, battalion-sized mechanized assaults.
• Territorial Change: For the first time, RUS forces (identified as elements of the 98th VDV Division) have established a confirmed foothold within the eastern administrative boundaries of Chasiv Yar, specifically in the "Kanal" micro-district.
• Ukrainian Posture Change: Ukrainian (UKR) forces conducted a planned tactical withdrawal from exposed forward positions in the "Kanal" micro-district to pre-prepared, more defensible lines to preserve combat power.
• New EW Deployment: The Krasukha-4 EW system has been confirmed as operational in this sector for the first time, representing a significant new threat to UKR unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and command and control (C2) links.
• New Enemy Tactics: RUS forces are now employing coordinated reconnaissance-strike drone swarms, using Orlan-10 for target acquisition and Lancet loitering munitions (some with thermobaric warheads) for immediate engagement.

3. THREAT ASSESSMENT

• OVERALL THREAT LEVEL (CHASIV YAR AXIS): CRITICAL (Upgraded from ELEVATED)
• NEW ENEMY CAPABILITIES:
  • Electronic Warfare: Confirmed deployment of the Krasukha-4 long-range EW system, capable of disrupting UAV navigation, airborne radar, and communication systems. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Aerial Bombardment: Intensified and systematic use of FAB-500 glide bombs to suppress UKR strongpoints prior to and during ground assaults. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Fires: Increased use of TOS-1A thermobaric multiple rocket launchers to systematically clear and destroy UKR fortifications. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
  • Unmanned Systems: Coordinated employment of Orlan-10 (recon) and Lancet (strike) drones in swarm-like tactics for rapid find-fix-finish cycles. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• EMERGING RISKS:
  • Tactical Breakthrough: There is a high risk of a RUS tactical breakthrough into the urban core of Chasiv Yar if the combined threat of glide bombs and overwhelming artillery fire is not effectively countered.
  • ISR Degradation: Widespread EW effects are degrading UKR situational awareness and impacting the accuracy and timeliness of artillery fire, creating critical vulnerabilities.
  • High Attrition: The constant, high-tempo combined arms bombardment is likely causing unsustainable attrition rates for UKR frontline units, impacting their combat effectiveness.

4. OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

• CHASIV YAR AXIS (MAIN EFFORT):
  • RUS forces, primarily elements of the 98th VDV Division, conducted multiple battalion-sized assaults, successfully establishing a lodgment in the "Kanal" micro-district.
  • UKR units executed a tactical withdrawal to prepared defensive positions west of the initial line of contact to consolidate their lines and reduce exposure to direct fire.
  • Heavy, persistent fighting is ongoing as UKR forces attempt to contain the RUS advance and prevent further penetration.
• AVDIIVKA AXIS: Positional fighting continues with no significant changes to the frontline. RUS forces appear to be focused on regrouping and force reconstitution.
• LYMAN AXIS: Minor RUS ground attacks near Terny were successfully repelled.
• SOUTHERN AXIS (ROBOTYNE): RUS forces continue to conduct probing attacks with limited success.
• KHERSON AXIS: No significant changes reported. UKR forces continue to maintain their bridgehead on the Dnipro's left bank.

5. INTELLIGENCE GAPS

• The specific composition, strength, and disposition of RUS second-echelon reserves positioned to exploit a breakthrough at Chasiv Yar.
• The precise location, operational range, and tactical employment patterns of the newly deployed Krasukha-4 EW systems.
• The enemy's logistical capacity to sustain this high-intensity assault (ammunition, personnel, equipment) beyond the next 72 hours.
• RUS intent regarding the timing and axis of the main assault into Chasiv Yar proper from the newly secured "Kanal" staging area.

6. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (NEXT 24-48 HOURS)

• (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RUS forces will prioritize consolidating their gains in the "Kanal" micro-district and will use it as a staging area for subsequent assaults into the main urban area of Chasiv Yar.
• (HIGH CONFIDENCE) The enemy will maintain a high tempo of glide bomb and TOS-1A strikes against UKR defensive positions, command posts, and logistical routes west of the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal.
• (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RUS will intensify the use of reconnaissance-strike drone swarms to interdict UKR reinforcements and logistics and to hunt for high-value targets behind the frontline.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. PRIORITIZE COUNTER-EW/FIRE: Task all available ISR assets (SIGINT, IMINT) with identifying and targeting RUS EW platforms (especially Krasukha-4) and long-range fire assets (TOS-1A, 2S4 Tyulpan). Allocate priority for long-range precision fires to neutralize these threats.
2. BOLSTER AIR DEFENSE: Immediately redeploy mobile SHORAD and MANPADS units to the Chasiv Yar sector to create a layered air defense capable of countering glide bombs and protecting critical defensive nodes and C2 locations.
3. ACCELERATE DEFENSIVE PREPARATIONS: Expedite the preparation of secondary and tertiary defensive lines west of the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal to ensure a resilient defense-in-depth and mitigate the risk of a rapid breakthrough.
4. ADAPT UAS TACTICS: Disseminate updated TTPs for drone operations in a high-EW environment. Emphasize pre-programmed "fire-and-forget" flight paths, reduced-emission profiles, and the use of decoy drones to test and saturate enemy EW coverage.

END REPORT