1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Russian Forces (RF) have intensified offensive operations on the Avdiivka-Donetsk axis, successfully securing a foothold in the Avdiivka industrial zone and initiating a new push from the south, indicating a concerted effort to achieve a tactical encirclement. (NEW) Concurrently, the first confirmed combat deployment of the Russian "Sarmat-2" Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) near Bakhmut represents a significant evolution in RF ground tactics. (NEW) The air and missile threat to rear areas, particularly Odesa, remains HIGH following the confirmed resupply of Kalibr cruise missiles to the Black Sea Fleet.

2. CHANGES FROM PREVIOUS

• Avdiivka Axis: RF pressure has transitioned from probing attacks to a confirmed ground assault, achieving a lodgment in the eastern Avdiivka industrial zone. A new southern axis of advance has been opened, a significant change from the previous focus on the northern flank.
• Bakhmut Axis: The tactical situation has evolved with the introduction of the "Sarmat-2" UGV in a fire support role, a previously unobserved capability on this front. RF efforts to regain lost positions near Klishchiivka and Andriivka have intensified, shifting from localized counter-attacks to more coordinated assaults.
• Logistics (Crimea): The threat to the Black Sea Fleet has been updated following confirmation of Kalibr missile replenishment at the port of Sevastopol, elevating the immediate maritime strike threat.
• Electronic Warfare (EW): Enemy EW activity has notably increased in intensity and sophistication along the Zaporizhzhia front, shifting from general disruption to targeted GPS spoofing against our precision-guided munitions (PGMs).

3. THREAT ASSESSMENT

• Ground Threat: HIGH (Avdiivka, Bakhmut), MEDIUM (Zaporizhzhia). The primary threat is the RF's renewed capability for coordinated, multi-axis assaults in Avdiivka. The introduction of UGVs in Bakhmut presents a new tactical challenge for our frontline units, potentially increasing the effectiveness of enemy assaults on fortified positions. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Air/Missile Threat: HIGH (Odesa, Mykolaiv), MEDIUM (Other rear areas). The confirmed resupply of Kalibr missiles to naval platforms in Sevastopol significantly increases the likelihood of imminent, large-scale missile strikes against southern port infrastructure and energy facilities within the next 24-72 hours. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• EW Threat: HIGH (Zaporizhzhia). The increased sophistication of Russian EW, specifically GPS spoofing, poses a direct and immediate threat to the effectiveness of our PGM and UAV operations along the Robotyne-Verbove salient. This capability degrades our ability to conduct precision strikes on high-value targets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4. OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

• Avdiivka-Donetsk Axis:
  • Over the past 24 hours, elements of the 1st Army Corps, likely reinforced with mobilized personnel, conducted a multi-pronged assault on Avdiivka.
  • Confirmed: RF units have established a foothold in the eastern industrial zone ("promzone"). The depth of penetration is currently being assessed.
  • NEW: A separate assault was launched from the south, near Opytne and Vodyane, in an attempt to envelop the Avdiivka garrison from a new direction. This southern push is currently being contested by elements of our 110th Mechanized Brigade.
• Bakhmut Axis:
  • RF VDV (Airborne Forces) units, supported by the new "Sarmat-2" UGV, conducted multiple unsuccessful ground assaults on our positions near Klishchiivka and Andriivka. The UGV was observed providing direct fire support with its mounted machine gun.
  • Heavy artillery and mortar fire continue to target our defensive lines and suspected logistical routes along the T0504 highway.
• Zaporizhzhia Axis:
  • Positional fighting continues along the Robotyne-Verbove line with no significant changes in the forward line of own troops (FLOT).
  • Significant Activity: A marked increase in Russian EW activity has been recorded, resulting in several reported instances of GPS signal loss for our UAVs and targeting pods. This is assessed as a deliberate enemy effort to counter our technological overmatch in the sector.

5. INTELLIGENCE GAPS

• Enemy Intent (Avdiivka): The ultimate objective of the new southern push at Avdiivka is unclear. Is it a feint to draw our reserves, or the main effort to complete the encirclement? The composition and strength of the forces allocated to this new axis remain unconfirmed.
• UGV Capability: The full ISR and C2 capabilities of the "Sarmat-2" UGV are unknown. We lack intelligence on its operational range, control interface, and vulnerability to our own EW and anti-armor systems.
• EW Systems: The specific type of Russian EW system responsible for the sophisticated GPS spoofing in Zaporizhzhia has not yet been identified. Pinpointing the system is critical for developing effective countermeasures.

6. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

• COA 1 (Most Likely): RF will attempt to consolidate gains in the Avdiivka industrial zone while reinforcing the new southern axis of advance in the next 24-48 hours. The primary objective will be to sever ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Avdiivka from the west. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• COA 2 (Most Dangerous): RF will launch a coordinated cruise missile strike from Black Sea Fleet assets targeting Odesa's port infrastructure within the next 24 hours, timed to coincide with continued ground pressure in Avdiivka to maximize strategic impact. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• Bakhmut: RF will likely increase the use of UGVs in subsequent assaults on our positions near Klishchiivka, refining their tactics for integrating these systems with infantry and armor. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Re-task ISR: Immediately re-task all available ISR assets (UAV, satellite) to the southern approaches of Avdiivka to identify RF force composition, strength, and logistical preparations for the new assault vector. Priority should be given to identifying command posts and artillery positions.
2. Air Defense Posture: Elevate the readiness state of all air defense assets in Odesa and Mykolaiv Oblasts in anticipation of imminent Kalibr missile strikes. Disperse critical assets where possible.
3. Counter-EW: Deploy specialized signals intelligence (SIGINT) teams to the Zaporizhzhia front to identify and locate the source of GPS spoofing emissions. Task friendly EW units to develop and implement immediate countermeasures.
4. Counter-UGV Tactics: Disseminate all available intelligence on the "Sarmat-2" UGV to frontline units on the Bakhmut axis. Recommend prioritizing ATGM and FPV drone teams to target these new systems, as their armor is likely vulnerable.

//END REPORT//