1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) Russian forces have escalated their offensive on Chasiv Yar, employing new combined arms tactics and a novel electronic warfare (EW) system, designated "Pole-21," to disrupt UAV and precision munitions guidance. This tactical shift is supported by a significant intensification of KAB glide bomb strikes across the Donetsk front, aimed at overwhelming prepared defensive positions. A logistical buildup behind the Bakhmut axis indicates Russian intent to sustain this high-tempo offensive.

2. CHANGES FROM PREVIOUS

• NEW EW THREAT: First confirmed identification of the "Pole-21" EW system in the Chasiv Yar operational area, actively degrading GPS and datalinks. This marks a significant upgrade from previously observed standard jamming capabilities.
• TACTICAL SHIFT (CHASIV YAR): Enemy tactics have evolved from small-unit probing attacks to coordinated mechanized assaults on the "Kanal" microdistrict, integrating heavy KAB strikes, smoke screens, and EW support.
• ESCALATED AIR THREAT: A dramatic increase in the employment of KAB-500/1500 glide bombs has been observed, with over 30 strikes recorded in the last 24 hours, focusing on degrading fortifications in Chasiv Yar.
• LOGISTICAL POSTURE: New SIGINT confirms a logistical buildup (artillery munitions, fuel) behind the Bakhmut axis, indicating preparation for sustained offensive operations, a change from the previous period's standard resupply activity.

3. THREAT ASSESSMENT

• ELECTRONIC WARFARE (NEW): (HIGH CONFIDENCE) The "Pole-21" system presents a SEVERE threat to our UAV operations (reconnaissance and FPV strike) and the effectiveness of GPS-guided munitions (e.g., JDAM, HIMARS). Its ability to create a wide-area GPS-denied environment will degrade our situational awareness and precision strike capability.
• AIR-TO-GROUND: (HIGH CONFIDENCE) The massed use of KAB glide bombs is the primary threat to static defensive positions. These strikes are designed to destroy fortified command posts and bunkers, disrupt defensive cohesion, and inflict psychological stress prior to ground assaults. The threat level is assessed as SEVERE.
• GROUND MANEUVER: (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) The refined Russian assault tactics at Chasiv Yar, combining mechanized elements with comprehensive fire and EW support, pose a HIGH threat to frontline stability. They are attempting to fix our units in the southern part of the "Kanal" microdistrict while conducting flanking maneuvers from the north.

4. OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

• CHASIV YAR AXIS: (CONFIRMED) Russian forces launched a reinforced mechanized assault on the "Kanal" microdistrict. Elements of the Ukrainian 67th Mechanized Brigade are heavily engaged, reporting the use of smoke screens by the enemy to conceal movement. While Ukrainian forces are currently holding their primary defensive lines, the pressure is intense and sustained.
• AVDIIVKA AXIS: (CONFIRMED) Russian forces continue to exert pressure west of Avdiivka, particularly towards Ocheretyne. However, the pace of advance has slowed in the last 24 hours, likely due to a reallocation of air assets and operational focus to the Chasiv Yar sector.
• LOGISTICS & RESERVES: (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) SIGINT indicates a significant buildup of artillery munitions and POL (Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants) at depots behind the Bakhmut axis. This suggests Russian forces are preparing to resource a sustained, high-intensity push on Chasiv Yar rather than a limited tactical engagement.

5. INTELLIGENCE GAPS

• What are the specific technical parameters, vulnerabilities, and effective radius of the deployed "Pole-21" systems?
• What is the current disposition, composition, and readiness of Russian second-echelon forces positioned to exploit a potential breakthrough at Chasiv Yar?
• Are there additional "Pole-21" systems being deployed to other sectors along the front?

6. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (24-48 HOURS)

• (HIGH CONFIDENCE) Russian forces will continue their assault on the "Kanal" microdistrict of Chasiv Yar, led by massed KAB strikes to degrade defenses, followed by ground assaults under the cover of the "Pole-21" EW dome.
• (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) The enemy will likely attempt to expand their flanking maneuver north of the "Kanal" microdistrict to create an operational envelopment and force a Ukrainian withdrawal from forward positions.
• (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) We anticipate an increase in KAB strikes along adjacent fronts, particularly towards Siversk and west of Avdiivka, to fix Ukrainian reserves and prevent their redeployment to the Chasiv Yar sector.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. COUNTER-EW: Task all available ELINT and ISR assets to immediately geolocate, characterize, and identify vulnerabilities of the "Pole-21" emitters. Prioritize these systems for kinetic strikes.
2. FORCE ADAPTATION: Immediately disseminate intelligence on new Russian TTPs (mechanized assaults with KAB/EW/smoke) to all frontline units. Advise tactical-level commanders to adjust UAV TTPs for GPS-denied environments (e.g., increased reliance on inertial navigation, pre-plotted routes, and visual navigation).
3. TARGETING: Task long-range ISR and strike assets to monitor and develop targeting solutions for the identified logistical buildup behind the Bakhmut axis to disrupt the enemy's ability to sustain their offensive.
4. RESERVE POSTURE: Re-evaluate reserve force allocation in anticipation of a potential Russian attempt to fix units in other sectors. Maintain a mobile reserve capable of rapid counter-attack in the Chasiv Yar sector.

END REPORT