1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Russian Federation (RF) forces have escalated offensive operations to a new intensity in the Avdiivka sector, committing significant armored columns and air power in an attempt to achieve operational encirclement. Concurrently, Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) have successfully expanded the established bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River near Krynky, forcing RF command to divert resources and react to a new operational threat in the south.

2. CHANGES FROM PREVIOUS

• AVDIIVKA TACTICS (SIGNIFICANT ESCALATION): RF forces have shifted from smaller, infantry-led assaults to large-scale mechanized pushes involving multiple tank and BMP companies simultaneously. This represents a significant commitment of operational reserves.
• DNIPRO BRIDGEHEAD (NEW DEVELOPMENT): The UAF foothold on the Dnipro's eastern bank has been successfully expanded from a tenuous position to a more sustainable bridgehead, capable of repelling initial RF counter-attacks. This is a new and positive tactical development.
• RF AIR SUPPORT (INCREASED USE): There is a confirmed increase in the employment of FAB-500 glide bombs against UAF fortified positions in Avdiivka, indicating a higher prioritization of this axis by the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS).

3. THREAT ASSESSMENT

• GROUND (HIGH): The appearance of T-90M tanks in the Avdiivka sector signals the commitment of premier RF armored assets. The concentration of RF forces presents a significant risk of a localized breakthrough if defensive lines are breached.
• AIR (HIGH): The combination of heavy glide bomb usage in the east and the persistent threat of Lancet loitering munitions against UAF river-crossing equipment in the south presents a multi-faceted and severe air threat.
• ELECTRONIC WARFARE (HIGH): RF EW systems are heavily active along the Avdiivka front, degrading UAF drone ISR and tactical communications. This capability is expected to be deployed to counter UAF operations around the Krynky bridgehead.
• NAVAL / LONG-RANGE STRIKE (MEDIUM-HIGH): Increased RF naval activity observed at the Novorossiysk port is assessed as preparation for a potential coordinated Kalibr cruise missile strike within the next 48-72 hours.

4. OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

• AVDIIVKA AXIS:

  • CONFIRMED: Multiple, simultaneous RF assaults have been directed at UAF positions near Stepove and the Avdiivka Coke Plant. The primary objective is severing the main UAF ground line of communication (GLOC) into the city.
  • ASSESSMENT: UAF defensive units are holding their positions but are under extreme pressure. Attrition rates for both personnel and equipment are reported as very high on both sides. The tactical situation remains fluid and contested.

• DNIPRO RIVER AXIS (KHERSON OBLAST):

  • CONFIRMED: UAF marine units have expanded their controlled area near Krynky on the eastern bank, repelling several platoon-to-company-sized RF counter-attacks over the last 24 hours.
  • ASSESSMENT (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): Initial RF responses appear poorly coordinated, with intelligence suggesting elements of the 22nd Army Corps are suffering from low morale and command friction. RF forces are attempting to contain the bridgehead primarily with artillery and airstrikes while attempting to organize a more coherent ground response.

5. INTELLIGENCE GAPS

• What is the true rate of RF armored vehicle attrition in the Avdiivka sector, and what is their remaining capacity to generate new mechanized assault groups from operational reserves?
• What is the specific composition, readiness, and timeline for the arrival of RF reinforcements being re-deployed to the Krynky sector?
• What are the priority targets for the anticipated RF long-range strike originating from the Black Sea? (Command and Control nodes, logistics hubs, or energy infrastructure).

6. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (24-48 HOURS)

• AVDIIVKA AXIS (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF command will continue to commit forces to high-tempo assaults on Avdiivka, accepting significant losses to maintain pressure and achieve a politically significant victory. The primary effort will remain focused on cutting the main supply route.
• KRYNKY AXIS (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): RF forces will escalate their use of massed indirect fire (artillery, MLRS) and airstrikes to suppress and eliminate the UAF bridgehead. A larger, more coordinated ground counter-attack is likely being prepared but may not be executed effectively within the next 48 hours.
• DEEP STRIKE (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): There is a realistic probability of a large-scale missile and drone strike on Ukrainian strategic targets within the next 48 hours, synchronized to create maximum operational and psychological impact alongside the Avdiivka offensive.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

• PRIORITY 1 (AVDIIVKA): Immediately surge ATGM, MANPADS, FPV drones, and counter-drone systems to units defending the Avdiivka salient. Task all available ISR assets to identify and target RF follow-on echelons and artillery positions in the rear.
• PRIORITY 2 (KRYNKY): Reinforce the Dnipro bridgehead with robust EW suites, short-range air defense (SHORAD), and counter-battery radars to mitigate RF fire superiority. Pre-position combat engineering and medical evacuation (CASEVAC) assets to ensure the bridgehead's sustainability.
• PRIORITY 3 (NATIONWIDE): Place all air defense units on high alert. Direct command elements to review dispersal and hardening protocols for critical infrastructure and C2 nodes in anticipation of a potential RF deep strike. Task SIGINT/IMINT to provide immediate warning of missile preparations and launches from the Black Sea Fleet.

END REPORT