1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Russian Forces (RF) have intensified coordinated ground and air assaults on the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk axis, leveraging newly deployed TOS-2 thermobaric systems to breach fortified Ukrainian positions. (NEW) A significant increase in sophisticated electronic warfare (EW) activity has been confirmed in the Robotyne sector, aimed at degrading Ukrainian drone command and control. (CHANGED) These developments indicate a shift towards more technologically advanced and brutal tactics to achieve a breakthrough before the spring thaw impacts ground mobility.

2. CHANGES FROM PREVIOUS REPORT

• Axis of Main Effort: The Avdiivka-Pokrovsk axis has surpassed Bakhmut as the primary focus of RF offensive operations, evidenced by the commitment of elite VDV airborne units and advanced fire support assets.
• Enemy Capabilities:
  • CONFIRMED: First operational deployment of the TOS-2 "Tosochka" Heavy Flamethrower System in the Avdiivka sector. This represents a significant escalation in firepower against entrenched forces.
  • CONFIRMED: Deployment of the Shipovnik-Aero EW complex near Robotyne, a more advanced system than previously observed in this sector, capable of sophisticated GPS spoofing and C2 jamming.
• Tactical Posture: RF forces have transitioned from probing attacks to coordinated, multi-pronged assaults in the Avdiivka sector, employing a mix of mechanized infantry, VDV paratroopers, and heavy artillery. This is a marked increase in operational tempo and complexity compared to the previous 72-hour period.
• Logistics: HUMINT confirms the arrival of two dedicated ammunition trains at the Donetsk railhead, specifically noted to be carrying thermobaric and large-caliber artillery rounds, corroborating the intensified fire missions.

3. THREAT ASSESSMENT

• Conventional Attack: Threat Level: SEVERE (Increased). The combined-arms assault on the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk axis, now augmented with TOS-2 systems, presents a critical threat to the stability of the defensive line. The use of VDV elements suggests an intent to rapidly exploit any breach. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Air/Missile Attack: Threat Level: HIGH (Sustained). The use of glide bombs (UMPKs) continues unabated, now more effectively guided by improved reconnaissance drones. The primary risk is to frontline command posts and logistics nodes just behind the FLOT (Forward Line of Own Troops). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Electronic Warfare: Threat Level: HIGH (Increased). The deployment of Shipovnik-Aero EW systems near Robotyne poses a severe and immediate threat to all Ukrainian drone operations (reconnaissance and FPV) within a 10-15km radius. Expect significant loss of ISR and strike capability in this sector. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE on precise effective range)
• Emerging Risks: The concentration of elite units (VDV) and specialized assets (TOS-2) in a single sector suggests RF command has accepted greater risk elsewhere along the front, potentially creating windows of opportunity for Ukrainian counter-offensive actions in less-defended areas.

4. OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

• AVDIIVKA-POKROVSK AXIS:
  • RF forces, spearheaded by elements of the 76th Guards Air Assault Division (VDV), launched three major ground assaults on Ukrainian positions west of Avdiivka over the last 24 hours.
  • CONFIRMED: At least one assault was preceded by a massive barrage from TOS-2 thermobaric systems, resulting in the temporary collapse of a fortified company position before Ukrainian reserves stabilized the line.
  • IMINT shows a significant concentration of RF armored vehicles (T-90M, BMP-3) in staging areas 5-10km from the line of contact, indicating follow-on forces are prepared to exploit a breakthrough.
• ROBOTYNE SECTOR (ZAPORIZHZHIA):
  • Ukrainian drone operators reported a sudden and sharp increase in signal loss and GPS navigation failures, consistent with the activation of the Shipovnik-Aero EW system. At least 12 FPV strike missions were aborted and 4 reconnaissance drones lost.
  • RF ground activity remains limited to small-unit probes, likely intended to fix Ukrainian defenders in place while the EW system degrades local situational awareness.
• BAKHMUT AXIS:
  • RF operational tempo has noticeably decreased. Engagements are limited to artillery duels and small-scale infantry skirmishes. This is assessed as an economy of force measure to support the main effort on the Avdiivka axis. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
• KHARKIV AXIS:
  • No significant changes reported. RF posture remains defensive.

5. INTELLIGENCE GAPS

• What is the specific trigger for the commitment of second-echelon forces staged behind the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk axis?
• What is the current resupply status of Ukrainian units experiencing intense TOS-2 bombardments?
• What countermeasures, if any, are proving effective against the Shipovnik-Aero EW system? Need urgent feedback from frontline units.
• What is the precise location and disposition of RF command and control nodes for the VDV elements near Avdiivka?

6. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (24-48 HOUR FORECAST)

• Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): RF forces will continue to press the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk axis, using TOS-2 systems to systematically reduce Ukrainian strongpoints before committing armored reserves to achieve a deep penetration towards Pokrovsk. The EW bubble over Robotyne will be maintained to prevent Ukrainian ISR from observing RF movements or staging flanking attacks. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): RF forces could use the EW suppression in the Robotyne sector as a screen for a surprise local offensive, aiming to recapture lost ground while Ukrainian attention and reserves are fixed on Avdiivka. (LOW CONFIDENCE, but high impact)

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

• Action: Immediately re-task all available ISR assets (satellite, long-range UAV) to the Avdiivka-Pokrovsk axis to identify and target RF second-echelon forces and TOS-2 launch locations. Priority for HIMARS/GMLRS fires.
• Action: Disseminate technical intelligence on the Shipovnik-Aero EW system to all frontline drone units in the Zaporizhzhia sector. Advise immediate adoption of modified flight protocols, including reduced reliance on GPS and use of pre-planned, non-linear flight paths.
• Action: Prepare mobile counter-attack forces to respond to a potential RF breakthrough west of Avdiivka. Pre-position anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) teams along likely avenues of armored advance.
• Consideration: Evaluate feasibility of a limited, spoiling attack on a deprioritized sector (e.g., Bakhmut flank) to force RF to divert resources away from their main effort.

END REPORT