1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Russian (RU) forces have significantly escalated preparations for a renewed offensive along the Svatove-Kreminna axis, concentrating at least three Motor Rifle Regiments and deploying advanced Electronic Warfare (EW) systems. This shift in posture, combined with a change in EW tactics from broad jamming to creating localized "bubbles" to protect assault groups, indicates an offensive is likely within the next 24-48 hours. Ukrainian Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) effectiveness is being actively degraded in this sector, requiring immediate tactical adjustment.

2. CHANGES FROM PREVIOUS REPORT

• NEW - Force Concentration (Svatove): Confirmed presence of elements from at least three RU Motor Rifle Regiments (MRR) consolidating west of Svatove. This represents a significant increase in combat power in this sector compared to the screening forces observed previously. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
• CHANGED - EW Tactics: RU forces have shifted from broad-area, continuous jamming to a more dynamic, localized employment of EW systems. These systems are now creating protective "EW bubbles" over advancing assault groups, primarily targeting UAS C2 and GPS links. This is a marked evolution from the static defense posture of the last 72 hours. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• NEW - Probing Attacks (Kreminna): RU forces, including VDV and BARS-13 elements, have initiated multiple company-sized probing attacks and assaults southwest of Kreminna. These are more coordinated and better supported than previous reconnaissance-in-force actions.

3. THREAT ASSESSMENT

• PRIMARY THREAT: A large-scale RU offensive operation aimed at seizing Ukrainian positions west of the Svatove-Kreminna line. The concentration of forces and new tactical approaches elevates the threat level in this sector to SEVERE.
• EW THREAT: The deployment of advanced RU EW systems (e.g., Shipovnik-Aero) poses a HIGH risk to all UAS operations within a 10-15km radius of the line of contact, particularly in the Kreminna sector. This will significantly impact Ukrainian ISR and fire-control capabilities.
• EMERGING RISK: The use of localized EW bubbles suggests RU forces may attempt to achieve tactical surprise by masking the final assembly and direction of their main assault, bypassing heavily monitored areas.

4. OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

• Svatove-Kreminna Axis:
  • Force Composition: The primary RU grouping consists of elements from the 144th Motor Rifle Division, reinforced by VDV and BARS (Combat Army Reserve) detachments. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
  • Tactics: RU forces are conducting reconnaissance-in-force and probing attacks under the cover of localized EW, followed by artillery preparation. Engagements near Chervonopopivka and Zhytlivka confirm this TTP (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures).
  • Logistics: Increased movement of logistical convoys carrying fuel and ammunition has been observed moving west from Starobilsk towards the Svatove front. This indicates sustainment preparations for offensive operations. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
• Bakhmut Axis: No significant changes reported. RU forces continue attritional assaults with minimal gains, likely serving as a fixing operation to prevent the redeployment of Ukrainian assets to the northern front.
• Zaporizhzhia/Southern Axis: No substantial new information. RU forces remain in a defensive posture.

5. INTELLIGENCE GAPS

• Commander's Intent: The precise timing and primary axis of the anticipated main RU assault remain unclear.
• EW Capabilities: The full extent and specific capabilities of the newly deployed RU EW systems are not fully understood. It is unknown if they can effectively target encrypted military communication systems in addition to UAS links.
• Reserve Forces: The location and readiness of RU operational reserves behind the front line are not confirmed. We lack intelligence on what forces are being held to exploit a potential breakthrough.

6. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

• Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA) (HIGH CONFIDENCE): Within the next 24-48 hours, RU forces will launch a multi-pronged ground offensive along the Svatove-Kreminna line. The main effort will likely target the seam between Ukrainian units defending the P-66 highway, with supporting efforts from the Kreminna area. The objective will be to seize key terrain and disrupt Ukrainian defensive cohesion, forcing a tactical withdrawal.
• Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA) (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): The Svatove offensive is a feint designed to draw in Ukrainian reserves. The main RU effort will subsequently be launched in an unexpected sector, potentially further south towards Lyman, exploiting the redeployment of Ukrainian defenders. The sophisticated EW employment could be used to mask this larger maneuver.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Action: Immediately increase ISR coverage (especially SIGINT and counter-EW assets) on the Svatove front to identify the main RU assault axis and pinpoint EW system locations for targeting.
2. Action: Disperse UAS launch/recovery sites and utilize alternative, non-GPS-dependent navigation methods and communication frequencies where possible. Task UAS operators to identify the edges of EW "bubbles" to enable flanking ISR missions.
3. Action: Alert frontline units to the updated RU TTPs (EW-protected assaults). Pre-sight artillery and mortar targets on likely enemy assembly areas and avenues of approach identified via recent probing attacks.
4. Consider: Hold mobile reserves in readiness to counter-attack a potential RU breakthrough, but do not commit them prematurely until the main axis of the RU offensive is definitively identified.

END OF REPORT