SUBJECT: DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY – 2025-11-23 16:30:00Z

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) OPERATIONAL CRISIS: The situation on the Pokrovsk Axis has reached a critical failure point following the delayed execution of reserve deployment "Plan 7-B," leaving the forward defense at Rodynske vulnerable to immediate envelopment. Synchronized with this tactical breakdown, the Russian Federation (RF) has launched a sophisticated Information Operation (IO) claiming a "Geneva Peace Framework" to induce command hesitation, while simultaneously prepping a massive ballistic missile strike expected No Later Than (NLT) 240000Z. SAR imagery indicates a shift in activity from logistics nodes to the 1st Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment, suggesting RF is actively posturing Air Defense (AD) to cover the imminent offensive culmination.

2. CHANGES FROM PREVIOUS REPORT

• Operational Status (DOWNGRADE): The Pokrovsk sector status has degraded from "Active Exploitation" to "Operational Crisis" due to the confirmed failure/delay of Plan 7-B. The critical terrain has shifted from Mirnohrad outskirts to the Rodynske junction.
• IO Vector (SHIFT): The primary cognitive threat has shifted from general internal friction (Odesa TCC aftermath) to a specific, high-level diplomatic deception campaign regarding a fake "Geneva Peace Framework," timed to paralyze National Command Authority (NCA) decision-making.
• Secondary Axis (NEW): A confirmed RF flanking maneuver is underway west of Stepnohirsk (Zaporizhzhia front), creating a dilemma for reserve allocation previously focused solely on Pokrovsk.
• SAR Indicators (UPDATED): Unlike previous reports focusing on the 2652th GRAU arsenal, new SAR data highlights rising activity at the 1st Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (Score 6.71 - RISING) and 1545th Guards Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment, indicating RF force protection escalation likely to cover the ballistic launch window.
• Strike Timeline (SPECIFIC): Intelligence now provides a hard timeline for the anticipated ballistic strike: NLT 240000Z (Nov 24, 00:00), moving from "imminent" to a specific tactical window.

3. THREAT ASSESSMENT

• Pokrovsk GLOC Severance (THREAT LEVEL: CRITICAL): The M-30/T-05-15 Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) facing physical severance at Rodynske within 6 hours. RF Close Air Support (CAS) is active over Varvarovka, facilitating this interdiction. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Strategic Missile Strike (THREAT LEVEL: CRITICAL): Dempster-Shafer analysis (Belief 0.59) and signals intelligence confirm the strike package is active. The failure of UAF AD to intercept a probing Iskander-M (0/1 intercept rate reported 220703Z) indicates extreme vulnerability in the Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia C2 sector. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Cognitive Paralysis (THREAT LEVEL: HIGH): The synchronization of the "Geneva Peace Plan" narrative with the kinetic strike is designed to force the NCA into crisis management rather than military command, delaying the authorization of Plan 7-B MOD. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

4. OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

• Pokrovsk Axis: RF 40th/155th Separate Marine Brigades (OMBR) are exploiting the reserve vacuum. RF Aviation (11th Guards Army VVS/PVO) is conducting airstrikes on Varvarovka to cover the advance on Rodynske.
• Zaporizhzhia Front: Confirmed RF maneuver to bypass Stepnohirsk from the west. This effectively fixes UAF Southern reserves, preventing their redeployment to Pokrovsk.
• UAF Tactical Success: Elements of the 38th Separate Marine Brigade successfully utilized FPV drones to counter RF light vehicle patrols, proving tactical viability despite the operational crisis.
• Deep Rear: Air raid alerts in Zaporizhzhia city have lifted (15:24Z), likely a tactical pause to re-arm or reposition for the NLT 240000Z ballistic wave.

5. INTELLIGENCE GAPS

• PRIORITY 1 (IMMEDIATE): Rodynske Penetration Depth. Real-time location of RF Spetsnaz (SpN) elements relative to the M-30 GLOC is required to plot safe corridors for the "Plan 7-B MOD" counter-move.
• PRIORITY 2 (IO): Source of "Geneva" Leak. Identification of the specific diplomatic channel or OSINT vector used to seed the fake peace plan is needed to issue a credible denial.
• PRIORITY 3 (BDA): C2 Node Status. Confirmation of damage to the C2 node struck by the un-intercepted Iskander-M (220703Z) in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

6. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (NEXT 6-24 HOURS)

• MLCOA (GLOC Severance & Strike): (HIGH CONFIDENCE) Within 6 hours, RF forces will physically interdict the M-30 GLOC near Rodynske. Between 22:00Z and 24:00Z, the RF will launch the massed ballistic strike (Iskander/KN-23) targeting UAF C2 hubs in Dnipropetrovsk to prevent the coordination of the "Plan 7-B MOD" relief force.
• MDCOA (Operational Collapse): (MEDIUM-HIGH CONFIDENCE) The delay in authorizing Plan 7-B MOD allows 40th OMBR to encircle UAF forward units at Rodynske. The NCA, distracted by the "Peace Plan" IO, fails to authorize GLOC clearing operations. The ballistic strike successfully decapitates the J-FIRE (Joint Fires) coordination center, resulting in a rout on the Pokrovsk axis.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Maneuver Execution (IMMEDIATE - J3): AUTHORIZE PLAN 7-B MOD. Bypass the contested Rodynske junction. Operational Command must accept high risk during transit to establish a secondary defensive line. Do not wait for perfect security; speed is the only remaining variable.
2. Strategic Communications (URGENT - STRATCOM): Issue an immediate, top-level denial of the "Geneva Peace Framework." Frame it explicitly as "Enemy deception to cover the bombardment of Ukrainian cities." This must be released before the missile strike lands to inoculate the information space.
3. Air Defense Re-Tasking (CRITICAL - Air Force): Based on the Iskander penetration and rising SAR activity at RF 1st AA Regt (indicating offensive cover), shift all Patriot/SAMP-T batteries to Anti-Ballistic Mode immediately. Ignore Shahed/Geran drones; conserve high-value interceptors solely for the NLT 240000Z ballistic wave.
4. Southern Flank Security (J3): Deploy a reinforced company tactical group to the western approach of Stepnohirsk. This must be drawn from local reserves, not the Pokrovsk relief force.

//END OF REPORT//