SUBJECT: DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY – 181900Z NOV 25

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) CRITICAL NEW DEVELOPMENT: The Russian Federation (RF) has committed the 40th Separate Marine Brigade (OMBR) to the Pokrovsk axis, reinforcing the 155th OMBR. This major conventional escalation is synchronized with an imminent (0-8 hours) threat of Spetsnaz (SpN) interdiction against the sole remaining road supply line (GLOC) at Kostiantynivka. While general missile arsenal activity remains stable/falling, new SAR data indicates RISING activity at Air Bases Monchegorsk and Pskov, suggesting a potential divergence in threat vectors or localized reconstitution not previously tracked.

2. CHANGES FROM PREVIOUS REPORT

• Ground Force Disposition (SIGNIFICANT CHANGE): Unlike the previous reporting period which focused on the aftermath of the air campaign, the primary shift is now on the ground. The introduction of the 40th OMBR (Volodymyrivka–Sofiivka sector) indicates RF intent to transition from fixing operations to a breakthrough attempt, exploiting the logistical fragility caused by the rail severance.
• SpN Threat Timeline (STATUS CHANGE: PEAK WINDOW → IMMINENT): The threat of rear-area interdiction has moved from a general "peak window" to a specific, tactical timeline of 0-8 hours. Intelligence indicates SpN elements are positioned to strike.
• Strategic Strike Indicators (STATUS CHANGE: STABLE → MIXED): Previous assessment of "stable/falling" arsenal activity holds for GRAU sites (e.g., '2652th' showing 0.00 score/falling), BUT SAR analysis now detects a RISING trend at AB Monchegorsk (Score 8.49) and AB Pskov (Score 12.96). This contradicts the assessment of a total pause in aerial threat generation.
• IO/Diplomatic Context (NEW): A new Information Operation (IO) vector has emerged involving alleged sabotage in Poland. RF is amplifying these claims to potentially slow cross-border logistics, creating a "strategic delay" to compound the tactical logistics crisis.

3. THREAT ASSESSMENT

• GLOC Interdiction (THREAT LEVEL: CRITICAL - IMMEDIATE): The Kostiantynivka–Pokrovsk road corridor is the operational center of gravity. With the rail line confirmed severed, any road closure >4 hours due to SpN ambush or IEDs creates immediate ammunition starvation at the front. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Ground Breakthrough (THREAT LEVEL: HIGH - RISING): The combination of the 155th and newly committed 40th OMBR creates a localized force superiority capable of overwhelming UAF defenders if resupply is interdicted. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Aerial Strike (THREAT LEVEL: LOW-MEDIUM): While a mass missile strike remains unlikely in the next 24 hours, the rising activity at northern air bases (Monchegorsk/Pskov) suggests a potential buildup for future operations or smaller, targeted sorties. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

4. OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

• Logistics Crisis: The J4 situation is critical. UAF is fully dependent on road convoys. The lack of a technical BDA (Battle Damage Assessment) for the Kamyan’ske rail hub continues to paralyze long-term contingency planning.
• Northern Sector Defense: UAF successfully repelled 7 assaults in the Kursk and North Slobozhansky directions, confirming RF efforts to fix UAF reserves away from the critical Donbas sector.
• Deep Strike Success: UAF "Shadow Unit" confirmed destruction of RF armor and artillery, maintaining tactical morale despite the logistics squeeze.
• Rear Area Security: Operation IRON CLAW (convoy escorts) is active, but current force density is assessed as insufficient against the estimated SpN infiltration levels.

5. INTELLIGENCE GAPS

• PRIORITY 1 (NEW - HIGH): 40th OMBR Disposition. Precise OOB, specific operational objectives, and integration level with the 155th OMBR. Is this a relief-in-place or a massing of forces?
• PRIORITY 2 (CRITICAL - PERSISTENT): Kamyan’ske Rail BDA/ETR. Still no definitive engineering assessment on the time-to-repair for the rail hub. This gap is becoming operationally negligent.
• PRIORITY 3 (REFINED): Northern Air Base Activity. Determine the specific nature of the "Rising" activity at AB Monchegorsk and Pskov (aircraft staging vs. cargo loading) to distinguish between strike prep and logistics movement.

6. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (NEXT 24-48 HOURS)

• MLCOA (Synchronized Strangulation): (HIGH CONFIDENCE) Within 8 hours, RF SpN will execute a complex ambush on a key logistics convoy near Kostiantynivka to halt road traffic. Simultaneously, the 40th and 155th OMBR will launch high-intensity assaults on the Pokrovsk axis, timing the attack to coincide with the expected ammunition dip at the front lines.
• MDCOA (Operational Collapse): (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) The SpN interdiction successfully closes the road for >18 hours. UAF forward units, lacking resupply, are forced into a disorganized withdrawal. RF mechanized units exploit the retreat, achieving a penetration depth of >5km and compromising secondary defensive lines.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. ROE Change to "Hunter-Killer" (IMMEDIATE - J3): Escalate Operation VIPER HUNT. Transition SOF/security elements in the rear area from passive convoy escort to active "Hunter-Killer" operations. Use thermal/UAS assets to preemptively engage detected signatures in the Kostiantynivka corridor. Defensive posture is no longer viable.
2. Forward Logistics Caching (IMMEDIATE - J4): Direct the immediate pre-positioning of 36-hour emergency stocks (Fuel/155mm) to hardened caches forward of the vulnerable road choke points. This buffers against the MLCOA of temporary road closure.
3. Targeted ISR Redirection (IMMEDIATE - J2): Task SAR and SIGINT assets specifically against AB Monchegorsk and Pskov to characterize the anomalous rising activity.
4. Diplomatic/IO Counter-Action (URGENT - J2/STRATCOM): Provide evidence to Polish liaisons to counter the RF "sabotage" narrative and prevent border processing delays.

//END OF REPORT//