DTG: 131300Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 121300Z NOV 25 – 131300Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: Intelligence Summary - Confirmed RF Strike Reconstitution and Active SpN Threat

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) The RF Spetsnaz (SpN) threat to road-based Ground Lines of Communication (GLOCs) in the Kostiantynivka sector has transitioned from an anticipated to an active kinetic threat, requiring immediate counter-infiltration operations. NEW satellite intelligence (IMINT) confirms a massive spike in activity at key RF GRAU missile arsenals, indicating rapid reconstitution for follow-on long-range strikes is underway. A NEW strategic agreement with the EU for military funding provides critical long-term resource assurance for UAF.

2. CHANGES FROM PREVIOUS

• RF Strike Reconstitution (STATUS CHANGE: ASSESSED → CONFIRMED): NEW: SAR intelligence confirms a significant and anomalous increase in activity at two key RF strategic depots: 'Missile Arsenal' (change score: 42.93, delta +32.20 vs 7-day avg) and the '2652th Artillery Armament Base' (change score: 25.25, delta +11.51 vs 30-day avg). This provides CONFIRMED evidence that RF is actively and rapidly reconstituting long-range strike packages, validating previous assessments and shortening the timeline for the next wave. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• SpN Threat Status (STATUS CHANGE: IMMINENT → ACTIVE): The threat of RF SpN action in the Kostiantynivka-Myrnohrad sector is no longer predictive. It is assessed as an ACTIVE and ongoing operation intended to kinetically exploit the logistical vulnerability created by the Kamyan'ske rail interdiction. The window for preemption has closed; the operational focus must be on mitigation and destruction of these elements. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Strategic Sustainment (NEW DEVELOPMENT): The EU Council and Parliament have formally agreed to redirect civilian funds for military aid and support Ukraine's accession to the European Defence Fund. This represents a new, major strategic development that ensures long-term military-financial support. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• RF Air Defense Posture (NEW INDICATOR): NEW: SAR data indicates a rising activity trend at locations associated with the RF '1st Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment'. This may indicate redeployment to protect high-value assets (e.g., GRAU depots) from UAF deep strikes or preparation to provide cover for offensive operations. (LOW CONFIDENCE)

3. THREAT ASSESSMENT

• RF Follow-on Strikes (THREAT LEVEL: HIGH → CRITICAL): The threat of a large-scale follow-on strike is elevated to CRITICAL. Confirmed IMINT of surge activity at GRAU arsenals indicates that both the capability and intent exist for another massed strike within a compressed timeline (est. 48-72 hours). These strikes will likely target UAF logistics transloading points, C2 nodes, or energy infrastructure. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• RF SpN Kinetic Action (THREAT LEVEL: CRITICAL - UNCHANGED but ACTIVE): The threat from RF SpN groups remains the most immediate danger to the operational viability of the Pokrovsk salient. With road GLOCs now the sole supply artery, any successful interdiction by these groups will have a decisive and immediate impact on frontline combat effectiveness. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• RF Information Operations (THREAT LEVEL: MEDIUM - PERSISTENT): NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE. RF IO continues to amplify UAF casualties and display captured equipment to degrade morale, synchronized with kinetic effects.

4. OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

• Intelligence Domain (NEW): Successful exploitation of SAR imagery has provided actionable intelligence on RF’s strategic reconstitution efforts. This allows for proactive threat assessment and potential preemptive targeting of RF logistics hubs.
• Strategic Domain (NEW): A major diplomatic success has been achieved with the EU agreement on military funding. This provides a strategic counter-narrative to RF efforts and guarantees critical resource flow, enhancing operational endurance.
• Ground/Air Domains: NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE. UAF Air Defense effectiveness remains high but strategically insufficient to prevent key strikes. UAF ground units (79th DShV) continue to demonstrate high tactical proficiency in close-quarters combat on the Pokrovsk axis.

5. INTELLIGENCE GAPS

• PRIORITY 1 (CRITICAL - UNCHANGED/URGENT): Determine the OOB, C2 structure, infiltration routes, and specific targeting plan for RF SpN elements currently active in the Kostiantynivka-Myrnohrad sector.
• PRIORITY 2 (CRITICAL - UNCHANGED/URGENT): Obtain a definitive BDA and Estimated Time to Repair (ETR) for the Kamyan’ske railway station to inform J4 sustainment planning for the winter period.
• PRIORITY 3 (HIGH - REFINED): Based on confirmed high activity at GRAU arsenals, what is the estimated timeline (in hours) until RF can generate and launch the next massed UAV/missile strike wave?

6. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (NEXT 24-48 HOURS)

• MOST LIKELY COA (Active GLOC Interdiction & Strike Preparation): (VERY HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF SpN elements will execute multiple kinetic attacks (ambush, IEDs, FPV drone strikes) against UAF logistics convoys and temporary depots along the Kamyan’ske road bypass. Concurrently, RF will complete strike package reconstitution and positioning of launch platforms for a follow-on strike wave to be executed within 48-72 hours, targeting the logistics chain SpN actions are designed to expose.
• MOST DANGEROUS COA (Synchronized Operational Collapse): (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) UNCHANGED. Successful SpN interdiction of road GLOCs (halting supply >18 hours) is synchronized with a renewed high-intensity RF ground assault at Pokrovsk. The resulting logistics starvation forces a disorderly UAF withdrawal, creating an operational breach RF can exploit.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Initiate Dynamic Targeting (IMMEDIATE - J2/J3 Fires): NEW: Task long-range ISR and strike assets to immediately develop and prosecute targeting solutions for the 'Missile Arsenal' and '2652th Artillery Armament Base' exhibiting anomalous SAR activity. A preemptive strike offers a high-payoff opportunity to disrupt or delay the next RF massed attack.
2. Maintain Operation IRON CLAW (ONGOING - J4/J3): REITERATED/URGENT: The requirement for mandatory armored escort and dedicated overhead ISR for all logistics convoys in the Kostiantynivka sector remains absolute. No convoys move without these measures.
3. Execute VIPER HUNT (ONGOING - J3/GUR): REITERATED/URGENT: All available SOF, C-UAS, and SIGINT assets must remain surged in the Kostiantynivka sector with the primary mission to hunt and destroy active RF SpN cells.
4. Confirm Phased Withdrawal Plans (URGENT - J3): REITERATED/URGENT: Direct commanders on the Pokrovsk axis to confirm and rehearse phased withdrawal plans as a prudent measure against the high-impact MDCOA.

//END OF REPORT//