DTG: 171300Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 161300Z NOV 25 – 171300Z NOV 25 SUBJECT: Intelligence Summary - CRITICAL: RF Strike Executed, Threat Shifts to SpN Exploitation of Confirmed GLOC Severance

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) NEW: The Russian Federation (RF) executed the predicted large-scale strike, expending over 100 UAVs in a saturation attack which UAF successfully countered. NEW: SAR intelligence indicates a subsequent decrease in activity at key GRAU arsenals, lowering the immediate threat of a follow-on massed strike and shifting the paramount threat to RF Spetsnaz (SpN) exploitation of the now-confirmed severed rail line at Zaporizhzhia-Kamyan’ske.

2. CHANGES FROM PREVIOUS

• RF Strike Posture (STATUS CHANGE: IMMINENT STRIKE → STRIKE EXECUTED/RECONSTITUTION PAUSED): The massed strike anticipated in the previous report has occurred. UAF Air Force confirms neutralizing 108 UAVs. This represents a significant expenditure of RF assets. CRITICAL CHANGE: Contrary to yesterday's assessment of accelerated reconstitution, new SAR data shows STABLE or FALLING activity at monitored arsenals. The immediate reconstitution effort appears to have culminated with this strike. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Zaporizhzhia-Kamyan’ske Rail Interdiction (STATUS CHANGE: ASSESSED → CONFIRMED): The strike on the critical rail hub is now officially confirmed by the CEO of Ukrainian Railways (UZ). The logistical crisis is a confirmed operational reality. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• RF Air Defense Posture (STATUS CHANGE: RISING → STABLE/FALLING): Yesterday’s identified threat of AD hardening, specifically from the 183rd Guards AD Regiment, is not corroborated by today’s SAR data. Activity at monitored AD sites is generally stable or falling, suggesting the hardening effort has plateaued for now. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
• NEW Strategic Development: The EU Council has formally agreed to redirect civilian funds for military aid and support Ukraine's accession to the European Defence Fund. This provides a significant long-term strategic advantage for UAF sustainment and force generation. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

3. THREAT ASSESSMENT

• RF SpN Kinetic Action (THREAT LEVEL: PARAMOUNT - UNCHANGED/INCREASED URGENCY): This remains the primary and most time-sensitive tactical threat. With the Kamyan’ske rail GLOC confirmed severed, UAF is entirely dependent on vulnerable road transport. The operational window for RF SpN elements in the Kostiantynivka sector to interdict these convoys and achieve operational paralysis is at its peak. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• RF Follow-on Strikes (THREAT LEVEL: HIGH → MEDIUM-LOW): This is a significant downgrade from the previous report. The expenditure of >100 UAVs and the lack of SAR indicators for immediate reloading/reconstitution at key arsenals significantly lowers the probability of another massed missile/UAV strike within the next 24-48 hours. The threat of smaller, opportunistic strikes remains. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
• RF ISR Exploitation (THREAT LEVEL: MEDIUM → HIGH): The threat of RF UAS conducting Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) over Kamyan’ske and actively identifying UAF contingency logistics hubs and transloading points for future targeting is now assessed as HIGH. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

4. OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

• Air Defense Domain: UAF AD forces achieved a major tactical success, neutralizing 108 RF UAVs in a single reporting period. This action successfully defended against a large-scale saturation attack but represents a significant expenditure of friendly AD interceptors.
• Logistics Domain: The severance of the primary rail GLOC at Kamyan’ske is confirmed, forcing a full dependency on road convoys through the Kostiantynivka operational rear. This has placed extreme stress on J4 planning and force protection assets.
• Friendly Losses: Reports confirm 8 fatalities within the 35th Marine Brigade resulting from a separate RF strike in the Dnipropetrovsk area.
• Ground Domain: RF forces continue to apply high-tempo pressure on the Pokrovsk axis to fix UAF defenders and exploit the ongoing logistics crisis.

5. INTELLIGENCE GAPS

• PRIORITY 1 (CRITICAL - UNCHANGED): Determine OOB, C2 structure, and specific targeting plans for RF SpN elements in the Kostiantynivka-Myrnohrad sector. The urgency of this requirement has increased.
• PRIORITY 2 (CRITICAL - UNCHANGED): Obtain definitive BDA and Estimated Time to Repair (ETR) for the Kamyan’ske railway station. The continued absence of this data is severely degrading operational and logistical planning.
• PRIORITY 3 (HIGH - NEW): Assess RF long-range strike asset inventory (specifically Shahed-type UAVs) following the mass expenditure. Task collection against the '2652th' and '70th' arsenals to confirm their current low activity status and establish a baseline for identifying the start of the next reconstitution cycle.

6. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (NEXT 24-48 HOURS)

• MOST LIKELY COA (SpN Exploitation): (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF SpN elements will execute kinetic attacks (ambush, IED, FPV strikes) on UAF logistics convoys along the Kostiantynivka road bypass within 24 hours to maximize disruption. Concurrently, RF ISR assets will conduct reconnaissance of the Kamyan’ske area to finalize BDA and identify new logistics targets (transloading points, repair crews). High-tempo ground assaults at Pokrovsk will continue unabated.
• MOST DANGEROUS COA (Operational Paralysis): (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) The probability of this COA remains. A successful SpN interdiction of the road GLOCs is no longer dependent on a follow-on air strike to be decisive. An attack that halts road traffic for >18 hours could, by itself, create a logistics failure severe enough to trigger a forced, non-tactical withdrawal from forward positions at Pokrovsk.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Reiterate and Enforce Operation IRON CLAW / VIPER HUNT (IMMEDIATE/CRITICAL - J3/J4/GUR): Re-issue standing orders with maximum urgency. All logistics convoys through the Kostiantynivka sector MUST proceed with mandatory armored escort and dedicated overhead ISR. Prioritize all available SOF and SIGINT assets to neutralize the SpN threat before it can act.
2. Task ISR for Post-Strike Analysis (IMMEDIATE - J2): Task all-source collection to determine RF strike inventory post-expenditure. Specifically task SAR/IMINT against the '2652th' and '70th' arsenals to confirm current activity levels. NEW: Add Air Base Monchegorsk to the collection plan due to a new RISING SAR trend.
3. Direct Contingency Planning (IMMEDIATE - J3/J5): Direct Brigade Commanders on the Pokrovsk front to finalize and rehearse pre-planned, phased withdrawal routes to alternative defensive lines. The risk of logistics failure is now a confirmed, high-probability event. Proactive planning is essential to prevent a tactical setback from becoming an operational collapse.
4. Escalate BDA Requirement (IMMEDIATE - J3 to J4/ENGINEERS): J3 must formally task J4/Engineers with a non-negotiable 4-hour deadline to provide a preliminary BDA and ETR for the Kamyan’ske rail hub. All further operational planning is contingent upon this data.

//END OF REPORT//