1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) The predicted large-scale RF Shahed saturation strike has occurred and was largely defeated by UAF Air Defense (AD). However, a concurrent NEW RF precision strike has successfully interdicted the critical Zaporizhzhia-Kamyan’ske railway station, severely degrading the primary GLOC to the Donbas front and shifting the operational crisis to logistics sustainment.

2. CHANGES FROM PREVIOUS

• RF Saturation Strike (EXECUTED): The imminent large-scale Shahed strike predicted in the last report has been executed. NEW: UAF Air Force reports neutralizing 108 enemy UAVs, indicating a massive RF expenditure was met with a highly effective UAF AD response.
• UAF Logistics Posture (CRITICALLY DEGRADED): The generalized threat of deep kinetic strikes has materialized into a significant operational setback. NEW: RF has successfully struck and disabled the Zaporizhzhia-Kamyan’ske railway station, a key logistics node. This shifts the immediate operational problem from rear-area security to GLOC crisis management.
• UAF Strategic Interdiction (ESCALATED): UAF has expanded its deep strike campaign beyond economic targets. NEW: A successful UAF UAS strike has been confirmed against the Kostroma GRES (power station) deep within RF territory, demonstrating an escalation in targeting CNI.
• Operational Environment (NEW FACTOR): A G3 level geomagnetic storm is now active. This will likely degrade precision guidance systems (e.g., KABs) and UAS command links for both sides, while also potentially degrading RF AD radar performance.
• Strategic Support (NEW DEVELOPMENT): The EU has formally agreed to redirect civilian funds for Ukrainian military needs and support Ukraine's accession to the European Defence Fund, providing a significant boost to long-term materiel and financial stability.

3. THREAT ASSESSMENT

• RF Infiltration in Operational Depth (THREAT LEVEL: CRITICAL - AMPLIFIED): (HIGH CONFIDENCE) The threat from RF просачивание groups in Kostiantynivka is now amplified. With the primary rail GLOC severed at Kamyan’ske, these groups are perfectly positioned to interdict the now-critical, high-traffic road-based resupply routes, creating a compound logistics crisis.
• RF Precision Strike Capability (THREAT LEVEL: HIGH - VALIDATED): (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF has demonstrated and validated its capability to successfully target and kinetically affect critical logistics chokepoints deep in the UAF rear. Follow-on strikes against identified logistics rerouting efforts or repair crews are highly likely.
• Attrition of UAF Elite Units (THREAT LEVEL: HIGH - CONTINUED): (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF continues to prioritize targeting of UAF high-value personnel, with RF IO amplifying claims of successful strikes against the 35th Marine Brigade. This indicates a sustained effort to degrade UAF's most effective units.

4. OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

• Ground Domain - Donetsk Oblast: (HIGH CONFIDENCE - NEW) The operational focus has shifted from the forward line of troops (FLOT) at Pokrovsk to the operational rear. The confirmed interdiction of the Kamyan’ske rail hub now forces UAF J4 to execute immediate and high-risk logistics rerouting via road networks that are directly threatened by previously identified RF infiltration groups in Kostiantynivka.
• Air/Strike Domain (RF): (HIGH CONFIDENCE - NEW) The massive RF UAV saturation strike has culminated. While largely unsuccessful in overwhelming AD, the key RF success was the precision kinetic strike on the Kamyan'ske rail station, validating the analysis that RF's primary objective is the logistical strangulation of the Donbas defense.
• Deep Strike Domain (UAF): (HIGH CONFIDENCE - NEW) UAF maintains strategic initiative, escalating its deep strike campaign with a successful attack on the Kostroma GRES. This action forces RF to re-evaluate AD priorities and demonstrates UAF's expanding operational reach.

5. INTELLIGENCE GAPS

• PRIORITY 1 (CRITICAL - UNCHANGED): Determine OOB, C2, and specific mission sets of RF просачивание groups in Kostiantynivka, now critical for securing road-based GLOCs.
• PRIORITY 2 (CRITICAL - NEW/REFINED): Quantify the operational impact of the Kamyan’ske rail strike. Require immediate IMINT/engineering assessment of damage and estimated time to repair (ETR) to inform logistics contingency planning.
• PRIORITY 3 (HIGH - NEW): Assess the status of RF's long-range precision munition inventory (Shahed, Iskander, etc.) following the recent high-volume expenditure to predict capacity for follow-on large-scale strikes.

6. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (NEXT 24-48 HOURS)

• MOST LIKELY COA (Exploitation of Logistics Disruption): (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will exploit the confirmed rail interdiction. Within the next 12 hours, RF infiltration groups in Kostiantynivka will execute ambushes and harassing attacks against UAF logistics convoys on the vital road-based bypasses. Simultaneously, RF ground forces will intensify pressure on the Pokrovsk front to fix UAF units and prevent them from stabilizing the rear-area logistics crisis.
• MOST DANGEROUS COA (Cascading Logistics Failure): (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) The damage at Kamyan’ske proves extensive (ETR > 72 hours). RF infiltration groups successfully interdict or destroy a major road-based convoy near Kostiantynivka, halting resupply of fuel and ammunition to the Pokrovsk front for over 24 hours. This logistics paralysis triggers a forced, non-tactical withdrawal from forward positions in Pokrovsk, creating a significant breach in the Donbas defensive line.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Initiate Operation IRON CLAW (Urgent J3/J4 Priority): Immediately implement a high-risk convoy protocol for all logistics movements through the Kostiantynivka operational area. Mandate armored escort (min. 2x IFV/APC per 5-vehicle convoy) and dedicated overhead FPV/ISR drone coverage to mitigate the amplified ambush threat against the new primary GLOC.
2. Task Contingency Planning for Pokrovsk (Urgent J3 Priority): Order Brigade Commanders on the Pokrovsk front to immediately finalize and rehearse pre-planned, phased withdrawal routes to secondary and tertiary defensive lines. This proactive measure mitigates the risk of a disorganized collapse should the MDCOA materialize.
3. Reprioritize C-UAS Assets (Urgent J2/EW Priority): Immediately re-task available mobile Counter-UAS EW systems to provide a protective bubble over critical C2 nodes and ammunition supply points (ASPs) in the Kostiantynivka-Pokrovsk area. This is to deny RF ISR drones the ability to provide targeting data for infiltration groups.

//END REPORT//