1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) The predicted large-scale Russian Federation (RF) strike on Ukrainian Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) has commenced, manifesting as a sustained, multi-axis kinetic pressure campaign utilizing NEW extended-range KAB glide bombs against deep strategic targets, including Odesa. (NEW - CRITICAL) Concurrently, RF forces are executing a battlefield isolation campaign, using FPV drones and artillery to interdict Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) reserves moving to reinforce the penetrated defensive lines at Pokrovsk. A new economic vulnerability has emerged with a significant devaluation of the Hryvnia, which RF is actively exploiting in the information domain.

2. CHANGES FROM PREVIOUS

• RF CNI Strike Posture (SHIFT FROM PREDICTED TO MANIFESTING): The anticipated large-scale missile salvo has evolved. (NEW) The current threat is a continuous, widespread campaign of ballistic missile alerts and KAB strikes across multiple axes (Sumy, Odesa), assessed as a shaping operation to saturate UAF Air Defense (AD) and identify vulnerabilities prior to a potential culminating strike.
• RF Aerial Strike Capability (NEW CAPABILITY DEMONSTRATED): (NEW) RF has successfully deployed extended-range KABs against Odesa Oblast. This represents a significant new capability, extending the threat envelope to strategic deep rear areas previously considered at lower risk from this munitions class.
• Pokrovsk Ground Situation (SHIFT FROM PENETRATION TO ISOLATION): Following the confirmed penetration of UAF defenses reported yesterday, (NEW) RF has shifted focus to interdicting UAF logistical and reinforcement corridors. FPV footage confirms RF is actively targeting UAF armored personnel carriers moving from Konstantinovka towards the Pokrovsk breach, indicating a classic "fix and isolate" tactical phase.
• Economic Domain (NEW VULNERABILITY): (NEW) The National Bank of Ukraine has devalued the Hryvnia to 42 UAH/$. This creates a new economic pressure point and a potent vector for RF information operations targeting Ukrainian domestic morale and long-term sustainment confidence.
• UAF Deep Strike Posture (NO CHANGE): No significant new UAF deep strike operations have been reported in the last 24 hours. The successful UAS attack on Belgorod remains the most recent benchmark.

3. THREAT ASSESSMENT

• RF Ground Breakthrough at Pokrovsk (THREAT LEVEL: CRITICAL - UNCHANGED): (HIGH CONFIDENCE) The threat of an operational-level penetration remains critical. The NEW evidence of a dedicated RF interdiction campaign against UAF reserves significantly increases the probability of RF forces consolidating their gains and achieving a wider breakthrough.
• RF Deep Strike with Extended-Range KABs (THREAT LEVEL: SEVERE - NEW): (HIGH CONFIDENCE) The confirmed use of extended-range KABs against Odesa creates a NEW and severe threat to ports, C2 nodes, and logistics hubs in the UAF deep rear. This capability will further stretch already constrained UAF AD assets.
• Economic & Morale Degradation (THREAT LEVEL: HIGH - NEW): (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) The combination of the Hryvnia devaluation and a synchronized RF IO campaign exploiting it poses a new and significant threat to Ukrainian national cohesion and morale. This can impact mobilization efforts and long-term economic stability.
• Culminating CNI Strike (THREAT LEVEL: CRITICAL - UNCHANGED): (HIGH CONFIDENCE) The current multi-axis kinetic pressure is assessed as a precursor. The threat of a final, large-scale, synchronized missile salvo against key CNI nodes remains CRITICAL, likely timed to exploit AD gaps revealed by the ongoing shaping operations.

4. OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

• Air/Strike Domain – Odesa & Sumy Oblasts:
  • (HIGH CONFIDENCE - NEW) RF forces launched a confirmed strike package including three extended-range KABs targeting Odesa Oblast and multiple standard KABs against Sumy Oblast. This was concurrent with a nationwide ballistic missile threat alert issued by the UAF Air Force.
• Ground Domain – Donetsk Axis (Konstantinovka):
  • (HIGH CONFIDENCE - NEW) RF FPV drone footage provides Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) of successful strikes against UAF armored vehicles, including a Senator APC, operating on supply routes between Konstantinovka and the Pokrovsk sector. This confirms an active RF interdiction effort is underway.
• Information Domain:
  • (HIGH CONFIDENCE - NEW) RF IO channels are aggressively amplifying two narratives: 1) footage of alleged brutal UAF mobilization tactics in Odesa to degrade trust in the state, and 2) mockery of the Hryvnia devaluation to fuel narratives of economic collapse.
• RF Command & Control (C2):
  • (HIGH CONFIDENCE - NEW) RF Ministry of Defense has publicized Defense Minister Belousov's inspection of the Southern Grouping of Forces, emphasizing the industrial-level integration of drone warfare ("Dronovka"). This signals high-level strategic commitment to sustaining and advancing UAS capabilities.

5. INTELLIGENCE GAPS

• PRIORITY 1 (CRITICAL - REFINED): Determine the specific locations and capabilities of RF FPV and artillery units conducting the interdiction campaign against UAF reserves on the Konstantinovka-Pokrovsk axis. Task ISR assets to identify launch/fire positions for immediate counter-battery/C-UAS targeting.
• PRIORITY 2 (HIGH - NEW): Identify the launch platforms, operating envelopes, and technical specifications of the extended-range KABs used against Odesa. Confirmation of launch aircraft type and stand-off distance is critical for developing UAF AD counter-tactics.
• PRIORITY 3 (HIGH - UNCHANGED): BDA on the specific CNI nodes whose damage prompted the initial nationwide power rationing (ГПВ) remains incomplete. Identifying these critical vulnerabilities is essential for prioritizing AD assets against the culminating RF strike.

6. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (NEXT 24-48 HOURS)

• MOST LIKELY COA (Isolate and Saturate): (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will intensify the FPV/artillery interdiction campaign along the Pokrovsk reinforcement corridors to fully isolate the penetrated UAF defensive positions. Concurrently, RF will sustain the geographically dispersed KAB and ballistic missile threats to continue degrading and mapping UAF AD coverage, setting conditions for a follow-on, high-payload CNI strike.
• MOST DANGEROUS COA (Synchronized Breakthrough and Collapse): (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF successfully interdicts and repels UAF reserve elements, allowing RF ground forces to exploit their lodgment and achieve a full operational breakthrough at Pokrovsk. This ground success is synchronized with a mass missile strike against a key energy or C2 node, creating systemic paralysis and forcing a disorderly UAF withdrawal from the Donetsk front.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Adapt AD Posture to Counter Deep KAB Threat (Urgent Operational Priority): Based on the confirmed use of extended-range KABs, immediately task J3-Air to re-evaluate AD asset allocation. Consider repositioning mobile SAM systems to better defend high-value strategic targets in Odesa and other deep rear areas now within the expanded threat radius.
2. Implement Counter-Interdiction TTPs for Pokrovsk Reinforcements (Urgent Tactical Priority): Direct units moving to reinforce the Pokrovsk sector to immediately adopt revised tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Mandate night-only movement, maximum dispersion between vehicles, and the integration of dedicated mobile Electronic Warfare (EW) assets to jam RF FPV reconnaissance and strike drones.
3. Launch Strategic Counter-IO Campaign (Strategic Information Priority): Direct UAF STRATCOM and relevant government bodies to immediately launch a coordinated information campaign to counter RF narratives on the economy. Frame the NBU’s currency decision as a necessary wartime measure for long-term stability, pre-empting RF attempts to induce public panic and distrust.

//END REPORT//