1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(CONFIDENCE: HIGH) Russian Federation (RF) forces are intensifying shaping operations and logistical preparations for a renewed offensive in the Northern (Kharkiv) Axis, committing newly identified units while probing Ukrainian Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT). Concurrently, RF forces maintain maximum pressure on the Eastern Axis (Chasiv Yar and Avdiivka) to fix Ukrainian defenders and prevent the redeployment of operational reserves. The primary immediate threat is a concentrated RF push to bring Kharkiv city within range of tube artillery.

2. THREAT ASSESSMENT

• Overall Threat Level: HIGH
• Northern Axis (Kharkiv): THREAT LEVEL: HIGH. RF forces are demonstrating capability and intent to escalate offensive operations.
  • Capabilities: A newly identified Motorized Rifle Regiment (MRR) of the Northern Grouping of Forces has been observed in forward positions. IMINT and SIGINT confirm a significant increase in rail logistics flowing into the Belgorod Oblast, likely supplying ammunition and replacement equipment for a sustained offensive.
  • Immediate Risks: A concentrated push from current positions near Lyptsi or Vovchansk could compromise key defensive lines and enable RF artillery to directly target Kharkiv's critical infrastructure and civilian population centers.
• Eastern Axis (Chasiv Yar): THREAT LEVEL: HIGH. The primary threat remains overwhelming RF indirect fire.
  • Capabilities: RF forces are employing heavy volumes of standoff fires, including FAB-500/1500 glide bombs and massed artillery, to degrade defensive fortifications and inflict casualties. This indicates a preparatory phase for a renewed ground assault.
  • Immediate Risks: Continued degradation of defenses could create conditions for a tactical envelopment of Chasiv Yar from the south, forcing a Ukrainian withdrawal from fortified positions.
• Pervasive Threats: (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) The ubiquitous use of RF FPV drones and Lancet loitering munitions remains a critical threat to Ukrainian personnel, armored vehicles, and artillery systems across all sectors.

3. OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

• Northern Axis (Kharkiv):

  • (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM) Over the past 24 hours, RF elements conducted multiple company-sized reconnaissance-in-force operations against Ukrainian positions near Lyptsi and in the northern part of Vovchansk. These attacks were repelled but likely served to identify defensive vulnerabilities.
  • (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) Intercepted communications from RF units in this sector indicate low morale and complaints about equipment shortages among forward-deployed personnel. However, this is not assessed to be degrading their operational effectiveness at this time.
  • Tactical Success: OSINT and battle damage assessment confirm the destruction of a high-value RF TOS-1A heavy thermobaric launcher system near Vovchansk by Ukrainian artillery, temporarily degrading RF fire support capabilities in the immediate area.

• Eastern Axis (Bakhmut/Chasiv Yar):

  • (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF ground activity has been limited to small-unit actions. The primary effort has been an intense and sustained aerial and artillery bombardment of Ukrainian positions in and around Chasiv Yar, consistent with shaping operations.

• Eastern Axis (Avdiivka):

  • (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM) RF forces continued attritional assaults west of Ocheretyne, achieving marginal tactical gains at a high cost in personnel and armor.
  • (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) Recent IMINT confirms a high concentration of RF armored vehicles (T-72/T-80 MBTs, BMPs) massed in rear areas, indicating intent to sustain pressure and exploit any potential breakthrough.

4. INTELLIGENCE GAPS

• RF Northern Grouping Reserves: The composition, readiness, and exact disposition of the RF operational reserve in the Belgorod and Kursk Oblasts remain unclear. Determining the size and trigger for commitment of this force is the highest priority intelligence requirement.
• RF Strategic Intent in Kharkiv: It is unclear if the current Kharkiv operation is a feint to draw Ukrainian reserves from the Donbas, an effort to establish a limited buffer zone, or the initial phase of a deliberate assault on the city.
• Effectiveness of RF Electronic Warfare (EW): The extent and effectiveness of RF EW systems deployed to counter Ukrainian drone operations in the Kharkiv axis requires further assessment.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (NEXT 24-48 HOURS)

• Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF forces will continue reconnaissance-in-force and intense shaping fires in the Kharkiv axis while building combat power for a larger, more coordinated assault. Pressure on Chasiv Yar and Avdiivka will be maintained at current levels to prevent Ukrainian reinforcement of the north.
• Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM) RF forces commit their unlocated operational reserves in a concentrated armored thrust on the Lyptsi axis. The objective would be to achieve a rapid breakthrough and establish fire control over the main supply routes into Kharkiv city before Ukrainian mobile reserves can effectively respond.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Prioritize ISR on RF Reserves: Task all available ISR assets (UAV, SIGINT, satellite imagery) to focus on the Belgorod Oblast to identify, characterize, and track the RF operational reserve force.
2. Disrupt RF Logistics: Execute targeted strikes against identified railheads and logistical nodes near Valuyki and other border areas to disrupt the flow of materiel supporting the Kharkiv offensive.
3. Reinforce Anti-Armor Capabilities: Allocate additional ATGM teams and pre-position FPV drone intercept/jammer systems to defensive positions west of Ocheretyne to counter the confirmed RF armored concentration.
4. Prepare Mobile Reserves: Place tactical reserves on a heightened state of readiness for rapid counter-attack deployment to either the Lyptsi or Vovchansk sectors in response to the MDCOA.