1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Russian forces are intensifying offensive operations on Chasiv Yar, successfully exploiting tactical gains to establish a confirmed foothold in the eastern Kanal microdistrict. The pervasive use of glide bombs (FABs) and sophisticated Electronic Warfare (EW) is severely degrading Ukrainian defensive capabilities and represents the most critical threat to the city's stability over the next 48 hours.

2. THREAT ASSESSMENT

• Overall Threat Level (Chasiv Yar Sector): HIGH
• Enemy Capabilities:
  • Lead Elements: Confirmed presence of units from the 98th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division and supporting motorized rifle elements, operating as the main assault force. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Fire Support: Extensive and systematic use of FAB-250/500 glide bombs to suppress Ukrainian strongpoints prior to ground assaults. Confirmed employment of TOS-1A thermobaric rocket systems to clear fortified positions in close urban combat. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Electronic Warfare: Pervasive EW employment is actively degrading Ukrainian Command and Control (C2) and ISR capabilities, with a significant impact on UAV operations and GPS-dependent systems. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Immediate Risks:
  • The primary immediate risk is a Russian consolidation of the Kanal microdistrict, creating a staging area for a deliberate assault across the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal. This would directly threaten the main defensive lines of Chasiv Yar proper.
  • Degradation of friendly ISR drone coverage due to enemy EW severely limits tactical situational awareness and our ability to effectively target enemy assault groups.

3. OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

• Chasiv Yar Advance: Russian forces have successfully advanced into the Kanal microdistrict, establishing a foothold east of the canal. (HIGH CONFIDENCE). This was achieved by forces crossing the T0504 highway and suppressing defending Ukrainian units with overwhelming air and artillery support.
• Enemy Tactics: Enemy units are employing combined arms tactics, utilizing small, dispersed infantry assault groups to probe defenses and minimize vulnerability to artillery. These groups are supported by armor, continuous indirect fire, and preparatory glide bomb strikes.
• Friendly Force Posture: Ukrainian units, including elements of the 56th Motorized Brigade, are conducting a tactical fighting withdrawal to more defensible, prepared positions on the western side of the microdistrict and along the canal itself. The defense remains cohesive but is under extreme pressure.

4. INTELLIGENCE GAPS

• Enemy Reserves: The strength, composition, and location of Russian second-echelon forces staged to exploit a potential breakthrough remain unconfirmed.
• Logistical Status: The sustainability of the current Russian operational tempo is unclear. We lack detailed intelligence on the status and vulnerability of the logistical supply lines supporting this offensive axis.
• EW Emitter Locations: Precise locations and capabilities of the key Russian EW systems responsible for widespread GPS and communications degradation require immediate identification for targeting.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (NEXT 24-48 HOURS)

• Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): (HIGH CONFIDENCE) Russian forces will focus on consolidating their gains within the Kanal microdistrict, clearing the entire area east of the canal, and securing their flanks along the T0504 highway. This phase will be characterized by intense reconnaissance-by-fire and continued glide bomb strikes on Ukrainian positions in Chasiv Yar proper to shape conditions for future assaults.
• Secondary Course of Action (Secondary COA): (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) The enemy may attempt a hasty, opportunistic crossing of the canal with small reconnaissance or sabotage groups to test Ukrainian defenses on the western bank and identify weaknesses for a larger, future crossing operation.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

• FIRES: Prioritize ISR assets (where viable) to identify and target high-value Russian assets, specifically TOS-1A systems and suspected glide bomb release points. Task long-range precision assets to interdict identified logistical chokepoints supporting the T0504 axis.
• FORCE ALLOCATION: Immediately allocate additional FPV drone assets and counter-drone systems to units defending Chasiv Yar, particularly the 56th Brigade, to counter enemy assault groups in the close-quarters urban environment.
• MANEUVER: Immediately reinforce defensive positions on the western bank of the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal to establish a firm line of defense and repel any potential enemy crossing attempts.
• ELECTRONIC WARFARE: Deploy mobile friendly EW teams to the Chasiv Yar sector to actively identify, locate, and counter Russian drone reconnaissance and C2 nodes.

END OF SUMMARY