Security Council of Russia
Security Council of the Russian Federation — Mandate and Structure
The Security Council of the Russian Federation (Совет Безопасности Российской Федерации) is a constitutional advisory body formed and chaired by the President pursuant to the 1993 Constitution (Article 83). It provides strategic guidance on national security, defense planning, internal security, foreign policy priorities that affect security, and crisis response coordination. The Council’s permanent apparatus (the Secretariat) supports policy development, interagency coordination, and preparation of national security documents (e.g., the National Security Strategy approved by presidential decree in 2021). The Council’s commissions and working groups address specific domains such as defense, economic security, information security, and border security.
Leadership and Membership
Chair: President Vladimir Putin. Secretary: Sergei Shoigu (appointed in May 2024 by presidential decree, succeeding Nikolai Patrushev). Membership is set by presidential decree and typically includes senior state officials such as the Prime Minister, the Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs, the heads of security and intelligence services (e.g., FSB and SVR), the Chief of the General Staff, and legislative leaders. Composition and roles are periodically adjusted by presidential acts; current detailed membership lists are published by the Kremlin and may change.
Location Analysis — Security Council Headquarters and Meeting Venues
Headquarters: Moscow, Kremlin. Security Council sessions are commonly held within the Kremlin complex and at other presidential facilities in the Moscow region when required. The Kremlin functions as the central node for decision-making, with secure conference facilities and dedicated communications suites. A presidential helipad within the Kremlin (commissioned in 2013) facilitates short-range rotary-wing transfers, reducing reliance on ground convoys to and from Moscow-area airfields. Specific floorplans, hardened facility details, and protected access routes are not publicly disclosed.
Command, Control, and Communications (C3) within the Kremlin
Secure communications for national leadership are administered by the Federal Protective Service (FSO) and its Special Communications and Information Service (Spetssvyaz). The Kremlin hosts secure conferencing and decision-support capabilities, including situational facilities used for high-level briefings. Connectivity supports coordination with federal ministries and security agencies, and with airborne or forward-deployed command-and-control assets as needed. Technical specifics of encryption, network topology, and redundancy are classified and not publicly available.
Protective Security Framework
The Federal Protective Service (FSO) provides close protection for top state officials and secures federal executive sites, including the Kremlin and associated VIP transport movements. Security measures encompass layered access control, counter-surveillance, communications security, and coordination with Moscow law enforcement and civil aviation authorities for movement deconfliction. Details on guard forces, sensor arrays, counter-UAS deployments, and response protocols are restricted and not disclosed in open sources.
Rossiya Special Flight Squadron — Organizational Overview
The Special Flight Detachment "Rossiya" (СЛО "Россия") is a federal state unit operating under the Presidential Property Management Department of the Russian Federation. It provides air transport for the President, Prime Minister, heads of federal bodies, and visiting foreign dignitaries. The ICAO designator is RSD, commonly using the call sign "Russia". Missions include domestic and international VIP transport, protocol flights, support for official delegations, and special communications/command-and-control support for state leadership movements.
Basing and Sites — Vnukovo Government Terminals and Helipads
Primary operations for Rossiya SLO are conducted at Moscow Vnukovo Airport’s dedicated government and VIP terminals: Vnukovo-2 (state/heads-of-state terminal) and Vnukovo-3 (VIP/business aviation and official delegations). These terminals have segregated aprons, hangars, and secure access points distinct from general passenger operations. The Kremlin helipad (central Moscow) and helipads at presidential residences in the Moscow region enable short rotary-wing shuttles to Vnukovo. Ground and perimeter security, screening, and airside access at these facilities are protected by federal services; detailed security configurations are not public.
Fleet Composition and Roles (Rossiya SLO)
Open-source reporting indicates use of the following types: Ilyushin Il-96-300/400 (long-range VIP transports; Il-96-300PU variants outfitted for secure communications and leadership transport), Tupolev Tu-204-300 (VIP transport for medium to long sectors), Tupolev Tu-214 special variants including Tu-214SR (communications relay), Tu-214PU and Tu-214VPU (airborne command-post roles), and Tu-214PU-SBUS (special onboard communications suite), Sukhoi Superjet 100 (short-to-medium range VIP transport), and Mil Mi-8MTV-1 (VIP helicopter for short-range movements). Typical unrefueled ranges: Il-96-300 roughly 10,000–11,000 km; Tu-214 approximately 6,500–7,000 km (variant-dependent); Tu-204-300 up to roughly 9,000 km (configuration-dependent); SSJ100 approximately 3,000–4,500 km depending on variant; Mi-8MTV-1 roughly 450–600 km. Exact airframe counts, interior layouts, and mission systems are not publicly detailed.
Airborne C2 and Communications Support
Tu-214SR aircraft serve as airborne communications relays to support secure links during leadership movements and major events. Tu-214PU/VPU variants function as airborne command posts with dedicated operator consoles and multi-band communications, enabling secure voice and data connectivity. These assets integrate with national secure communications networks administered by FSO/Spetssvyaz. Specific wavebands, satellite resources, encryption methods, and operating procedures are classified; only their general roles are described in open sources.
Operational Employment Patterns
For state visits and high-profile events, Rossiya SLO coordinates departure/arrival sequences at Vnukovo-2/3 with dedicated ground handling, security sweeps, and airspace management measures. Communications-relay aircraft (e.g., Tu-214SR) are frequently observed operating racetrack patterns to ensure persistent connectivity. Mi-8MTV-1 helicopters conduct short transfers between the Kremlin or presidential residences and Vnukovo to minimize surface exposure. Specific flight schedules, passenger manifests, routes, and protective tactics are not publicly released.
Legal and Policy Context
The President forms and chairs the Security Council under the Russian Constitution (1993). National security policy is framed by presidential decrees and strategic documents, including the National Security Strategy (2021). The Rossiya Special Flight Detachment operates as a federal state entity under the Presidential Property Management Department; its mandate is defined by government regulations governing state transport and protection of top officials. Technical and operational specifics for leadership protection and secure transport are protected by law and not disclosed.
Recent Developments and Fleet Sustainment (Open-Source)
In May 2024, Sergei Shoigu was appointed Secretary of the Security Council. UAC has publicly reported the resumption and scaling-up of Tu-214 production at Kazan for domestic needs; special-mission Tu-214 variants continue to be produced for state customers. The Il-96-400M conducted its first flight in 2023 as part of an ongoing effort to field upgraded widebody airframes domestically; any integration of Il-96-400 variants into leadership transport or special-mission roles has not been officially detailed in open sources as of 2025.
Information Gaps and Classification Constraints
Precise facility schematics, security force compositions, defensive systems, communications architectures, aircraft internal configurations, and operational procedures for the Kremlin, Vnukovo-2/3, and Rossiya SLO aircraft are restricted or classified. Open sources provide general roles and platform types but not the protected technical details. Where such specifics are not publicly available, they are omitted.