Unknown Installations (UI)
Identification
Best assessed as a folder-level OSINT category rather than a single installation. The record comprises 69 placemarks all labeled "UI" or close variants, and ISW has separately described the underlying RBMI dataset as an externally compiled map of Russian and Belarusian military/security objects whose findings it partially verified for its own ATACMS-range assessment. ([understandingwar.org](https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/interactive-map-hundreds-known-russian-military-objects-are-range-atacms?utm_source=openai))
Official context
As of February 2026, official Russian sources list Sergei Shoigu as Secretary of the Security Council, and Kremlin event pages show recent Security Council meetings taking place in the Kremlin. Official descriptions characterize the body as a constitutional advisory/deliberative organ under the President, with its Office functioning as a directorate within the Presidential Executive Office; independent analysis by the Marshall Center similarly describes it as a deliberative body with a Moscow-based secretariat. That public profile does not substantiate a nationwide 69-site basing network. ([scrf.gov.ru](https://www.scrf.gov.ru/persons/person97/?utm_source=openai))
Geographic relevance
The placemarks are nationally dispersed, with especially notable clusters in Kaliningrad, the Kola Peninsula, Crimea/Black Sea, and Kamchatka. Those clusters sit in regions anchored by major Russian strategic infrastructure: Baltiysk is described by Russian official/state reporting as the Baltic Fleet’s main naval base; Sevastopol serves as the main base of the Black Sea Fleet; Severomorsk is the Northern Fleet headquarters/main base; and Kamchatka hosts the major submarine base at Vilyuchinsk. This makes the record strategically relevant even though the individual UI points themselves remain unidentified. ([tass.com](https://tass.com/defense/1873217?utm_source=openai))
Attribution limits
Only a few placemarks carry functional hints in the metadata—one marked "SIGINT/ELINT," two tentative "SIGINT?," one "Unidentified Signals Intelligence (?) Installation," and one "UI Rosgvardiya." On the open sources reviewed for this briefing, those labels cannot be elevated beyond unverified map annotations: the publicly documented role of the Security Council is institutional and Moscow-centered, and no authoritative source reviewed here publicly identifies a matching Security Council-controlled field network for these exact points. ([en.kremlin.ru](https://en.kremlin.ru/structure/security-council?utm_source=openai))
Bottom line
The safest identification is: a dispersed set of unresolved Russian-security-related sites inside the RBMI OSINT dataset, not a single confirmed installation and not a publicly verified Security Council-owned network. Analytically, the record is useful as a cue set for further geospatial work around high-value Russian military regions, but mission, force posture, and infrastructure details remain unconfirmed for most points. ([understandingwar.org](https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/interactive-map-hundreds-known-russian-military-objects-are-range-atacms?utm_source=openai))