The 3rd Army Corps (Russian: 3-y armeyskiy korpus, 3 AK) is a formation of the Russian Ground Forces created in 2022 to field newly raised volunteer units for operations in Ukraine. It is distinct from the Russian Navy’s long-established 11th and 14th Army Corps (Baltic and Northern Fleets respectively). While the corps’ existence and deployment have been widely referenced by Russian and Ukrainian sources since late August–September 2022, the Russian Ministry of Defence has not released a detailed, official public order of battle for this formation.
Public reporting in July–August 2022 described an accelerated recruitment drive across multiple Russian regions to staff the 3rd Army Corps with volunteer battalions. Numerous regional announcements advertised short-notice contracts, elevated pay packages, and expedited training for candidates, generally including broader age bands than pre-war standards. Open-source imagery and media indicated that the corps was formed during August 2022 and began moving personnel and equipment toward the theater by late August and early September 2022.
There is no official public confirmation of the 3rd Army Corps’ commander. The specific attribution of command to a Major General Vladimir Belyaevsky cannot be substantiated from authoritative open sources. As of September 2025, Russian Ministry of Defence communiqués, state-media releases, and publicly accessible decrees have not identified a permanent, named commander for the corps.
The Mulino Combined Arms Training Ground in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast served as the principal assembly and training site for the 3rd Army Corps in mid-2022. Multiple open-source photos and videos documented newly issued armored vehicles and rail-loading activities there during August–September 2022. After initial outfitting, units associated with the corps were staged at the Kadamovsky Training Ground near Novocherkassk in Rostov Oblast before entering the operational area in eastern Ukraine. Both sites provide extensive range infrastructure and rail access suitable for rapid force generation and deployment.
The detailed order of battle for the 3rd Army Corps has not been publicly disclosed. However, the 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade has been widely attributed to the corps in wartime reporting, including Russian and Ukrainian accounts that referenced the brigade’s actions on the Bakhmut axis in 2023. Numerous regionally raised volunteer battalions were aggregated under the corps during its formation period in 2022, but the enduring alignment of specific battalions and regiments within the corps has not been officially published.
Initial equipment issued to units attributed to the 3rd Army Corps included relatively modern platforms. Open-source imagery from August 2022 at Mulino documented T-80BVM and T-90M main battle tanks and BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles. Additional sightings indicated BTR-82A armored personnel carriers and 2S19 Msta-S self-propelled howitzers with newly formed elements. Subsequent battlefield imagery shows that some units operated older systems, such as T-72B3 tanks and BMP-2 IFVs, likely reflecting attrition and replacement dynamics. Precise equipment tables by unit have not been released publicly.
Late August–September 2022: Elements attributed to the 3rd Army Corps moved from Mulino to Rostov Oblast and were committed in Kharkiv Oblast during Ukraine’s September counteroffensive; Russian and Ukrainian sources reported 3rd Army Corps units in the Balakliya–Izium sector. Late 2022–early 2023: Presence of corps elements was reported along the Svatove–Kreminna axis. May 2023: The 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, widely linked to the corps, was publicly criticized by Wagner Group leadership for losses and a withdrawal on Bakhmut’s southern flank, confirming its involvement there. September 2023: Ukrainian reporting and imagery indicated the degradation of 72nd Brigade elements near Andriivka, southwest of Bakhmut. From 2024 onward, references to 3rd Army Corps units continue intermittently in open sources, but comprehensive, official accounts of deployments are not available.
The corps’ generation relied on existing training and rail logistics at the Mulino and Kadamovsky training grounds. Open-source records show rail transport was used for heavy equipment movements during the formation phase in August–September 2022. Beyond these staging and training facilities, official disclosures do not provide detailed information on permanent garrisons, depots, or dedicated sustainment bases assigned to the corps; consequently, granular site-level logistics and infrastructure arrangements cannot be verified from public sources.
At formation in 2022, the 3rd Army Corps was reported under the Western Military District. On 1 February 2024, Russia re-established the Leningrad and Moscow Military Districts, replacing the Western Military District. Public records do not clarify which of the reconstituted districts administratively controls the 3rd Army Corps following this reorganization. No official, updated organizational chart identifying the corps’ current subordination has been released.
As of September 2025, no authoritative public data quantifies the corps’ current manpower, equipment holdings, or exact disposition. The 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade continues to be cited in periodic Russian and Ukrainian reporting in the eastern Ukraine theater. Absent official Russian Ministry of Defence publications detailing the corps’ structure, basing, and command relationships, only limited, event-driven facts about its units and engagements can be confirmed from open sources.
The proposed commander name, Major General Vladimir Belyaevsky, is not confirmed by authoritative open sources. There is no public Russian Ministry of Defence announcement, state-media profile, or official decree that identifies a corps commander by this name for the 3rd Army Corps. Therefore, the commander of the 3rd Army Corps cannot be verified from publicly available, credible sources at this time.
Key details that remain undisclosed in public sources include the corps’ full order of battle, permanent basing and support infrastructure, commander identity, current subordination within Russia’s post-2024 military-district structure, and exact manpower and equipment strengths. Where specific data are not publicly available or cannot be corroborated, they are omitted here in accordance with the requirement to avoid assumptions or speculation.