Best match is the modern Russian Ground Forces 6th Motor Rifle Division subordinate to the 3rd Army Corps. Open sources consistently confirm the division-corp link, but they do not publicly confirm a single fixed divisional installation or exact permanent headquarters, so this record is best treated as a unit entry rather than a uniquely located site. ([jamestown.org](https://jamestown.org/moscow-re-organizes-russian-armed-forces-part-two/?utm_source=openai))
The strongest geographic tie in open sources is corps-level rather than division-level: Reuters, citing the UK Ministry of Defence on August 10, 2022, identified Mulino in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast as the 3rd Army Corps base/training center. After Russia restored the Moscow Military District by decree on February 26, 2024, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast fell inside that district, which makes the supplied hierarchy geographically plausible; however, open sources do not publicly confirm Mulino as the 6th Motor Rifle Division’s permanent HQ or formally document the division’s own administrative assignment to the Moscow Military District. ([agriculture.com](https://www.agriculture.com/markets/newswire/wrapup-2-ukraine-says-11-killed-overnight-britain-flags-new-russian-force))
ISW reporting placed elements of the division in the Bakhmut sector in early 2024, including near Klishchiivka/Andriivka, and later in the Chasiv Yar-Kostyantynivka axis through 2025. Russian state reporting in February and October 2025 likewise placed 6th Motor Rifle Division FPV-drone elements near Chasiv Yar and in the Kramatorsk-Druzhkivka direction. ([understandingwar.org](https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-21-2024?utm_source=openai))
Open-source ORBAT reporting confirms the division as part of 3rd Army Corps and attributes to it at least a motor-rifle core, the 27th Artillery Regiment, a tank regiment, and a 52nd air-defense element. Public regiment numbering is inconsistent: late-2023 ISW/CTP reporting cited the 57th Motorized Rifle Regiment plus two unnamed motor-rifle regiments, while 2024-2025 combat reporting identified 1008th, 1194th, 1307th, and 1442nd regimental elements. The full divisional order of battle is therefore not publicly confirmed. ([understandingwar.org](https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia%E2%80%99s-military-restructuring-and-expansion-hindered-ukraine-war?utm_source=openai))
Verified observable capabilities are those of a conventional mechanized formation with organic artillery and active drone employment. ISW and Russian reporting specifically mention the division’s 27th Artillery Regiment and FPV/UAV operators in the Chasiv Yar-Kostyantynivka sector, indicating routine use of tube artillery and small unmanned strike/reconnaissance systems in current combat. ([understandingwar.org](https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-12-2025?utm_source=openai))
Higher-echelon subordination above the corps remains opaque in open sources. CTP/ISW noted conflicting reporting over whether 3rd Army Corps remained tied to the former Western Military District or shifted under other wartime command arrangements, while Russian state reporting in 2025 described the 6th Motor Rifle Division as part of the 3rd Army Corps within Battlegroup South. The corps affiliation is well supported; the precise administrative chain above it is not publicly settled. ([criticalthreats.org](https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/restructuring-and-expansion-of-the-russian-ground-forces-hindered-by-ukraine-war-requirements))