Ballistic Missile Attack on Kyiv: Between 01:56 and 02:02, a multi-rocket ballistic strike targeted the capital. At least 4 "high-speed" targets were tracked from the north; explosions were confirmed in the city (KMVA, AFU Air Force, Vanek, 01:56-02:02, HIGH CONFIDENCE).
New Northern UAV Vector: At 02:05, a group of UAVs entered northern Chernihiv Oblast, transiting through Kholmy and Baturyn toward Nizhyn/Ichnya (AFU Air Force, 02:05, HIGH CONFIDENCE).
Kharkiv UAV Threat: A group of UAVs is currently approaching Kharkiv from the southern vector (AFU Air Force, 02:06, HIGH CONFIDENCE).
Russian MoD Communication Denial: The Russian Ministry of Defense issued a statement claiming that front-line communications are conducted strictly via standard military equipment, denying the use of Telegram for operational command (TASS, 02:07, MEDIUM CONFIDENCE).
Operational picture (by sector)
1. Northern Sector (Kyiv/Chernihiv/Sumy):
Kinetic Strike: The ballistic attack from the north represents a significant escalation in tempo, occurring while UAVs are still loitering in the Sumy/Poltava corridor (from previous sitrep).
UAV Incursion: The move through Chernihiv toward Nizhyn suggests a flanking maneuver to bypass existing AD screens around Kyiv or to target rail/logistics hubs in the Ichnya area.
Weather: Extreme cold persists. Kharkiv remains at -13.9°C (66% cloud), while Svatove is at -14.2°C with clear skies (02:00, Weather Context). These conditions maximize the impact of any potential energy infrastructure hits.
2. Eastern Sector (Donetsk/Kharkiv):
UAV Pressure: Kharkiv is facing a tactical "pincer" with UAVs approaching from the south while the region remains under the umbrella of ballistic threats from the Belgorod axis.
Weather: Pokrovsk is recorded at -6.1°C with 60% cloud cover and wind speeds of 3.7 m/s (02:00, Weather Context).
3. Southern Sector (Kherson/Zaporizhzhia):
Environment: Overcast conditions continue (100% cloud) in Kherson and Orikhiv with temperatures between -2.1°C and -2.7°C (02:00, Weather Context). No new kinetic messages were reported in this window, but previous UAV threats to Mykolaiv remain active.
Enemy activity / threat assessment
Course of Action (COA) Analysis: The Russian VKS has transitioned from "saturation" (UAVs) to "execution" (Ballistics). The timing of the ballistic strike on Kyiv suggests an attempt to hit high-value targets while mobile fire groups are occupied with the multi-axis UAV incursions in Chernihiv and Poltava.
Tactical Adaptation: The use of "high-speed" (likely Iskander-M or North Korean KN-23) missiles from the north emphasizes a focus on minimizing the UAF reaction window.
Logistics: Russian claims regarding German-supplied Leopard tanks (Colonelcassad, 02:03) suggest Russian ISR is actively prioritizing the tracking of heavy western armor (Leopard 1A5/2A6) integrated into the 155th OMBR during winter conditions.
Friendly activity (UAF)
Active Defense: UAF Air Defense is currently engaged in the capital region. Successful detection of the ballistic launch allowed for immediate alerts, though impacts/intercepts in Kyiv are still being assessed for damage.
Force Disposition: Elements of the 155th OMBR are confirmed to be operating western armor in winter conditions, likely in a defensive-maneuver role to counter mechanized thrusts in the East.
Information environment / disinformation
Operational Security (OPSEC) Narrative: The Russian MoD’s denial of Telegram use (02:07) is likely a response to internal criticism regarding communication vulnerabilities or an attempt to mask the reality of decentralized C2 reliant on civilian software.
Supplies Narrative: Russian milbloggers (Colonelcassad) are amplifying specific counts of German armor deliveries, likely to frame current UAF resistance as entirely dependent on external logistics rather than organic capability.
Outlook (next 6-12h)
Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): Continued ballistic harassment of Kyiv and Kharkiv to degrade air defense stocks, followed by a potential cruise missile wave at dawn (04:00-06:00 UTC) as UAVs clear flight corridors.
Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): A secondary ballistic wave targeting the Nizhyn/Ichnya rail junctions to sever logistics between Kyiv and the eastern front, coinciding with the extreme cold to maximize humanitarian and military disruption.
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
[TACTICAL] Damage assessment of the ballistic strikes in Kyiv; identification of specific missile types used (Iskander vs. KN-23).
[OPERATIONAL] Confirmation of UAV flight altitudes in the Chernihiv/Nizhyn corridor to determine if they are acting as decoys or ISR platforms for the ballistic strikes.
[TECHNICAL] Verification of the Russian MoD claim regarding "standard means of communication" to identify if new hardened EW-resistant comms are being deployed at the tactical level.
