Situation Update (1437 UTC, Feb 13, 2026)
Key updates since last sitrep
- Strategic SEAD Strike (Crimea): UAF General Staff confirms a successful strike on a Russian "Nebo-U" long-range radar station in occupied Crimea. Additional "occupier objects" were also neutralized in the same mission (Tsaplienko/GenStaff, 1420Z, HIGH).
- Diplomatic Exclusion (Geneva): RU Presidential Press Secretary Peskov confirmed Feb 17-18 talks in Geneva will include the US, Russia, and Ukraine, but explicitly exclude European representatives. Deputy FM Mikhail Galuzin and a negotiator named Dmitriev are confirmed for the RU delegation (TASS/Dva Mayora, 1420-1432Z, HIGH).
- Expanded KAB Operations: RU aviation has launched Guided Aerial Bombs (KAB) against three distinct axes: Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Sumy regions (AFU Air Force, 1416-1436Z, HIGH).
- New UAV Vector (Mykolaiv): Strike UAVs (Shahed-type) are currently ingressing Mykolaiv from the south, adding a southern maritime/coastal axis to the ongoing multi-vector drone pressure (AFU Air Force, 1433Z, HIGH).
- Sumy Sector Volatility: Russian sources claim localized advances near Kondratovka and Alekseevka but concede a tactical setback near Korchakovka due to high UAF drone density (Rybar, 1410Z, MEDIUM).
- Russian C2 / Cyber-Infrastructure: The Tatarstan MVD has formally proposed a federal block on Telegram and VPNs, suggesting a pivot toward a state-controlled alternative ("MAX") to curb "IT crimes," indicating deepening internal paranoia regarding secure communications (Alex Parker, 1434Z, MEDIUM).
Operational picture (by sector)
Crimean Sector (Air/Sea):
The destruction of the "Nebo-U" radar system is a significant operational success. This system provides long-range surveillance and tracking for ballistic missiles and aircraft. Its removal creates a "blind spot" in Russia’s early-warning network over the Black Sea, potentially facilitating future UAF missile or drone strikes against the Sevastopol naval hub or the Kerch Bridge.
Sumy Sector:
The sector has shifted from "shaping" to active tactical maneuvering. RU forces are attempting to establish bridgeheads in Kondratovka and Alekseevka. However, the admission of a setback at Korchakovka highlights the effectiveness of UAF "drone-first" defensive posture in the border regions.
Southern Axis (Mykolaiv/Zaporizhzhia):
A coordinated push is underway. While KABs target Zaporizhzhia to degrade frontline fortifications, loitering munitions are being funneled toward Mykolaiv. This suggests a localized effort to disrupt port logistics or southern power distribution nodes.
Donetsk Sector:
The "Vostok" grouping claims to have repelled 9 counter-attacks, specifically identifying the loss of Ukrainian BTRs and BBVs. While kinetic intensity is high, no significant territorial shifts were reported in the last hour beyond the continued use of KABs by RU aviation to suppress UAF artillery (Voin DV, 1433Z).
Enemy analysis (threat assessment)
Tactical Changes & Adaptations:
- KAB Saturation: Russia is increasingly relying on standoff KAB strikes across the entire front to compensate for high infantry losses in frozen conditions. This allows RU aviation to stay outside the immediate envelope of shorter-range UAF AD.
- Negotiation Positioning: By excluding Europeans from the Geneva talks, Moscow is attempting to revive a "Cold War" style bilateral (US-RU) security architecture, effectively trying to delegitimize the EU’s role in Ukrainian security.
Logistics & Sustainment:
- Institutional Purges: The arrest of Chelyabinsk Deputy Governor Andrey Faleychik for bribery (1437Z) and the seizure of assets from Krasnodar officials suggest a continued "war-time anti-corruption" drive within the RU interior to tighten control over regional budgets and military-industrial funding.
Friendly activity (UAF)
Tactical Successes:
- Counter-Drone Operations: Footage from the 65th Mechanized Brigade ("Ronin" unit) confirms continued systematic destruction of RU armored vehicles in snowy terrain, likely utilizing FPV drones with thermal optics (Sternenko, 1423Z).
- Internal Security: The Office of the General Prosecutor issued new treason and collaboration charges against individuals providing data to RU occupation structures, indicating active counter-intelligence operations in liberated or frontline zones (PGO, 1430Z).
Information environment / disinformation
- Verkhovna Rada "Sickness" Fake: RU milbloggers are circulating a doctored photo of the Rada voting board claiming a session was canceled due to "diarrhea" (1426Z). This is a low-effort disinformation attempt to portray the Ukrainian government as dysfunctional or physically incapacitated.
- Mobilization Fatigue: RU channels are amplifying claims that Ukraine's mobilization resource will expire in 1.5 years (1412Z). This is a strategic narrative designed to lower UA morale and encourage draft evasion.
- European Troop Dissent: RBK-UA is tracking reports of public opposition in France and Germany to troop deployments. This highlights a critical "center of gravity" for RU influence operations: driving a wedge between European populations and their pro-Ukraine governments.
Outlook (next 6-12h)
Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA):
A multi-domain strike tonight involving the Mykolaiv-bound UAVs and KAB-carrying Su-34s. Target focus will remain on energy infrastructure and AD radar nodes, capitalizing on the psychological pressure of the -27°C weather.
Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA):
RU utilization of the "blind spot" created by the Nebo-U strike (ironically) to move naval assets or launch Kalibr missiles from unexpected vectors in the Black Sea, targeting Odesa or Mykolaiv while ground-based AD is distracted by KABs.
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
- [CRITICAL] Assess the degree of coverage loss following the Nebo-U destruction; identify if RU has mobile backup radar units (e.g., "Podlet") moving into the area.
- [HIGH] Verify the "Dmitriev" negotiator's identity—specifically whether this refers to Kirill Dmitriev (RDIF), which would indicate a focus on economic/sanctions bargaining in Geneva.
- [MEDIUM] Monitor the Sumy border for signs of RU 1st Guard Tank Army elements, which would signal that the "localized advances" in Kondratovka are the start of a larger offensive.
//ANALYSIS ENDS//
