Situation Update (1107 UTC, Feb 13, 2026)
Key updates since last sitrep
- Geneva Negotiation Framework: Russia confirms a new round of trilateral negotiations (Russia-USA-Ukraine) in Geneva for Feb 17-18; the Russian delegation will be led by Medinsky (1058Z-1100Z, TASS, HIGH).
- Air Domain Escalation: Russian UAVs have transitioned from northwestern Kyiv Oblast toward Zhytomyr Oblast, indicating a broadening of the strike corridor (1046Z, UA Air Force, HIGH).
- Pokrovsk Engagement: Ukrainian Air Assault Forces are actively engaging Russian units in the garage cooperative area on the southeastern outskirts of Pokrovsk (1104Z, UA DSHV, MEDIUM).
- Energy Resilience Strategy: PM Shmyhal announced Ukraine is "stripping" Soviet-era Thermal Power Plant (TPP) equipment from Eastern Europe to rapidly rebuild the domestic energy reserve (1043Z, RBK-UA, HIGH).
- Russian Drone Recruitment: KhMAO-Yugra has launched a specialized 1-year contract for a "Drone Aviation Regiment" with a record 4.1M RUB lump sum, signaling a desperate need for skilled UAS operators (1050Z, Voenkor Kotenok, HIGH).
- Alleged UA Strike on Civilians: Pro-Russian sources claim UA strikes hit an administrative/humanitarian hub in Zaporizhzhia and a funeral procession in Melitopol; these claims lack independent verification (1054Z, 1104Z, TASS/Balitsky, LOW/UNCONFIRMED).
Operational picture (by sector)
Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk Sector):
Heavy fighting continues on the southeastern outskirts. UA Air Assault Forces (DSHV) are defending the "garage cooperative" sector. This area remains a critical friction point as RU forces attempt to leverage frozen terrain to flank Ukrainian positions.
Southern Sector (Zaporizhzhia/Melitopol):
Russia is actively pushing a "war crime" narrative in this sector, claiming UA strikes on a funeral (Melitopol) and an administrative building (Zaporizhzhia). This likely serves as a propaganda screen for their own defensive failures or as a pretext for upcoming strikes. UA local authorities are focusing on long-term hardening, announcing the construction of underground kindergartens (1039Z).
Northern/Western Sector (Kyiv/Zhytomyr):
The threat has shifted west. UAVs that were previously screening the Kyiv Reservoir are now pushing into Zhytomyr Oblast. This suggests a maneuver to bypass the densest air defenses around the capital to hit critical infrastructure or military transit nodes in the rear.
Enemy analysis (threat assessment)
Capabilities & Intentions:
- Diplomatic Offensive: The announcement of the Geneva talks (Medinsky-led) suggests RU is attempting to pair kinetic pressure (infrastructure strikes) with a formal negotiation track to freeze the front while UA is under maximum environmental stress (-27°C).
- Human Capital Attrition: The 4.1M RUB contract offer for drone pilots indicates RU is struggling with personnel quality in high-tech MOS roles, despite recent claims of "moving at a snail's pace" (Rutte, 1051Z).
- Internal Control: Increased calls by Solovyov and Lukashenko to control/ban foreign messengers (Telegram, WhatsApp) suggest the RU/BY security apparatus is concerned about internal dissent or C2 leaks during the Geneva lead-up (1043Z, 1102Z).
Tactical Changes:
- RU is utilizing "digital fog" and propaganda more aggressively in the South to characterize UA counter-battery fire as strikes on civilian infrastructure.
Friendly activity (UAF)
Force Posture:
- Active Defense: DSHV units are holding the line in Pokrovsk against RU infantry flanking maneuvers.
- Logistical Adaptation: The acquisition of Soviet-era TPP blocks from Eastern Europe is a critical "stop-gap" measure that utilizes existing technical expertise to bypass modern supply chain delays.
Internal Security:
- No new updates on the FSB cell disruption, but high vigilance remains around Zhytomyr as UAVs ingress that airspace.
Information environment / disinformation
- Negotiation Framing: RU state media is emphasizing the "trilateral" format (RU-USA-UA) to marginalize EU influence, coinciding with RU-linked reports of a Merz-Macron "split" (1045Z).
- Atrocity Narratives: Claims of UA striking a funeral procession (Melitopol) are being amplified to coincide with the Geneva announcement, likely to weaken UA's moral standing at the negotiating table (1054Z).
Outlook (next 6-12h)
Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA):
UAV strikes will transition to kinetic impacts in Zhytomyr and western Kyiv regions targeting energy or transit hubs. RU will continue localized "meat-grinder" pushes in Pokrovsk to gain "territorial chips" before the Feb 17 Geneva meeting.
Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA):
A massed missile/UAV strike launched under the cover of the current -27°C cold snap, specifically timed to coincide with Medinsky’s "peace" rhetoric to create maximal psychological and physical leverage.
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
- [HIGH] Verify the extent of damage to the administrative building in Zaporizhzhia to counter RU disinformation.
- [MEDIUM] Confirm if the "Drone Aviation Regiment" recruitment in KhMAO-Yugra is linked to a specific new UAV platform (e.g., "Oreshnik" support or FPV mass-production).
- [CRITICAL] Identify specific Eastern European nations providing TPP components to assess potential RU hybrid retaliation against those transit routes.
//ANALYSIS ENDS//