Situation Update (1037 UTC, Feb 13, 2026)
Key updates since last sitrep
- Active Air Ingress: Ukrainian Air Force confirms Russian UAVs are transiting from western Chernihiv toward the Kyiv Reservoir (1019Z, UA Air Force, HIGH) and moving toward Sumy and Kharkiv from the north (1035Z, UA Air Force, HIGH).
- Counter-Intelligence Success: The SBU neutralized an FSB agent network planning terrorist attacks in Kyiv and Zhytomyr; significantly, the cell included a serving UAF female soldier (1033Z, RBK-UA, HIGH).
- Contested Southern Momentum: Pro-Russian sources claim the Ukrainian counterattacks on the Dnipro/Zaporizhzhia border have "stalled" with high personnel losses, contradicting earlier reports of UA gains due to RU C2 failures (1012Z, Poddubny, LOW/UNCONFIRMED).
- Munich Diplomatic Pivot: President Zelensky’s arrival in Munich coincides with reports of a potential high-level meeting with US Secretary of State Rubio to discuss rumored "Trump plans" for negotiation (1025Z, 1033Z, Operatsiya Z/Tsaplienko, MEDIUM).
- Russian Economic Stabilization: The Russian Central Bank unexpectedly lowered the key interest rate from 16% to 15.5%, signaling an attempt to stabilize domestic markets despite war-time inflation (1030Z, TASS, HIGH).
- Russian Power Projection: A detachment of the Russian Pacific Fleet, led by the corvette Rezky, has departed Vladivostok for a long-distance mission in the Asia-Pacific region, likely a symbolic move to demonstrate reach despite the naval attrition in the Black Sea (1031Z, MoD Russia, HIGH).
Operational picture (by sector)
Southern Sector (Zaporizhzhia/Dnipro):
The situation at the administrative border of Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia is currently obscured by a "digital fog." While 0946Z reports indicated UA exploitation of RU C2 failures, 1012Z RU reports claim these counterattacks have "choked" (захлебнулись). Given the source (Poddubny), this is likely a defensive narrative adjustment, but it indicates heavy engagement and RU efforts to stabilize the line.
Northern/Eastern Sector (Kharkiv/Sumy/Chernihiv):
RU forces have conducted strikes on a Temporary Deployment Point (PVD) of the UA 22nd Separate Motorized Brigade near Veterinarne (Kharkiv direction) using FAB glide bombs (1018Z). New UAV ingress vectors from the north (Sumy/Kharkiv) and west (Chernihiv) suggest a multi-vector screening operation or precursor to a larger strike on the capital's northern approaches.
Strategic Rear / Air Domain:
Air defense activity is focused on the Kyiv Reservoir. The threat to TPP-5 and TPP-6 remains extreme. Internal security remains a critical front following the SBU’s disruption of the Kyiv/Zhytomyr FSB cell, highlighting RU’s continued use of "insider threats" within the UAF.
Enemy analysis (threat assessment)
Capabilities & Intentions:
- Hybrid Logistics: RU continues to integrate Ground Robotic Complexes (NRTK "Courier") for logistics in snowy conditions, mitigating personnel exposure (1029Z).
- Infrastructure Targeting: The current UAV flight paths (Chernihiv to Kyiv Reservoir) suggest RU is positioning assets to target the Kyiv hydroelectric or thermal assets previously identified.
- Economic Maneuvering: The 0.5% rate cut suggests RU leadership believes they have reached a peak in inflation or are prioritizing industrial liquidity over currency stability to sustain the defense sector.
Tactical Changes:
- RU appears to be using thermal-equipped drones more aggressively in the Kharkiv sector to identify UAF deployment points in built-up areas (1018Z).
Friendly activity (UAF)
Force Posture:
- Counter-Offensive Pressure: UAF remains on the offensive in the South, though facing stiffening RU resistance and propaganda-led "counter-reporting."
- Internal Security: High vigilance. The arrest of a serving soldier in an FSB cell indicates a rigorous internal screening process is underway to prevent sabotage during the infrastructure crisis.
Diplomatic Maneuver:
- The UAF leadership is increasingly tied to the outcome of the Munich Security Conference, specifically regarding the "Trump negotiation plan" and securing the German-UA drone production enterprise.
Information environment / disinformation
- Negotiation Framing: RU and Western outlets (Politico) are circulating Miami and Abu Dhabi as potential negotiation sites (1021Z). This serves to create an air of "inevitable peace" which can undermine frontline resolve.
- Domestic RU Friction: Internal Russian pushback against the Telegram ban is surfacing through religious channels (Altai priest), suggesting the C2 disruptions mentioned in the previous sitrep are causing significant internal frustration (1010Z).
- Western Support Narratives: UA channels are amplifying NATO Secretary General Rutte’s criticism of Putin's "snail's pace" to bolster morale (1027Z).
Outlook (next 6-12h)
Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA):
A continuation of the UAV-led harassment of Kyiv's northern perimeter, transitioning into a kinetic strike on TPP assets as temperatures remain at -27°C. RU forces in the South will continue "meat-grinder" defensive operations to stall the UA counter-offensive.
Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA):
Coordinated sabotage by remaining FSB "sleeper cells" within Kyiv to coincide with a massed UAV/missile strike, overwhelming emergency response teams and air defenses simultaneously.
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
- [CRITICAL] Confirm the current status of UA 22nd Brigade personnel and equipment following the FAB strike at Veterinarne.
- [HIGH] Identify the specific "insidous plan" details regarding Trump-Zelensky negotiations to assess potential shifts in military aid or operational constraints.
- [MEDIUM] Determine if the RU rate cut (15.5%) is tied to a specific injection of liquidity into the "Oreshnik" production program or general economic stabilization.
//ANALYSIS ENDS//
