Situation Report

Situation Update (2026-02-11 10:57 UTC)

Key updates since last sitrep

• UAF LIBERATION OF KOSIVTSEVE: (10:56, РБК-Україна, HIGH) UAF forces have successfully cleared the village of Kosivtseve (Zaporizhzhia sector) of Russian occupiers. This represents a significant tactical counter-offensive success in a contested region.
• SURGE IN RU RECONNAISSANCE UAVs: (10:35, UAF Air Force, HIGH) Russian ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance) drones are active over Sumy, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kherson regions. This is a likely precursor to precision missile or "Geran" strikes.
• SYSTEMIC ATTACK ON RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE: (10:37, РБК-Україна, HIGH) RU forces have launched coordinated strikes against trains and railway infrastructure in several regions. This aims to disrupt UAF logistics and reinforcement movements.
• DEEP FPV INTERDICTION (DONETSK/AVDIIVKA): (10:47, STERNENKO/IFG, MEDIUM) Operators from the Ivan Franko Group (IFG) conducted deep-rear FPV strikes against RU logistics near Donetsk/Avdiivka, destroying multiple vehicles, including a fuel tanker.
• RU C2 CONTRADICTION ESCALATION: (10:47, Alex Parker Returns, HIGH) Russian milbloggers are now openly and aggressively refuting Kremlin spokesperson Peskov’s claims regarding Telegram. Frontline sources confirm Telegram is the exclusive backbone for coordination, reconnaissance feeds, and casualty evacuation; its disruption is causing a "concentrated strike" on RU operational capability.
• DESTRUCTION OF RU BM-27 URAGAN: (10:49, БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС, HIGH) Ukrainian National Guard "Lazar" unit destroyed a Russian BM-27 Uragan MLRS that was targeting civilian infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia.
• UNCONFIRMED: NEGOTIATION RUMORS: (10:39, Alex Parker Returns, LOW) Speculation continues regarding a US-guaranteed (Witkoff/Kushner) flight of a UA delegation to Moscow via Warsaw. Assessment: Remains a high-probability Russian PSYOP.

Operational picture (by sector)

• Zaporizhzhia Sector: UAF regained the initiative in Kosivtseve (10:56), indicating localized RU defensive failures. However, RU continues to utilize MLRS (BM-27) against civilian targets, though UAF counter-battery and drone units are successfully interdicting these assets (10:49).
• Donetsk/Avdiivka Sector: RU claims of UAF surrenders near Krasnoarmiisk (10:29) are currently uncorroborated and likely propaganda to counter news of UAF deep-strike successes. UAF IFG operators are effectively targeting RU supply lines (tankers/logistics) in the deep rear (10:47).
• Northern/Rear Sectors: RU is prioritizing the degradation of the Ukrainian rail network (10:37) to isolate the eastern fronts from Western and domestic supply hubs.
• Sumy/Kharkiv: Increased RU UAV density (10:35, 10:53) specifically targeting Krolevets and Konotop suggests imminent kinetic strikes on these logistical junctions.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

• Aviation & Missile Threat: The transition from "quiet" GRAU arsenals (previous report) to active ISR UAV saturation across five regions (10:35) strongly indicates that a large-scale coordinated strike (MLCOA) is imminent.
• C2 Instability: The internal RU rift over Telegram is deepening. If the Kremlin persists in blocking or throttling the app, RU tactical units will likely resort to unencrypted or commercial alternatives (WhatsApp), significantly increasing their vulnerability to UAF SIGINT (Signals Intelligence).
• Foreign Recruitment Friction: Pressure from South Africa regarding "tricked" citizens (10:54) indicates RU's growing desperation in manpower procurement and potential diplomatic fallout with "friendly" Global South nations.

Friendly activity (UAF)

• Tactical Counter-Offensive: The liberation of Kosivtseve demonstrates UAF capability to conduct localized clearing operations despite the "Ice Armor" conditions.
• Logistical Resilience: UAF rail repair teams are likely heavily engaged following the strikes on infrastructure (10:37). Maintaining the flow of Western aid remains a critical priority.
• ISTAR Dominance: UA drone units (Lazar, IFG) continue to demonstrate superior situational awareness, striking high-value assets (MLRS) and deep logistics.

Information environment / disinformation

• Diplomatic Sabotage: Hungarian PM Orban’s framing of UA’s EU entry as a "declaration of war" (10:48) serves RU interests by threatening EU cohesion.
• Reflexive Control: The "Moscow Delegation" narrative (10:39) is being sophisticatedly seeded with specific names (Kushner/Witkoff) to lend it an air of legitimacy, likely intended to trigger internal UA political friction.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

• MLCOA: RU will likely launch a wave of "Geran" UAVs or standoff missiles against the regions currently under ISR surveillance (Sumy, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia) within the next 6-12 hours.
• MDCOA: RU may attempt a surge on the Pokrovsk axis (Krasnoarmiisk) to capitalize on claimed surrenders and rail disruptions, attempting to sever UAF supply before the weather shifts.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

1. [CRITICAL] Assess the operational status of the rail network following the 10:37 attacks; identify specific choke points destroyed.
2. [HIGH] Monitor RU tactical radio frequencies for a transition away from Telegram to unencrypted comms.
3. [MEDIUM] Confirm the current status of the front line around Kosivtseve to ensure RU has not established new flanking positions.

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IPB 1: SITUATION OVERVIEW The battlefield is currently defined by RU attempts to paralyze UA movement through infrastructure strikes (Rail) and high-altitude recon. The "Ice Armor" facilitates RU infantry but also makes their heavy MLRS assets (like the BM-27) easier to spot and destroy when they move into firing positions.

IPB 2: ENEMY ANALYSIS RU is facing a critical failure in internal cohesion. The MoD/Kremlin is prioritized on digital control (Telegram ban), while the tactical level (Milbloggers/Operators) is warning of a C2 collapse. This friction is a primary exploitable vulnerability for UAF.

IPB 3: FRIENDLY FORCES UAF is demonstrating "aggressive defense," seizing opportunities to reclaim territory (Kosivtseve) while maintaining a high attrition rate on RU technical assets (MLRS/Logistics).

IPB 4: INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT The RU info-op is moving from domestic distraction to international disruption (Orban/US-guaranteed talks). The objective is to create a sense of "inevitable negotiation" to demoralize UAF front-line troops.

IPB 5: PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS Expect a significant kinetic event in the next 12 hours involving RU long-range strikes. Tactical success in Kosivtseve should be used to bolster UA morale to counter the RU "surrender" narratives circulating on the Pokrovsk axis.

//ANALYSIS ENDS//