Situation Report

Situation Update (2026-02-11 10:30 UTC)

Key updates since last sitrep

• RU VKS STRIKES ON SLOVIANSK: (10:22, Поддубный, MEDIUM) Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) conducted strikes against industrial zones in Sloviansk. Smoke plumes indicate hits on heavy fortifications/logistics hubs; this marks an intensification of efforts to "soften" the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk defensive line.
• TELEGRAM C2 CRISIS ESCALATION: (10:15-10:26, Colonelcassad/Дневник Десантника, HIGH) Total fines against Telegram reached 11 million RUB. Kremlin spokesperson Peskov’s continued denial of Telegram’s tactical military utility is facing open derision from RU frontline "paratrooper" sources, indicating a deepening rift between RU MoD/Kremlin and tactical operators.
• "GERAN" DOMESTIC PRODUCTION CLAIM: (09:58, Архангел Спецназа, MEDIUM) Russian sources released images of a purportedly domestic internal combustion engine for "Geran" (Shahed) drones, claiming 1,000 units/month capacity. If true, this signals a transition to a fully sovereign long-range strike supply chain.
• UNCONFIRMED: UKRAINIAN DELEGATION TO MOSCOW: (10:13, ЦАПЛІЄНКО / 10:17, Операция Z, UNCONFIRMED/LOW) Rumors are circulating in both UA and RU spaces regarding a potential UAF delegation visit to Moscow for direct talks. Note: This is likely a Russian information operation (PSYOP) designed to sow internal UA discord.
• SBU COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE SUCCESS: (10:04, Оперативний ЗСУ, HIGH) The SBU apprehended a RU military intelligence (GRU) agent in the Kyiv region. The agent had previously provided targeting data on the Pokrovsk axis, confirming RU's continued priority on this sector.
• RU INTERNAL TECH DISRUPTION: (10:00, ТАСС, MEDIUM) A "technical failure" has paralyzed the Moscow Region's GAI (Traffic Police) information systems. While likely a localized glitch, it occurs against a backdrop of wider digital instability in RU.

Operational picture (by sector)

• Donetsk Sector (Sloviansk/Bakhmut Axis): RU has transitioned to standoff strikes (VKS) against Sloviansk industrial areas (10:22). Heavy destruction is confirmed in Ivanivske (10:03) via 5th Assault Brigade footage, indicating the village is functionally a grey zone of ruins rather than a defensible position.
• Donetsk Sector (Pokrovsk/Kostiantynivka): RU forces (Akhmat) are utilizing high-frequency drone reconnaissance to interdict UAF movements on the outskirts of Kostiantynivka (10:04). SBU activity confirms that RU intelligence collection is heavily focused on the Pokrovsk-Kyiv corridor.
• Southern Sector (Velyka Novosilka/Ternovatoye): RU 14th Spetsnaz Brigade claims to be disrupting UAF logistics 3km west of Ternovatoye (10:00). While equipment destruction is claimed, source attribution in RU video evidence remains inconsistent.
• Northern Border: No significant changes since the massive UAV raid (09:55), though RU air defense recruitment (10:00) suggests a perceived long-term vulnerability.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

• Tactical C2 Fragility: The "Telegram vs. Kremlin" conflict is no longer just a legal issue; it is a direct threat to RU tactical coordination. RU mil-bloggers are effectively warning that dismantling Telegram without a functional alternative will lead to a collapse in lateral comms.
• Spetsnaz Interdiction: RU Spetsnaz units (14th and 56th) are prioritizing UAF "drone command posts" and communication nodes (10:03) using FPV drones, suggesting a coordinated "anti-UAV" campaign.
• Industrial Persistence: The localization of drone engines suggests RU is insulating its strike capabilities from Western/Chinese supply chain pressure.

Friendly activity (UAF)

• Counter-Intelligence: Successful neutralization of the Pokrovsk-axis spy (10:04) mitigates the risk of precision strikes on troop concentrations in the rear.
• Force Sustenance: The 14th Mechanized Brigade is engaging in family liaison and repatriation efforts (10:14), maintaining morale and organizational transparency despite heavy fighting.
• Resilience Operations: Ongoing SSO "Resistance Movement" promotion (10:15) targets occupied Tokmak, indicating active behind-the-lines insurgent preparation.

Information environment / disinformation

• "Moscow Visit" Narrative: The simultaneous appearance of the "UA delegation to Moscow" story across RU and UA Telegram channels (10:13, 10:17) bears the hallmarks of a coordinated RU reflex control operation aimed at undermining UA political stability.
• Hungarian Leverage: RU sources are amplifying Hungarian FM Szijjártó's comments (10:08) to paint UA mobilization as failing and human rights-violating.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

• MLCOA (Most Likely): Continued RU VKS strikes on Sloviansk/Kramatorsk industrial sites to prevent UAF from consolidating reserves.
• MDCOA (Most Dangerous): A localized collapse of RU C2 due to Telegram "throttling," which RU might mask with a sudden, massive "Geran" launch to regain the initiative.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

1. [CRITICAL] Verify the authenticity of the "UA Delegation to Moscow" claim through official government channels to neutralize potential PSYOP.
2. [HIGH] Technical analysis of the "domestic" Geran engine (10:00) to determine if it is a rebadged foreign component or a genuine industrial shift.
3. [MEDIUM] Monitor RU GAI/Police system failures for signs of a wider cyber-offensive or internal RU administrative collapse.

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IPB 1: SITUATION OVERVIEW Battlefield geometry remains defined by the "Ice Armor" conditions, facilitating RU infantry mobility but also exposing them to UAF drone surveillance. Sloviansk is emerging as the primary target for RU long-range aviation (VKS) to bypass the frozen ground stalemate.

IPB 2: ENEMY ANALYSIS Russia is attempting to solve its drone supply chain issues (Geran engines) while simultaneously creating a self-inflicted wound in its C2 infrastructure (Telegram ban). This contradiction—advancing in hardware while retreating in software—is a critical RU vulnerability.

IPB 3: FRIENDLY FORCES UAF is maintaining high-level counter-intelligence pressure. The detention of the Novogrodivka miner (Holovin) prevents RU from refining its targeting on the Pokrovsk axis, which is currently the most active kinetic front.

IPB 4: INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT The Kremlin is using "diplomatic smoke" (Orban/Moscow visit rumors) to distract from the domestic friction caused by the Telegram ban and the high casualty rates documented in villages like Ivanivske.

IPB 5: PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS The next 6 hours will likely see RU "shaping operations" via VKS strikes in the Donetsk region. If the RU C2 rift widens, we expect increased usage of unencrypted radio by RU frontline units, providing a window for UAF signals intelligence (SIGINT) exploitation.

//ANALYSIS ENDS//