Nightwatch logo
'Nightwatch' text with white and gray letters
Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2026-02-09 12:03:39Z
15 days ago
Previous (2026-02-09 11:33:41Z)

Situation Update (2026-02-09T12:03:20Z)

Key updates since last sitrep

  • STRATEGIC LOGISTICAL STRIKE: (11:34, GenStab ZSU, HIGH) UAF confirmed the destruction of approximately 6,000 Russian FPV drones and components across three containers at a storage facility in Rostov. This represents a massive disruption to Russian tactical UAS capacity.
  • COMMAND NODE NEUTRALIZATION: (11:40, GenStab ZSU, HIGH) A Russian command post was successfully struck near Sudzha (Kursk Oblast), further degrading C2 in the border region.
  • HVT STATUS UPDATE: (11:47, TASS, MEDIUM) Russian state media reports Deputy Head of the GRU, Lt. Gen. Vladimir Alekseev, is in "stable" condition. RU authorities have identified a suspect (Serebritskaya) linked to the assassination attempt in the LNR (11:58, TASS, MEDIUM).
  • ARMOR LOSS CLAIM: (11:50, Poddubny/WarGonzo, LOW/UNCONFIRMED) Russian sources claim the destruction of an Australian-supplied M1 Abrams tank near Huliaipole via FPV drone strikes.
  • HYBRID THREAT (BELARUS): (11:44, WarGonzo/SVR, MEDIUM) The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) has escalated rhetoric claiming US, UK, German, and Polish involvement in a planned coup in Belarus.
  • FUEL INFRASTRUCTURE STRIKE: (11:40, Colonelcassad, MEDIUM) Russian drones reportedly struck a fuel and lubricant (POL) storage facility in Kachanovo, Poltava Oblast.
  • AIR DEFENSE ENGAGEMENT: (11:38, Anatoliy "Stirlitz" Stefan, HIGH) UAF successfully downed a Russian "Molniya" drone over Kostyantynivka; meanwhile, new "Shahed" incursions are moving south through Chernihiv (11:34, Air Force).

Operational picture (by sector)

1. Northern Border / Kursk-Sudzha Axis:

  • Battlefield Geometry: The strike on the Sudzha command post (11:40, GenStab ZSU) suggests UAF is systematically targeting the C2 nodes supporting Russian border security and potential offensive assemblies in the north.
  • Enemy Disposition: Continued loitering of Il-78 tankers (per previous daily report) and the detection of new UAVs over Chernihiv (11:34) indicate persistent Russian aerial reconnaissance and strike posture.

2. Southern Sector (Zaporizhzhia/Huliaipole):

  • Ground Operations: High-intensity tactical activity near Huliaipole. The claim of a destroyed Australian Abrams (11:50) suggests Russian forces are prioritizing the hunt for Western-donated heavy armor using the 35th Army's FPV units.
  • Energy/Logistics: Zaporizhzhiaoblenergo is attempting to stabilize the regional grid amid ongoing kinetic pressure and -27°C temperatures (12:00, Zaporizhzhia OVA).

3. Eastern Sector (Donbas):

  • Air Defense: Successful interception of a "Molniya" drone in Kostyantynivka (11:38) indicates UAF tactical AD remains alert despite systemic pressure on the national power grid and missile stocks.
  • Civilian Impact: A night attack on Shakhtarske (Dnipropetrovsk border) resulted in 9 hospitalizations (11:56, Dnipropetrovsk OVA), highlighting continued Russian targeting of settlements in the immediate rear.

4. Russian Rear / Rostov-on-Don:

  • Logistical Impact: The loss of 6,000 FPV drones in Rostov is a significant blow to the 7th Guards Air Assault Division and other units staged for the Donbas/Zaporizhzhia fronts (Dempster-Shafer belief: 0.42). This will likely result in a localized 48-72 hour "drone drought" for certain Russian tactical units until stocks are replenished.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

  • Course of Action: Russia is increasingly leveraging the "SVR narrative" (11:44) regarding Belarus to create a perceived threat on the northern flank, likely intended to fix UAF reserves away from the active southern and eastern fronts.
  • Tactical Adaptation: The use of "Molniya" drones and persistent FPV strikes on armor suggests a continued shift toward attritional, UAS-led warfare to compensate for infantry vulnerabilities in the deep freeze.
  • Propaganda: RU media is weaponizing Western reporting (Financial Times) to claim UAF air defense exhaustion (12:01), aiming to undermine morale and pressure Western allies.

Friendly activity (UAF)

  • Force Posture: UAF continues to demonstrate high-end "deep strike" capability, reaching into Rostov and Kursk to hit high-value logistical and C2 targets.
  • Information Defense: The State Emergency Service (DSNS) successfully neutralized a disinformation campaign regarding "mass poisonings" in Poltava (11:36, 11:41), illustrating proactive management of the internal cognitive domain.
  • Economic Resilience: The UAH remains relatively stable against the USD (~43 UAH/USD), providing a degree of internal financial predictability despite infrastructure damage (12:02, RBC-Ukraine).

Information environment / disinformation

  • Belarusian Pretext: The SVR-led claims of Western-backed coups (11:44) are a high-priority disinformation thread designed to justify Russian military integration with Belarus.
  • Domestic RU Crackdown: Legal actions against anti-war activists in Samara (11:54) and "terror" suspects in Ufa (11:35) indicate the Kremlin is tightening internal security to prevent domestic instability from mirroring the energy crisis.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

  • MLCOA (Most Likely): Russian retaliatory strikes against Ukrainian energy and POL storage in response to the Rostov drone depot loss. Continued movement of "Shahed" UAVs from the north (Chernihiv) toward central hubs.
  • MDCOA (Most Dangerous): A coordinated Russian/Belarusian military "exercise" or deployment on the northern border, triggered by the SVR's "coup" narrative, forcing a major UAF reallocation of forces during the energy crisis.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

  1. [URGENT] Technical confirmation of the reported Abrams loss near Huliaipole (visual confirmation or BDA needed).
  2. [HIGH] Assessment of RU logistical surge capacity—how quickly can 6,000 FPV drones be replaced from central stocks or Iranian/Chinese supply lines?
  3. [MEDIUM] Verification of the "stable" condition of Gen. Alekseev—is he still functional for operational C2?
  4. [MEDIUM] Monitoring of Belarusian troop movements in response to the SVR narrative.

//ANALYSIS ENDS//

Previous (2026-02-09 11:33:41Z)

We only use optional analytics cookies if you allow them. Necessary cookies stay on for sign-in and site security.

Learn more in our Privacy Policy.