DEEP STRIKE EXPANSION: UAVs have transited Zhytomyr Oblast (Olevsk, Luhyny) and are now on a westward vector toward Rivne Oblast (0323Z, AFU Air Force, HIGH).
C2 DEGRADATION CONFIRMED: Ukrainian state media acknowledges that Starlink connectivity disruptions have fundamentally "changed the situation on the front," corroborating previous reports of "White List" friction (0316Z, RBC-UA, HIGH).
ORBAT INDICATOR: Russian platoon-level command presence from the Amur region (Eastern Military District) confirmed in-theater, indicating continued commitment of Far East mobilized assets (0303Z, Colonelcassad, MEDIUM).
Operational picture (by sector)
Northern/Western Sector: The UAV threat has shifted from transit through Zhytomyr to an active approach toward Rivne Oblast. This suggests the target set may include the Rivne Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) switching stations or regional distribution nodes to further destabilize the western "safe zone" grid.
Frontline (General): Command and Control (C2) is currently the primary friction point. The official acknowledgement of Starlink issues suggests that localized Ukrainian counter-attacks or defensive coordination are being hindered by intermittent data links.
Southern/Eastern Sectors: (Baseline) Heavy KAB (Guided Aerial Bomb) activity continues in Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, and Dnipropetrovsk. No new kinetic impacts reported in the last 30 minutes, but the air threat remains active.
Enemy activity / threat assessment
UAV Flight Path Analysis: The vector toward Rivne indicates a deliberate effort to extend the "Dark Start" scenario to the far west. By targeting the Rivne/Volyn corridors, the enemy seeks to sever the remaining synchronized links with the European energy grid (ENTSO-E).
Force Disposition: The presence of personnel from the Amur region (Dobryy's unit) confirms that the Russian 35th or 36th Combined Arms Army (CAA) elements remain active in the AO. Their mobilization status (2022) suggests these are now seasoned, albeit attrition-heavy, units.
Electronic Warfare (EW) / Cyber: The Starlink "White List" update is being exploited by Russian forces. While intended to brick captured terminals, the resulting "blue-on-blue" technical friction is providing a window for Russian tactical advances without the usual Ukrainian FPV drone density, which relies on these links.
Friendly activity (UAF)
C2 Recovery: Technical teams are likely working to stabilize the Starlink "White List" to restore frontline connectivity. The public reporting of this issue suggests the impact is too widespread to remain a classified operational detail.
Air Defense (AD): Mobile Fire Groups (MFGs) are being repositioned westward to intercept the UAVs approaching Rivne. Extreme cold (-27°C) continues to impact equipment readiness and personnel endurance.
Information environment / disinformation
Narrative Shift: Russian sources are humanizing the "long war" through interviews with mobilized commanders (e.g., "Dobryy"), aiming to project stability and high morale to domestic audiences.
Operational Security (OPSEC): Ukrainian media's frank assessment of Starlink issues serves a dual purpose: alerting the international community to the severity of the technical crisis while inadvertently confirming the success of the disruption to Russian intelligence.
Outlook (next 6-12h)
Most Likely COA (MLCOA): UAV strikes on Rivne energy infrastructure between 0400Z and 0600Z. Continued KAB pressure on the Zaporizhzhia and Dnipro axes to prevent AFU from exploiting any Starlink recovery windows.
Most Dangerous COA (MDCOA): A coordinated ground assault in the Donetsk or Zaporizhzhia sectors while Ukrainian C2 remains degraded, utilizing the Starlink "blackout" to achieve tactical surprise.
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
[CRITICAL] Rivne AD Coverage: Assess the remaining AD interceptor density in Rivne Oblast following recent shifts to cover Kyiv and the East.
[HIGH] Starlink Impact on RU: Verify claims that the Starlink disruptions are also affecting Russian units using "grey market" terminals (0316Z RBC-UA reference).
[MEDIUM] Tactical Movement: Monitor for increased Russian ground activity in the Dnipro/Zaporizhzhia junction to see if "shouting" on RU channels translates to kinetic maneuvers.
