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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2026-02-06 11:56:10Z
18 days ago
Previous (2026-02-06 11:26:09Z)

Situation Update (1155Z FEB 06 2026)

Key updates since last sitrep

  • MYRNOHRAD SECTOR DETERIORATION: Situation in Myrnohrad has significantly worsened; Russian forces are deploying heavy armored equipment and intensifying assaults (1140Z, RBC-UA; HIGH).
  • GEN-LT ALEKSEEV ASSASSINATION DETAILS: New intelligence indicates the GRU Deputy Chief was shot in the back in an elevator hall on Volokolamskoye Highway, Moscow, at 0700 local time (1139Z, Fighterbomber; MEDIUM).
  • CANADIAN MILITARY AID: Canada has committed to supplying Ukraine with AIM air-to-air missiles to bolster aerial defense capabilities (1135Z, Operativniy ZSU; HIGH).
  • WIDESPREAD POWER OUTAGES: Emergency blackouts have expanded beyond Odesa and Dnipro, with reports indicating outages are now affecting most Ukrainian regions following continued strikes (1140Z, Operatsiya Z; MEDIUM).
  • INTERNAL CORRUPTION PROBE: NABU has reported the theft of 246 million UAH by UA generals and a colonel regarding the development of an automated military system (1143Z, Colonelcassad; HIGH).
  • PRISONER CAPTURE CLAIM: Russian sources claim the capture of 10 Ukrainian personnel by a four-man Russian squad; however, this remains UNCONFIRMED and likely intended for propaganda (1133Z, Colonelcassad; LOW).

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

  • Battlefield Geometry: The focal point of ground operations has consolidated in the Myrnohrad (Pokrovsk) sector. The introduction of Russian heavy armor suggests a shift from infantry-led "meat assaults" to a more conventional combined-arms breakthrough attempt on the urban outskirts.
  • Air Domain: Multiple UAV threats persist. A group of Shahed-type drones is currently transiting from Dnipropetrovsk toward Kremenchuk (Poltava) (1131Z). A separate UAV is loitering on the northern outskirts of Dnipro, heading west (1136Z).
  • Weather/Environment: The extreme cold (-27°C) remains the primary environmental factor, exacerbating the impact of the expanding emergency power outages across "almost all regions" of Ukraine (1140Z).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat assessment)

  • Tactical Adaptation (Myrnohrad): Russian forces (likely elements of the 35th Army) are transitioning to high-intensity urban assault tactics. The use of heavy equipment indicates they are attempting to exploit the current atmospheric and energy-related strain on Ukrainian logistics.
  • C2 Vulnerability: The specific details of Gen-Lt Alekseev’s assassination (location: Volokolamskoye Highway; timing: 0700Z) confirm a massive failure of the Russian Federal Protective Service (FSO) and internal GRU security.
  • Information Warfare: Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov is aggressively utilizing the Alekseev hit to frame Ukraine as a "terrorist state" intent on disrupting negotiations with the OSCE and Switzerland (1132Z, 1139Z). This is a coordinated effort to undermine Western diplomatic support.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue force tracking)

  • Capability Enhancements: The acquisition of Canadian AIM missiles (1135Z) is critical for counter-UAV and cruise missile defense, potentially offsetting the depletion of Soviet-era interceptors.
  • Personnel Movements: Former Border Guard (DPSU) Chief Gen-Lt Serhiy Deineko has been released from service following a medical commission (VLYK) ruling (1155Z).
  • Internal Governance: The NABU investigation into the 246 million UAH theft (1143Z) indicates ongoing internal friction within the MOD/General Staff regarding procurement for automated C2 systems. This may temporarily impact the deployment of digital battlefield management tools.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive domain)

  • RF Propaganda: Russian channels (Colonelcassad) are promoting "small unit heroics" (4 vs 10 capture claims) to bolster domestic morale amid the Alekseev scandal.
  • Hybrid Repression: Inside Russia, legal pressure is mounting against opposition figures (Khodorkovsky book banned) and activists (Navalny-related fines), suggesting a tightening of the home front during the "negotiation" narrative push (1136Z, 1145Z).
  • UA Morale: The Coordination Headquarters meeting with the families of the 225th Separate Assault Regiment (1145Z) highlights the ongoing sensitivity regarding POW/MIA status and the psychological pressure on frontline units.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future operations)

  • Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): Russian forces will attempt to penetrate Myrnohrad’s northern industrial zones within the next 12 hours using the newly deployed heavy armor. Concurrently, a "Shahed" wave will likely target Kremenchuk’s infrastructure to further degrade the central UA power grid.
  • Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): Exploiting the reported corruption-related delays in UA's "automated system," Russian electronic warfare (EW) units may launch a coordinated effort to jam UA C2 nodes in the Pokrovsk sector during the armored assault.
  • Negotiation Narrative: Expect Russia to present a "peace ultimatum" through OSCE channels within the next 24-48 hours, citing the Alekseev assassination as "final proof" that the current UA leadership is an unsuitable negotiating partner.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

Critical threat to the Myrnohrad defense line. Expect high-intensity urban combat and potential tactical shifts. Air defense units in Poltava and Dnipropetrovsk must remain on high alert for low-altitude UAV incursions targeting energy hubs.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

  1. [URGENT] Verification of the "10 UA POWs" claim—identify the unit involved and assess if a local breakthrough occurred.
  2. [HIGH] Status of the 225th Separate Assault Regiment—determine if the HQ meeting indicates high casualty rates or a specific localized crisis.
  3. [MEDIUM] Technical specs and delivery timeline for Canadian AIM missiles (Can they be integrated into existing UA platforms immediately?).
  4. [LOW] Impact of the NABU software investigation on current frontline C2 capabilities.

//REPORT ENDS//

Previous (2026-02-06 11:26:09Z)

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