SATCOM TECHNICAL RESTRICTION (2255Z, Alex Parker Returns, LOW - UNCONFIRMED): Reports indicate Starlink has implemented a velocity-based connectivity lockout. Terminals reportedly face degraded service at 70-80 km/h and total disconnection at 90 km/h.
COMMUNICATIONS DISRUPTION (Analytic Judgment, MEDIUM): Dempster-Shafer belief (0.40) supports a "Communication Network Disruption," likely correlating with the reported Starlink velocity caps.
ELECTRONIC WARFARE CIRCUMVENTION (Baseline, HIGH): UAF continues to face "fiber-optic" FPV threats in the Pokrovsk sector which remain immune to current EW and SATCOM disruptions.
Operational picture (by sector)
Multi-Domain: Communications & SATCOM
Technical Constraint: If confirmed, the 90 km/h Starlink lockout specifically targets high-speed fixed-wing ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) and strike UAVs.
Exemptions: Intelligence suggests UAF may maintain a "military serial number" whitelist, potentially bypassing these restrictions for authorized units.
Resilient Platforms: The velocity cap does not affect low-speed platforms such as the "Baba Yaga" heavy hexacopters or Unmanned Surface Vessels (USVs), which typically operate below the reported 70 km/h threshold.
Zaporizhzhia Sector
Artillery Engagement: The Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (Vostok Group) remains active. Fire missions are ongoing against UAF defensive nodes.
Ground Activity: No change from 2251Z; Russian forces are maintaining "Negotiation by Fire" posture ahead of February 1st diplomatic talks.
Eastern Sector (Pokrovsk)
Fiber-Optic Threat: The use of hard-wired FPV drones by Russian "Rubicon" units continues to deny UAF movement on the Pavlohrad-Pokrovsk highway. This remains a critical tactical vulnerability as it bypasses the signal-based disruptions reported in the SATCOM domain.
Enemy activity / threat assessment
Course of Action: Russia is likely leveraging technical SATCOM restrictions (whether through diplomatic pressure on providers or exploitation of commercial terms of service) to degrade Ukrainian long-range drone capabilities.
Capability Assessment: The 62nd Missile Division remains at a high state of readiness (Activity Score 11.82). The 1446th Mobile Command Post is active, indicating the launch window for a massed missile strike remains open.
Tactical Adaptation: Shift toward fiber-optic and low-speed, high-payload drones (Baba Yaga style) suggests a move toward platforms that are harder to disrupt via traditional EW or velocity-based SATCOM lockouts.
Friendly activity (UAF)
Technical Adaptation: UAF signal units are likely testing terminal velocity limits to confirm the reported 90 km/h lockout.
Force Posture: High operational security (OPSEC) is maintained regarding the "Shadow" unit's recent successes and the deployment of Rodeur 330 munitions.
Morale: Despite technical challenges, internal UAF channels indicate high resolve and successful localized counter-battery operations.
Information environment / disinformation
Source Analysis: The Starlink restriction report originates from a Russian mil-blogger source (Alex Parker Returns). It may be an attempt to project Russian influence over Western technology providers or to cause panic among UAF drone operators.
Narrative Tracking: Russian state media (TASS) continues to amplify casualty figures (38.5k) and domestic scandals (cemetery disputes) to foster internal Ukrainian discord.
Outlook (next 6-12h)
Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): Continued tactical pressure in Zaporizhzhia and the Donbas. UAF will likely transition high-speed drone operations to alternative datalinks or inertial navigation to bypass Starlink restrictions.
Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): A coordinated mass missile strike by the 62nd Missile Division targeting the fragile energy grid, timed to maximize leverage before the Miami/Abu Dhabi negotiations.
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
[CRITICAL] Technical verification of Starlink velocity lockout—requires field testing by friendly units to confirm the 90 km/h threshold and identify if "military" terminals are indeed exempt.
[HIGH] SIGINT/ELINT monitoring of Russian "Rubicon" units to determine the effective range and spool capacity of fiber-optic FPV drones.
[MEDIUM] Evaluation of alternative SATCOM or long-range datalinks (e.g., Skynode, proprietary mesh nets) for UAF high-speed UAVs.
