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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2026-01-29 02:32:35Z
18 days ago
Previous (2026-01-29 02:02:32Z)

Situation Update (0240Z 29 JAN 2026)

Key updates since last sitrep

  • HV-TARGETING WESTERN AXIS (0225Z, UAF Air Force, HIGH): Shahed-type UAV is confirmed on a terminal vector toward Starokostiantyniv (Khmelnytskyi Oblast) from the north.
  • KINETIC STRIKE ZAPORIZHZHIA (0204Z, Zaporizhzhia OVA, HIGH): Hostile attack on the Zaporizhzhia district has resulted in 3 KIA and 1 WIA; civilian infrastructure damage confirmed.
  • UNCONFIRMED DEPOT STRIKE (0219Z, TASS/RU MOD, LOW): Russian Ministry of Defense claims "Uragan" MLRS destroyed UAF ammunition warehouses in the Zaporizhzhia region. Note: This likely corresponds to the 0204Z civilian attack; BDA is pending.
  • TACTICAL AVIATION ESCALATION (0203Z, UAF Air Force, HIGH): Russian tactical aviation has launched Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs) against targets in Donetsk Oblast.
  • INTELLIGENCE PIVOT (0225Z, RBC-Ukraine/FT, MEDIUM): Reports indicate European allies are preparing to replace US-sourced intelligence for Ukraine within months.

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

The operational tempo is increasing as the "Negotiation by Fire" strategy manifests across three distinct geographic sectors. The enemy is synchronizing long-range UAV probes with tactical aviation (KABs) and heavy MLRS fire.

Battlefield Geometry & Key Terrain:

  • Starokostiantyniv (Western Sector): Remains the primary high-value target (HVT) for the current UAV wave. The entry from the north (0225Z) suggests a maneuver to bypass AD concentrations detected earlier in Vinnytsia.
  • Donetsk Sector: Increased use of KABs indicates a persistent effort to degrade frontline defenses ahead of the rumored 80k-man reserve push (Ref: Daily Report).
  • Zaporizhzhia Sector: Emerging as a focal point for heavy artillery/MLRS. The geographic overlap between reported civilian casualties and claimed ammo depot strikes suggests "indiscriminate" or "area-effect" weapons usage (Uragan MLRS).

Weather & Environmental Factors:

  • Cloud cover may be providing concealment for KAB-launching aircraft, complicating visual acquisition by UAF MANPADS teams in the East.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment) (IPB Step 2)

Aviation & Strike Assets:

  • Tactical Shift: The use of "Uragan" MLRS (0219Z) against purported rear-area logistics in Zaporizhzhia indicates a shift toward using long-range rocket artillery for interdiction, potentially to conserve precision-guided munitions (PGMs).
  • KAB Deployment: Continuous KAB launches in Donetsk are intended to suppress UAF strongpoints. This high-volume, low-cost delivery system is the primary tool for shaping the battlefield.

Logistics & Sustainment:

  • The Russian claim of destroying ammo depots (0219Z), if even partially true, indicates a prioritized effort to disrupt UAF sustainment prior to the Abu Dhabi talks.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking) (IPB Step 3)

UAF Posture & Readiness:

  • Air Defense: Mobile Fire Groups (MFGs) are actively engaged in the Khmelnytskyi sector. The "northward" approach of the UAV requires a rapid re-orientation of AD assets around Starokostiantyniv.
  • Resilience: Despite the strike in Zaporizhzhia, local administrative structures are maintaining C2 and providing immediate casualty data (0204Z).

Intelligence Support:

  • The prospect of European intelligence replacement (0225Z) suggests a strategic hedging against potential fluctuations in US support. This indicates a long-term transition in the UAF’s multi-domain awareness framework.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain) (IPB Step 4)

  • Disinformation/Verification: There is a direct contradiction between the Zaporizhzhia OVA (Reporting civilian casualties/infrastructure) and the Russian MOD (Reporting military depot destruction).
    • Analytic Judgment: The RU MOD claim is likely a "sanitization" of a strike that hit civilian areas, intended to frame civilian casualties as collateral damage from a successful military interdiction.
  • Geopolitical Messaging: TASS video of "Uragan" crews (0219Z) serves a domestic propaganda role, projecting an image of proactive military success during the lead-up to the February 1st talks.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA):

  • Next 6-12h: Kinetic impact (strike or intercept) at Starokostiantyniv is imminent. We expect a follow-on wave of UAVs or a small missile group to target the same sector to exploit the "cleared" path.

Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA):

  • The concentration of KAB launches in Donetsk and MLRS in Zaporizhzhia suggests a coordinated "softening" of the southern/eastern hinge. The MDCOA remains a large-scale mechanized assault in the Donbas, supported by intensified tactical aviation, to seize key terrain before the Abu Dhabi diplomatic track begins.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

  1. [CRITICAL] BDA for Zaporizhzhia district: Confirm if any military infrastructure was co-located with the civilian casualties (Ref: 0204Z, 0219Z).
  2. [HIGH] Status of UAVs previously tracked toward Samar (Dnipropetrovsk); no update since 0145Z.
  3. [MEDIUM] Identification of the Russian airbases hosting the tactical aviation currently launching KABs toward Donetsk.

//REPORT ENDS//

Previous (2026-01-29 02:02:32Z)