Situation Update (0202Z 29 JAN 2026)
Key updates since last sitrep
- WESTERN VECTOR PROGRESSION (0149Z, UAF Air Force, HIGH): Shahed-type UAV previously tracked through Cherkasy/Vinnytsia has reached western Vinnytsia Oblast, maintaining a course toward Khmelnytskyi Oblast.
- EASTERN SECTOR EXPANSION (0145Z, UAF Air Force, HIGH): New UAV detection in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, currently on a vector toward Samar (formerly Novomoskovsk).
- KREMLIN INFORMATION OPERATION (0137Z, TASS, MEDIUM): Russian MFA (Maslennikov) issued a formal statement claiming the EU has "divided" frozen Russian assets between Kyiv and the Western defense industrial base.
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)
The aerial threat profile has expanded from a two-pronged attack to a three-pronged multi-axis harassment operation. Russia is currently maintaining pressure on the Western, Southern, and Eastern air defense (AD) sectors simultaneously.
Battlefield Geometry & Key Terrain:
- Western Axis: The UAV transit toward Khmelnytskyi is a critical development. This likely targets the Starokostiantyniv airbase or key logistics nodes facilitating Western equipment flow.
- Eastern Axis: The probe toward Samar (Dnipropetrovsk) suggests a widening of the "Negotiation by Fire" strategy to include industrial and logistics hubs supporting the Donbas front.
- Southern Axis: Odesa remains under threat from Black Sea-launched assets (Ref: 0130Z Sitrep).
Weather & Environmental Factors:
- Ground conditions remain restrictive due to snowfall. Aerial operations (UAVs) appear unaffected, but UAF Mobile Fire Groups (MFGs) may face local mobility challenges on secondary roads while repositioning to intercept low-flying targets.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment) (IPB Step 2)
Aviation & Strike Assets:
- Saturation Tactics: The geographic dispersion (Khmelnytskyi to Samar) indicates an attempt to overstretch UAF AD coverage. By forcing engagement across three disparate oblasts, the enemy is seeking to identify "seams" in the radar network.
- High-Value Targeting: The move toward Khmelnytskyi suggests a transition from general infrastructure harassment to high-value military/logistics targets.
Information Environment:
- The TASS statement (0137Z) regarding asset seizure is likely timed to coincide with the Abu Dhabi diplomatic track (Ref: Daily Report). It serves to frame Western financial support as "theft" to justify the current escalatory strike posture (Negotiation by Fire).
C2 and Logistics:
- No further updates on the VDV’s transition to VKontakte (0111Z), but the grounding of the shadow fleet tanker (0129Z) remains a significant logistics anomaly for Russian maritime energy exports.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking) (IPB Step 3)
UAF Posture & Readiness:
- Air Defense: UAF Air Force is actively vectoring assets to cover the Khmelnytskyi and Samar approaches.
- Electronic Warfare: Focus remains on neutralizing the western-bound UAVs before they reach sensitive military installations in Khmelnytskyi.
Tactical Successes/Setbacks:
- Success: Sustained early detection and public warning (0145Z, 0149Z) provides civil defense and military assets sufficient lead time.
- Risk: The unconfirmed Lancet strike on a Radar Station (RLS) (0103Z) remains the primary tactical concern; if verified, it indicates a local degradation of early warning capabilities.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain) (IPB Step 4)
- Russian Narrative: Moscow is framing the conflict as an economic defense against "EU theft" while simultaneously conducting strikes. This dual-track approach aims to consolidate domestic support while the GRU-led diplomatic mission prepares for Abu Dhabi.
- UAF Narrative: Highlighting the maritime vulnerability of the Russian "shadow fleet" provides a counter-narrative of Russian logistical fragility.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)
Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA):
- Next 6-12h: Continued UAV probes into Khmelnytskyi and Dnipropetrovsk to fix AD assets. This will likely be followed by a small-scale "probing" missile strike (4-8 missiles) to test the reaction times of depleted AD batteries.
Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA):
- A massed, synchronized strike using Tu-95MS strategic bombers and Black Sea Kalibr platforms, specifically targeting the Khmelnytskyi logistics hub and the Dnipro bridge infrastructure, timed for first light when MFG visibility is low but before AD batteries can be reloaded.
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
- [CRITICAL] Confirmation of UAV impact or intercept in the Khmelnytskyi sector (Ref: 0149Z).
- [HIGH] Status of the Odesa-bound UAVs detected at 0130Z; assessment of whether they were decoys or kinetic assets.
- [MEDIUM] SIGINT/ELINT monitoring of VDV radio traffic to confirm if the VKontakte shift (0111Z) has resulted in operational C2 delays.
//REPORT ENDS//
