CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE DEFICIT (1203Z, TASS/Zelenskyy, HIGH): President Zelenskyy confirms 60% of Kyiv remains without electricity, with 4,000 residential buildings lacking heat during a sub-zero cold front.
KINETIC ACTION - SEVASTOPOL (1216Z, Operatsia Z, MEDIUM): Russian sources report a 30-minute sustained attack on Sevastopol; nature of ordnance (UAV vs. Missile) and damage assessment are currently UNCONFIRMED.
LOGISTICAL THREAT - POLISH BORDER (1204Z, RBC-UA, HIGH): Ukrainian State Customs Service warns of a renewed blockade by Polish farmers; this poses a direct threat to the "Solidarity Lanes" for fuel and dual-use goods.
TACTICAL INNOVATION - DRONE WARFARE (1225Z, Sternenko, HIGH): Successful procurement of 1,357 fiber-optic drones announced; these systems are immune to conventional Electronic Warfare (EW) and signify a major shift in UA tactical strike capabilities.
ENEMY FORCE REPLENISHMENT (1201Z, Colonelcassad, HIGH): Russian State Duma passed a law regularizing the service of foreigners in the RF Armed Forces, likely aimed at stabilizing the legal status of "volunteer" units and foreign recruits.
ENERGY RESILIENCE FUNDING (1230Z, Zaporizhzhia ODA, HIGH): Ukrainian government allocated 2.5 billion UAH for the procurement of generators for local communities to mitigate the current grid collapse.
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW
The operational environment is currently dominated by two parallel struggles: the "Battle for the Grid" in the rear and a high-intensity drone/artillery exchange on the FLOT. While the diplomatic focus shifts toward Davos (Trump arrival, 1221Z) and tomorrow’s Putin-Witkoff meeting, the kinetic tempo is increasing in the southern sector.
Battlefield Geometry: No major shifts in the FLOT. Russian forces are increasingly employing 2S4 Tyulpan 240mm self-propelled mortars (1221Z, Colonelcassad), indicating a focus on destroying hardened Ukrainian fortifications.
Weather/Environmental: Severe cold continues to weaponize the 60% energy deficit in Kyiv, making the 2.5 billion UAH generator allocation a critical survival measure.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS
Capabilities and Intentions:
Manpower Stabilization: The new Duma law regarding foreign fighters suggests the RF is moving to institutionalize its "international" recruit pipeline, potentially to replace heavy losses without a politically sensitive new mobilization wave.
Tactical Siege Weapons: The deployment of Tyulpan mortars suggests a transition from maneuver to heavy attrition against UA defensive nodes.
Domestic Fragility: The Novosibirsk TC collapse (1211Z) and the imposition of fees for driving tests/internet tariff increases (1207Z, 1231Z) indicate mounting economic and infrastructure stress within the RF rear.
Tactical Changes:
UAV Vectoring: Current UAV flights are transiting Mykolaiv toward Kirovohrad (1224Z), likely probing for the gaps in the air defense (AD) umbrella created by the recent focus on Kyiv/Kharkiv.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (UA)
Ukrainian Force Posture:
Anti-EW Evolution: The integration of 1,357 fiber-optic drones provides UA with a significant tactical edge in high-EW environments where traditional radio-controlled FPVs are failing.
Resource Constraints: Urgent fundraising for "eyes" (surveillance drones) for the 225th Separate Assault Regiment (1203Z) highlights a persistent gap in organic tactical reconnaissance assets for frontline units.
Anti-Corruption/Stability: Asset seizures against the husband of Yulia Tymoshenko (1202Z) and legal moves against Chubais-linked assets in the RF rear (1211Z) reflect an ongoing "legal front" targeting political/economic elites on both sides.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
Hybrid Operations:
Targeting Narratives: UA channels are amplifying reports of Russian educational shifts as "legitimizing strikes on schools" (1205Z). This is a counter-narrative aimed at maintaining international support by highlighting the erosion of civilian-military distinctions in RF doctrine.
Economic Attrition: RF media (TASS/Forbes) is highlighting rising consumer costs (internet, driving tests) within Russia, which UA intelligence may exploit to amplify domestic discontent.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS
Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA):
RF will continue "drip-feed" UAV strikes on central/western Ukraine (Kirovohrad/Mykolaiv) to force the redistribution of AD assets away from the energy-depleted North.
Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA):
The Polish border blockade (starting 1204Z) successfully chokes the flow of specialized generator parts and fuel precisely as the 2.5bn UAH procurement begins, leading to a humanitarian collapse in urban centers during the peak of the cold front.
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
[CRITICAL] Confirm the damage assessment from the Sevastopol strike; identify if Western-supplied long-range assets or domestic UA drones were used.
[HIGH] Determine the exact location of the Tyulpan mortar batteries to enable counter-battery or drone interdiction before they degrade UA fortifications.
[MEDIUM] Monitor the Polish border situation for Russian "active measures" (influence ops) designed to prolong the blockade.
[LOW] Track the impact of the new RF foreign fighter law on recruit numbers from Central Asia and Africa.
