CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE DEFENSE (1132Z, RBC-UA, HIGH): President Zelenskyy has authorized "reservation" (draft deferment) for all energy and utility workers involved in repair operations to stabilize the grid.
DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT (1141Z, Colonelcassad/Peskov, HIGH): The Kremlin has officially confirmed the meeting between Vladimir Putin and US Envoy Steve Witkoff for tomorrow, Jan 22.
PROPOSED PEACE ARCHITECTURE (1148Z, TASS, MEDIUM): US Envoy Witkoff stated the US hopes for both RF and UA to join a proposed "Peace Council." Spain is reportedly considering an invitation to join (1156Z, RBC-UA).
AERIAL ACTIVITY - KHARKIV (1157Z, Kharkiv Mayor, HIGH): A Russian combat drone struck the Slobidskyi district of Kharkiv; local air defenses reported multiple UAVs approaching from the north and northeast.
NON-COMBATANT TARGETING (1145Z, Zaporizhzhia ODA, HIGH): Russian forces targeted a State Emergency Service (SES) rescue vehicle in the Zaporizhzhia sector; no casualties reported.
REAR AREA INSTABILITY - RUSSIA (1142Z, TASS, HIGH): A major shopping center collapse in Novosibirsk has resulted in ongoing search and rescue operations; concurrently, Domodedovo Airport (Moscow) has been put up for sale via Dutch auction (1133Z, TASS).
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW
The operational tempo is characterized by "diplomatic maneuvering via kinetic pressure." While frontlines remain largely static, the Russian Federation (RF) is maintaining high-pressure drone strikes on urban centers (Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia) to influence the upcoming Putin-Witkoff meeting.
Battlefield Geometry: No significant changes to the FLOT reported in the last 60 minutes.
Weather/Environmental: Persistent sub-zero temperatures across Ukraine continue to make the 60% power deficit in Kyiv a critical survival factor.
Force Disposition: RF 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Army) is confirmed active in the Zaporizhzhia sector, focusing on anti-armor and logistics interdiction (1200Z, Voin DV).
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS
Capabilities and Intentions:
Kinetic Harassment: The RF is using Shahed-type UAVs to probe air defenses in Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia. The strike on a rescue vehicle suggests a deliberate policy of harassing "liquidators" of infrastructure damage to slow recovery efforts.
Rear-Area Vulnerability: The sale of Domodedovo Airport at a potential 50% discount and the structural failure in Novosibirsk indicate mounting domestic economic and infrastructure strain within the RF, which may be driving the Kremlin's willingness to engage in the Witkoff talks.
Tactical Changes:
UAV Infiltration: Shifting from massed missile volleys to persistent, multi-directional UAV "drip" feeds to keep air defense (AD) systems active and depleted.
Asset Targeting: Claims of strikes against Ukrainian MLRS/launchers in Kharkiv (1136Z, Dnevnik Desantnika) suggest an increased focus on suppressing UA's ability to conduct cross-border counter-battery fire.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (UA)
Ukrainian Force Posture:
Personnel Management: The decision to "reserve" energy workers is a significant shift, acknowledging that the "energy front" is as vital as the kinetic front. This ensures that skilled labor remains available for the 4,000 buildings currently without heat in Kyiv.
Active Defense: UA Air Force (PS ZSU) continues to successfully track and intercept low-altitude UAVs, though the Slobidskyi district impact confirms that saturation remains a threat.
Internal Security/Anti-Corruption: Legal proceedings against high-profile figures (Shurma, Tymoshenko) continue (1137Z, 1140Z). These are assessed as "alignment operations" to ensure state institutions meet the transparency requirements of Western partners during peace negotiations.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
Hybrid Operations:
Narrative Framing: Pro-Russian channels (Poddubny) are amplifying Western reports (The Guardian) regarding an "EU energy crisis" to create a sense of shared exhaustion and pressure European capitals to support the US-led peace plan (1150Z).
Influence Operations: RT School is launching new journalism courses, likely aimed at training a new cohort of "foreign correspondents" to amplify Kremlin-preferred narratives during the transition to a potential "Peace Council" framework.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS
Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA):
Expect a surge in UAV activity over the next 12 hours as the RF attempts to maximize its "negotiation capital" before the Jan 22 meeting. Strikes will likely focus on repair crews and logistics hubs near the frontline to demonstrate UA vulnerability.
Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA):
A localized Russian breakthrough in the Zaporizhzhia sector, supported by the 57th Brigade’s current interdiction of UA armor, timed to coincide with the start of the Moscow talks to force a "land-for-peace" concession under duress.
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
[CRITICAL] Confirm the nature of the "Peace Council"—is this a substitute for the NATO track or a supplemental diplomatic body?
[HIGH] Verify Russian claims of a strike on a UA launcher in Kharkiv; assess the impact on regional AD/counter-battery capacity.
[MEDIUM] Monitor the Novosibirsk incident for signs of sabotage vs. structural neglect to assess the stability of the Russian rear.
[LOW] Track the Domodedovo sale to identify the purchaser (potential shift in oligarchic power dynamics).
