NORTHERN AXIS - KHARKIV DEFENSIVE SUCCESS (2028Z, Operativnyi ZSU, HIGH): The 13th "Khartia" Brigade (National Guard of Ukraine) successfully neutralized approximately 70 Russian Federation (RF) personnel during a failed assault north of Kharkiv.
AIR OPERATIONS - NORTHERN KHARKIV (2014Z, UAF Air Force, HIGH): RF tactical aviation launched additional Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs) against northern Kharkiv Oblast, likely targeting defensive lines and remaining energy infrastructure.
EASTERN AXIS - LYMAN SECTOR PUSH (2014Z, Tsaplienko, MEDIUM): RF forces are conducting high-intensity assaults toward Lyman. The 63rd Brigade is currently utilizing FPV drones to mitigate "heavy losses" in enemy manpower and armor.
SOUTHERN FRONT - ZAPORIZHZHIA MANEUVER (2011Z, Colonelcassad, LOW/UNCONFIRMED): Pro-RU sources report active attacks on the "western flank" of the Zaporizhzhia front. This correlates with the previously reported threat to the H-08 highway near Stepnohirsk.
STRATEGIC LOGISTICS - PURL PROGRAM (2022Z, RBK-Ukraine, HIGH): President Zelenskyy announced expectations for increased international contributions to the Procurement of Ukrainian Resupply/Logistics (PURL) program to accelerate weapon acquisitions.
LEGAL/POLITICAL - VOLKOV INVESTIGATION (2009Z, ASTRA, HIGH): Ukrainian authorities have initiated criminal proceedings against Russian opposition figure Leonid Volkov following controversial private statements.
Operational picture (by sector)
1. Northern Axis (Kharkiv/Sumy)
Battlefield Geometry: High-intensity engagements continue north of Kharkiv city. The 13th "Khartia" Brigade remains the primary blocking force in this sector.
Tactical Activity: RF continues to employ KABs (2014Z) to suppress Ukrainian defensive positions. Despite the intensity, the "Khartia" success (2028Z) indicates the FLOT remains stable despite the critical energy deficit in the regional center.
2. Eastern Axis (Lyman/Donbas)
Tactical Activity: A significant RF push is underway in the Lyman direction (2014Z). The use of the 63rd Brigade's drone units suggests a reliance on remote-delivery munitions to compensate for potential local disparities in conventional tube artillery or armor.
3. Southern Axis (Zaporizhzhia)
Current Force Dispositions: Pro-RU maps (2011Z) suggest a widening of the offensive on the "western flank" (Stepnohirsk/Orikhiv axis).
Assessment: If the Stepnohirsk breach is consolidated, RF forces will likely attempt to bypass the primary defensive belts to threaten the southern approaches to Zaporizhzhia city.
Enemy activity / threat assessment
Tactical Changes: RF is maintaining high-tempo "meat assaults" (63 KIA north of Kharkiv, heavy losses in Lyman) while simultaneously using KABs for stand-off destruction. This suggests a willingness to trade high casualty rates for incremental geographic gains or to fix UAF units in place.
Capabilities: RF continues to utilize tactical aviation with impunity in the border zones (Sumy/Kharkiv). The "Oreshnik" threat noted in previous reports remains an active psychological factor, though no launch telemetry has been confirmed in the last 2 hours.
Friendly activity (UAF)
Force Posture: UAF is increasingly reliant on "Drone-Centric Defense" (DCD) in the Lyman and Kharkiv sectors to preserve personnel (2014Z, 2028Z).
Logistical Readiness: The push for expanded PURL contributions (2022Z) indicates a strategic shift toward direct procurement of NATO-standard assets as internal stockpiles face extreme pressure from the energy crisis.
Sustainment: Public fundraising remains critical, with the Sternenko channel reporting 12.1m UAH raised toward a 50m UAH goal (2017Z), likely for FPV/UAV procurement.
Information environment / disinformation
Narrative Divergence: Pro-RU sources (Starshe Eddy, 2012Z) are increasingly blending battlefield reports with strategic "tribute" demands (referencing Trump/Greenland/capitulation). This is intended to project an image of inevitability and Western irrelevance.
Legal Friction: The case against Leonid Volkov (2009Z) is being amplified by RU-linked channels to create friction between Ukraine and the Russian "liberal" opposition, potentially to degrade the coalition of anti-war sentiments.
Outlook (next 6-12h)
Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): RF will maintain the KAB-ground assault cycle in the North to exhaust the Khartia and Hart brigades. A second wave of air strikes against the energy grid is expected between 0200Z and 0500Z as temperatures drop.
Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): A rapid mechanized exploitation of the Stepnohirsk "western flank" toward the H-08 highway, coinciding with a combined missile strike that disables the local mobile network, hindering UAF coordination.
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
[URGENT] Confirmation of 63rd Brigade's status near Lyman; determine if the RF push has achieved a penetration of the second defensive line.
[HIGH] Visual confirmation (GEOINT) of the "western flank" attacks in Zaporizhzhia to verify RU claims of tactical movement.
[MEDIUM] Assessment of the impact of the Volkov case on European diplomatic support, specifically within the German (Merz) and Czech (Pavel) delegations.
