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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2026-01-11 09:00:07Z
1 month ago
Previous (2026-01-11 08:30:06Z)

Situation Update (0900Z 11 JAN 2026)

Key updates since last sitrep

  • TECHNICAL DATA: GERAN-5 UAV (0835Z-0849Z, GUR/Colonelcassad, HIGH): Dimensions for the new "Geran-5" strike UAV are confirmed as 6m in length with a 5.5m wingspan. This confirms a significantly larger airframe than the Geran-2 (Shahed-136), supporting assessments of increased payload capacity.
  • DEEP STRIKE: VORONEZH, RF (0834Z, WarGonzo, HIGH): UAF strike UAVs successfully penetrated Russian airspace to hit Voronezh overnight; Russian sources confirm at least one civilian casualty.
  • TACTICAL AVIATION: SUMY REGION (0856Z, UAF Air Force, HIGH): RF tactical aviation has initiated a wave of Guided Aerial Bomb (KAB) launches targeting the Sumy region.
  • GROUND ACTIVITY: BOROVA-REDKODUB (0848Z, Slivochny Kapriz, MEDIUM): New imagery confirms active combat operations and surveillance in the Borova–Redkodub sector (Oskil River axis).
  • GRID RESTORATION: KYIV REGION (0852Z, DTEK/RBC-UA, HIGH): Power has been restored to 370,000 subscribers in the Kyiv region following weather-related and kinetic disruptions, though the grid remains "fragile."
  • STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT: KUPYANSK (0838Z, Tregubov/RBC-UA, MEDIUM): Assessment indicates RF forces are unlikely to restore logistics or access to Kupyansk within their projected operational timelines.
  • REGIONAL INSTABILITY: IRAN INTERNET BLACKOUT (0836Z, NetBlocks/Colonelcassad, HIGH): Total internet shutdown in Iran has exceeded 60 hours, suggesting severe internal disruption or operational security measures by a key RF supplier.

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

The operational tempo is characterized by a dual-track escalation: Russian forces are introducing larger-diameter strike platforms (Geran-5) and tactical aviation (KABs), while Ukrainian forces are maintaining deep-strike pressure on Russian administrative centers (Voronezh).

  • Battlefield Geometry: The focus is shifting toward the Borova-Redkodub axis and Kupyansk, where RF forces are attempting to overcome logistics bottlenecks.
  • Weather and Environment: Severe weather remains a primary factor for grid stability in Northern Ukraine. While DTEK has restored significant power in Kyiv, the "catastrophic" state of the broader energy system reported by RU sources (0853Z) is being used as a psychological lever.
  • Logistics: The Kupyansk sector remains a critical failure point for RF, with current assessments suggesting they cannot meet their immediate territorial objectives there.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

  • Geran-5 Capabilities: The confirmed dimensions (6m x 5.5m) place this UAV in a higher weight class, potentially allowing for a 100kg+ warhead or advanced electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM). This platform is likely intended to destroy reinforced concrete structures or high-voltage transformers.
  • Course of Action (KAB Operations): The shift of KAB strikes to Sumy (0856Z) suggests a systematic effort to degrade UAF staging areas and cross-border logistics supporting operations in the Kursk/Sumy corridor.
  • Tactical Adaptation: In the Borova-Redkodub sector, RF is likely using improved surveillance to identify gaps in UAF's Oskil River defenses.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

  • Strategic Reach: The Voronezh strike demonstrates that despite the 154-drone wave targeting Ukraine, UAF maintains sufficient long-range assets to conduct reciprocal operations into the RF rear.
  • Infrastructure Resilience: The restoration of 370k subscribers in Kyiv (0852Z) indicates high-efficiency repair cycles by DTEK, though the system remains vulnerable to "test-to-failure" saturation strikes.
  • Defensive Posture: UAF continues to hold the line in the Kupyansk and Zelene sectors, effectively denying RF the rapid breakthroughs required to capitalize on the current cold snap.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

  • Energy Defeatism: Russian "Voenkor" channels (Operation Z) are heavily promoting images of low-voltage readings to argue that the Ukrainian energy system is in a state of "catastrophe" (0853Z).
  • Strategic Diversion: The amplification of the 60-hour Iran blackout (0836Z) serves to link the Ukrainian theater to broader Middle Eastern instability, potentially aimed at signaling to Western policymakers that RF allies are moving to a "war footing."
  • Hybrid Rhetoric: RU sources are mocking UK Defense Secretary John Healey (0855Z) to undermine the perceived seriousness of NATO military leadership.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

  • Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): RF will launch a dedicated "Geran-5" flight against a major railway junction or energy hub in the Sumy-Kyiv corridor within the next 12 hours to leverage its larger payload against hardened targets.
  • Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): Exploiting the 60-hour Iran communications blackout, RF receives a significant, unmonitored shipment of ballistic missiles/UAVs, launching a "double-tap" strike on Kyiv while repair crews are exposed during current restoration efforts.
  • Tactical Forecast: Expect intensified RF reconnaissance-in-force near Redkodub to test the thickness of UAF's screening forces before a larger push toward Borova.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

  1. Geran-5 Propulsion: Determine if the larger frame uses a reciprocating engine or a small turbojet, which would alter interception profiles for mobile fire groups.
  2. Voronezh BDA: Identify the specific target hit in Voronezh (Airfield, Oil Depot, or Command Post) to assess the strategic intent of the strike.
  3. Redkodub Force Composition: Confirm which RF units are active in the Borova-Redkodub sector (potentially elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army).

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

  1. Interception Profiles: Update SHORAD engagement manuals for the "Geran-5." Its 6m length provides a larger RCS (Radar Cross Section), but potentially higher speed or altitude—interception should prioritize heavy machine guns (14.5mm) or MANPADS over light small arms.
  2. Sumy Perimeter: Increase the density of mobile AD in the Sumy region immediately to counter the new wave of KAB launches.
  3. Repair Crew Security: Implement strict "double-tap" lookouts for DTEK crews in the Kyiv and Zaporizhzhia regions; RF is using the grid's fragility to bait technicians into vulnerable positions.

//END OF REPORT//

Previous (2026-01-11 08:30:06Z)

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