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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2026-01-10 14:30:07Z
1 month ago
Previous (2026-01-10 14:00:06Z)

Situation Update (1430Z 10 JAN 2026)

Key updates since last sitrep

  • KINETIC STRIKE ON KHARKIV (1426Z, RBK-UA/Terehov, HIGH): Confirmed missile strike on a critical infrastructure object in the Slobidskyi district. This follows a generalized missile alert for the region.
  • SUCCESSFUL ANTI-ARMOR ENGAGEMENT (1411Z, Butusov/28th Bde, HIGH): UAF 28th Separate Mechanical Brigade destroyed a Russian "turtle tank" equipped with an unconventional armored "trailer" attempting to breach urban areas in the Kostiantynivka sector.
  • SLOVYANSK CIVILIAN IMPACT (1402Z, ASTRA, HIGH): RF tactical aviation conducted a KAB (guided bomb) strike on a residential sector in Slovyansk, resulting in at least 6 civilian casualties.
  • MINE TREATY EXIT FINALIZED (1400Z, Operatyvnyi ZSU, HIGH): Finland has officially completed its withdrawal from the Ottawa Convention, enabling the use of anti-personnel mines for border defense.
  • ZAPORIZHZHIA TACTICAL LOSS (1400Z, Voin DV, MEDIUM): RF 14th Spetsnaz and 5th Army units confirmed the destruction of a UAF armored combat vehicle (ACV) at a junction in Verkhnia Tersa (west of Huliaipole) via FPV drone.
  • IRANIAN INTERNAL INSTABILITY ESCALATION (1409Z, 1422Z, Alex Parker/Tsaplienko, MEDIUM): Protesters in Tehran have reportedly burned a mosque and destroyed portraits of Ayatollah Khamenei, representing a significant escalation in symbolic defiance.

Operational picture (by sector)

Northern Sector (Kharkiv/Sumy)

  • Kharkiv: The strike on the Slobidskyi district infrastructure node (1426Z) suggests a continued effort to degrade urban sustainment capabilities.
  • Finland/Border: Transition from political intent to legal finality regarding the Ottawa Convention exit indicates immediate shifts in Finnish defensive engineering on the RF border.

Eastern Sector (Donbas)

  • Kostiantynivka: RF is attempting to use high-mass, improvised armored solutions (tank-turtle with trailers) to penetrate urban limits (1411Z). UAF 28th Bde's success confirms that standard anti-tank measures remain effective against these adaptations.
  • Slovyansk/Kramatorsk: Increased frequency of KAB strikes (1402Z, 1422Z) indicates RF is attempting to soften rear-area fortifications and logistical hubs ahead of ground pushes.
  • Lyman Axis: Hostile sources report a UAF "flag-raising" (1411Z). CONFIDENCE: LOW (UNCONFIRMED). This likely represents a tactical reconnaissance-in-force or a small-unit PR operation rather than a significant terrain shift.

Southern Sector (Zaporizhzhia/Kherson)

  • Huliaipole/Verkhnia Tersa: RF 14th Spetsnaz is successfully integrating drone reconnaissance with 5th Army fire assets to interdict UAF movements west of Huliaipole (1400Z).
  • Airstrike Activity: High activity of RF tactical aviation reported (1407Z), specifically launching KABs toward Zaporizhzhia (1411Z), likely targeting staging areas for UAF reserves.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

  • Aviation Tactics: Sustained use of KABs across the entire front (Zaporizhzhia to Slovyansk) indicates a high sortie rate and reliance on standoff precision munitions to compensate for ground attrition.
  • Armor Adaptation: The introduction of armored "trailers" on turtle tanks (1411Z) suggests an attempt to increase the survivability of mine-clearing or troop-carrying platforms, though mobility remains a critical vulnerability.
  • Information Warfare: RF channels are actively promoting "hypersonic surprises" (1427Z) and highlighting internal UAF command friction (1401Z). Assessment: This is a coordinated psychological operation intended to deter UAF offensive planning and foster domestic distrust in Ukrainian leadership.

Friendly activity (UAF)

  • Special Operations: SBU "Alpha" claims to have destroyed over $5B worth of RF hardware over a 4-year period (1411Z). While historical, the release of this data now serves as a morale-boosting counter-narrative to RF claims of technological superiority.
  • Defensive Posture: 28th and 82nd Brigades continue to demonstrate high proficiency in FPV-based area denial and anti-armor operations (1405Z, 1411Z).

Information environment / disinformation

  • Iranian Crisis: The reported burning of a mosque in Iran (1409Z) is a "black swan" event for RF logistics. If the IRGC is forced to pivot entirely to internal security, the "Shahed bridge" to Russia may face immediate disruption.
  • Internal Corruption Narrative: Reports of ARMA selling Carpathian land at undervalued prices (1401Z) are being amplified by domestic activists. This poses a risk to internal morale and could be exploited by RF propaganda to frame the Ukrainian state as inherently corrupt.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

  • MLCOA: Continued missile and KAB strikes on Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia infrastructure to exploit existing damage from the previous TPP strikes.
  • MDCOA: RF may attempt a "demonstration" strike using a hypersonic or high-yield ballistic asset to validate the "surprises" narrative (1427Z) and retaliate for the Volgograd oil depot strike.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

  1. Kharkiv BDA: Determine the specific nature of the Slobidskyi district infrastructure object (energy vs. transport) to assess local mobility impact.
  2. Turtle-Tank "Trailer" Specs: Identify if the "trailer" used in Kostiantynivka (1411Z) was a mobile EW platform, a mine-clearing charge, or merely additional composite armor.
  3. Iran Logistics Flow: Monitor for any sudden shifts in RF strategic transport aviation between Tehran and Moscow/Crimea.

//ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS//

  1. Counter-Armor Refinement: Distribute imagery of the "turtle tank with trailer" to all anti-tank platoons in the Kostiantynivka sector to identify weak points in the new configuration (specifically the trailer hitch/coupling).
  2. Infrastructure Resilience: Expedite the deployment of mobile repair teams to the Slobidskyi district of Kharkiv to prevent cascading utility failures.
  3. Strategic IO: Amplify visual evidence of Iranian unrest within RF military social media circles to degrade confidence in future munition resupply.

//END OF REPORT//

Previous (2026-01-10 14:00:06Z)

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