Situation Update (2026-01-10T07:00Z)
Key updates since last sitrep
- AERIAL ATTACK – LARGE SCALE (0627Z-0633Z, UA Air Force/GenStaff, HIGH): Overnight, RF launched a massive combined strike involving 121 UAVs (Shahed, Gerbera, others) and 1 Iskander-M ballistic missile. 94 UAVs were intercepted or suppressed; the Iskander-M was not intercepted.
- COMMUNICATIONS – TELEGRAM DISRUPTION (0627Z, RBK-Ukraine, HIGH): Significant service disruptions reported for Telegram across Ukraine and potentially the region, impacting message delivery and real-time reporting.
- DEEP STRIKE – RF TERRITORY (0628Z/0639Z, Colonelcassad/TASS, MEDIUM): RF MoD claims to have intercepted 67 Ukrainian fixed-wing UAVs overnight across several Russian regions (59 in one wave, 8 in a subsequent wave).
- TACTICAL COMBAT – POKROVSK SECTOR (0658Z, Butusov Plus, HIGH): Video evidence confirms intense urban combat within Pokrovsk city limits. Elements of the 68th Jaeger Brigade are utilizing FPV drones to engage RF armor and assault groups in snow-covered urban terrain.
- ACTIVE AIR THREAT – POLTAVA OBLAST (0638Z/0651Z, UA Air Force, HIGH): Multiple UAVs detected transiting from Dnipropetrovsk toward Poltava, passing Novi Sanzhary on a NW heading.
- ADAPTATION – RUSSIAN ARMOR (0648Z, Two Majors, MEDIUM): RF volunteer organizations are deploying "Frontline Armor" (custom cab/engine protection kits) for heavy logistics and combat vehicles to counter UAF drone strikes.
Operational picture (by sector)
Eastern Sector (Pokrovsk/Myrnohrad Axis)
The combat environment in Pokrovsk has transitioned to high-intensity urban warfare. Visual documentation (0658Z, Butusov Plus) shows RF "Center" Group armor and infantry attempting to penetrate city blocks, met by heavy UAF drone resistance. This confirms the pressure previously reported on the northern outskirts of Myrnohrad is now a generalized assault on the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad urban agglomeration.
Northern Sector (Kharkiv/Lyman)
Kharkiv City and five regional settlements sustained strikes in the last 24 hours (0637Z, Sinehubov). Russian "West" Grouping sources claim effective use of "KVN" drones against UAF logistics, asserting UAF forces are avoiding front-line transit due to drone saturation (0640Z, Colonelcassad). UNCONFIRMED/PROBABLY EXAGGERATED.
Southern/Central Sector (Poltava/Dnipropetrovsk)
A transit corridor for RF UAVs has opened from the south through Dnipropetrovsk toward Poltava (0638Z). This suggests RF is using these regions as bypass routes to target central Ukrainian logistical hubs or energy infrastructure.
Enemy activity / threat assessment
- Aerial Capability: The launch of 121 UAVs represents a significant expenditure of munitions, likely intended to saturate air defenses following the high activity noted at AB Shaykovka in the previous 24h. The failure to intercept the Iskander-M (0633Z) highlights a persistent gap in ballistic missile defense against specific launch vectors (Kursk).
- Technological Adaptation: The introduction of standardized "Frontline Armor" kits (0648Z) indicates the RF is moving from field-expedient "cope cages" to more industrial-scale solutions for drone protection on heavy equipment.
- Logistics Status: Despite heavy snow in the RU rear (noted in daily report), the RF managed a synchronized multi-axis launch from five different base locations (Kursk, Orel, Millerovo, Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Chauda).
Friendly activity (UAF)
- Defensive Operations: The 68th Jaeger Brigade remains effectively engaged in Pokrovsk, demonstrating high proficiency in urban drone warfare.
- Air Defense: UA AD maintains a ~77% success rate against UAVs, though the "leakers" (27 drones) and the ballistic missile remain high-priority threats to infrastructure.
- Counter-Offensive Capability: The reported 67-drone strike into RF territory indicates UAF maintains significant long-range strike capacity to pressure the RF rear and disrupt aerial launch logistics.
Information environment / disinformation
- Telegram Disruption: The reported outage (0627Z) is a critical development, as both sides rely heavily on Telegram for tactical reporting and civil alerts. This may be a byproduct of EW or a targeted cyber/infrastructure attack.
- Escalation Narratives: Pro-RF channels (WarGonzo, 0650Z) are escalating rhetoric toward "World War III," mirroring the "WWII" historical parallels noted earlier. This supports the analysis of preparing the domestic RF audience for prolonged conflict.
- Cyber Threat: RF MVD reports of auth-code intercepting malware (0635Z) may indicate an internal Russian security breach or a cover for state-sponsored surveillance of its own banking/communication sector.
Outlook (next 6-12h)
- MLCOA (Most Likely): RF will maintain pressure on Pokrovsk urban blocks, attempting to exploit the Telegram outage to disrupt UAF tactical coordination. Continued UAV transits through Poltava likely aiming for energy targets in North/Central Ukraine.
- MDCOA (Most Dangerous): Synchronized missile/UAV strike on Poltava/Kyiv during the Telegram outage to maximize chaos and delay emergency response times.
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
- Telegram Outage Scope: Determine if the disruption is geographic (Ukraine-only) or infrastructure-wide to assess if it is a targeted hybrid operation.
- Iskander-M BDA: Identify the impact point of the Iskander-M launched from Kursk; current reports indicate 0/1 intercepted, but impact location is unconfirmed.
- Pokrovsk Sector Geometry: Confirm which specific city blocks in Pokrovsk are currently contested to establish a more precise "Line of Contact" (LOC).
IPB SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSIS
1. BATTLEFIELD GEOMETRY
The conflict has officially entered a "city-fight" phase in Pokrovsk. Unlike previous trench-based attrition, the current geometry involves complex 3D urban terrain where UAF drone supremacy is being challenged by RU volume. The transit of UAVs over Poltava suggests an intent to expand the strike zone beyond the immediate frontline.
2. COGNITIVE DOMAIN
The Telegram outage (0627Z) occurring simultaneously with a 121-UAV swarm suggests a coordinated effort to degrade the Ukrainian "information-reaction" cycle. Rapid civil-defense alerts and volunteer coordination are most vulnerable during these windows.
//ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS//
- Redundant Comms: Units in the Pokrovsk sector must immediately transition to secondary/terrestrial communication systems (Starlink/Signal/Radio) and not rely on Telegram for tactical situational awareness until the service disruption is resolved.
- Mobile AD Poltava: Deploy mobile fire groups (MFGs) along the Dnipropetrovsk-Poltava-Novi Sanzhary axis to intercept the active UAV wave currently in transit (0651Z).
- Targeting – RF Launch Sites: Prioritize reconnaissance and strike assets on the Kursk/Orel launch sectors to disrupt the "leaker" ballistic missile capability that UA AD is currently failing to intercept.
//END OF REPORT//
