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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2026-01-10 01:00:05Z
1 month ago
Previous (2026-01-10 00:30:06Z)

Situation Update (2026-01-10T01:00Z)

Key updates since last sitrep

  • NEW NORTHERN UAV VECTOR – KHARKIV (0030Z, UAF Air Force, HIGH): New group of Shahed-type UAVs entering Kharkiv oblast from the north, maintaining persistent pressure on the city's air defense (AD) perimeter (UAF AF, 0030Z).
  • SOUTHERN APPROACH – DNIPRO (0054Z, UAF Air Force, HIGH): UAVs detected approaching Dnipro city from the south. This creates a multi-vector threat when combined with earlier northern approaches, forcing a 180-degree shift in SHORAD engagement sectors (UAF AF, 0054Z).
  • SPETSNAZ OPERATIONS – ZAPORIZHZHIA (0035Z, Colonelcassad/@Viking_SpN, MEDIUM): RF "Viking" Spetsnaz detachment, in coordination with SSO assets, reportedly engaged "uncovered targets" within Zaporizhzhia city. Likely indicates sabotage or precision-guided munition (PGM) spotting (Colonelcassad, 0035Z).
  • RE-ENTRY – KHARKIV OBLAST (0052Z, UAF Air Force, HIGH): Continuous UAV presence confirmed in Kharkiv oblast, suggesting a "loitering" tactic to exhaust AD crews (UAF AF, 0052Z).
  • DOMESTIC INFO-OP – RUSSIA (0040Z, TASS, LOW): Russian state media shift to demographic/genetic narratives. This serves as a secondary layer of domestic distraction from the active "Olina" maritime crisis and ongoing aero-ballistic preparations (TASS, 0040Z).

Operational picture (by sector)

Northern Sector (Kyiv/Kharkiv)

While the ballistic threat to Kyiv has temporarily subsided, the Kharkiv sector is facing a renewed UAV incursion from the northern border (0030Z). This secondary wave suggests an attempt to fix UAF mobile fire groups (MFGs) in the north, preventing their redeployment toward the developing situation in the Dnipropetrovsk/Donbas corridor.

Central Sector (Dnipro/Pavlohrad)

The threat to Dnipro has become significantly more complex. In addition to the northern threat identified in the 0030Z sitrep, a new UAV group is approaching from the South (0054Z). This "pincer" geometry is designed to exploit gaps in the radar horizon, particularly if drones are utilizing low-altitude riverine flight paths along the Dnipro.

Southern Sector (Zaporizhzhia)

The confirmed activity of the RF "Viking" Detachment (0035Z) within Zaporizhzhia city is a critical escalation. Given the recent loss of Zelene (Daily Report), these Spetsnaz elements are likely tasked with deep reconnaissance or the destruction of UAF reserve staging areas to facilitate a breakthrough toward the H-15 highway.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

  • Tactical Coordination: The RF is demonstrating high synchronization between UAV swarms and specialized ground units. The drone waves toward Dnipro and Kharkiv are likely providing the "noise" required for Spetsnaz units like "Viking" to operate with reduced detection risk in the Zaporizhzhia rear.
  • Dempster-Shafer Support: Analytical models show a high belief (0.60) in an intensified propaganda effort by the "Viking" detachment. This suggests their kinetic operations are being heavily leveraged for Information Warfare (IW) to degrade UAF morale in the southern sector.
  • Asset Disposition: The continued presence of UAVs in Kharkiv (0052Z) indicates a "saturation" strategy, ensuring that AD assets remain occupied while higher-value targets (logistics in Pavlohrad, C2 in Dnipro) are prioritized.

Friendly activity (UAF)

  • AD Realignment: UAF Air Force is currently managing three distinct UAV axes (Kharkiv North, Dnipro South, and the ongoing Poltava transit).
  • Internal Security: Heightened alert in Zaporizhzhia following the "Viking" report; counter-sabotage units are likely engaging in sweep operations.

Information environment / disinformation

  • Kinetic Branding: The use of stylized, aggressive branding by the "Viking" Detachment (0035Z) is a deliberate attempt to project an image of RF elite competence during the Zelene breach.
  • Strategic Distraction: TASS (0040Z) reporting on genetic testing is a classic "normalization" narrative, attempting to shift the Russian domestic focus from the potential for a maritime clash in the Black Sea to long-term "state care" and public health.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

  • MLCOA (Most Likely): Continued UAV saturation of Dnipro and Kharkiv to exhaust AD munitions. A localized ground push toward Bratskoye supported by the "Viking" Spetsnaz elements in the Zaporizhzhia rear.
  • MDCOA (Most Dangerous): A multi-domain strike involving the Tu-22M3 assets at AB Shaykovka (SAR 29.69), timed for 0400Z-0600Z, targeting the Dnipro bridges or Pavlohrad rail infrastructure while local AD is focused on the southern UAV vector.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

  1. Viking Impact Assessment: Need SIGINT or visual confirmation of the specific "targets" engaged by Spetsnaz in Zaporizhzhia (0035Z).
  2. UAV Ingress Altitudes: Determine if the southern Dnipro vector (0054Z) is utilizing the 30m "terrain-masking" profile observed in Odesa (Daily Report).
  3. Electronic Warfare (EW) Status: Monitor for localized GPS jamming or cellular outages in Zaporizhzhia city, which would indicate active Spetsnaz electronic transition.

IPB SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSIS

1. BATTLEFIELD GEOMETRY The battlefield has transitioned into a "distributed threat" model. By attacking Kharkiv from the North and Dnipro from the South simultaneously, the RF is forcing UAF command to make high-stakes decisions regarding the distribution of limited Western AD interceptors.

2. SITUATION OVERVIEW The introduction of Spetsnaz activity in Zaporizhzhia city (0035Z) directly supports the ground offensive at Zelene. The operational objective appears to be the isolation of the southern front by neutralizing the logistical and command support nodes in Zaporizhzhia and Dnipro.

//ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS//

  1. Zaporizhzhia Counter-Sabotage: Immediately increase security at the Zaporizhzhia-1 Railway Station and military hospitals. The "Viking" detachment targets are likely critical infrastructure nodes or high-value personnel.
  2. Dnipro AD Sectoring: Re-deploy mobile SHORAD teams to the southern outskirts of Dnipro to intercept the 0054Z vector. Ensure they are equipped for low-altitude, visual-engagement profiles.
  3. Information Integrity: Publicly debunk "Viking" operational footage if it contains recycled or falsified clips to diminish the 0.60 belief score in their propaganda effectiveness.

//END OF REPORT//

Previous (2026-01-10 00:30:06Z)

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