Total Blackout in Dnipro (2057Z, TASS/Local Media, HIGH): Multiple sources confirm a complete power failure in the city of Dnipro following localized explosions and flashes at the regional Thermal Power Plant (TEC) and several substations (2031Z, 2049Z).
Statewide Emergency Power Shutdowns (2054Z, DTEK/Operativnyi ZSU, HIGH): All TECs and major substations in the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast have reportedly ceased operations. There is currently "no forecast" for restoration (2035Z, 2041Z).
UAF Repels Massive Assault near Pokrovsk (2046Z, Tsaplienko, MEDIUM): Ukrainian forces successfully halted a large-scale Russian ground offensive in the Pokrovsk sector. This follows earlier reports of heavy armored engagement in the same area.
Ballistic Missile Threat (2049Z, UAF Air Force, HIGH): An active alert for ballistic weaponry launched from the South-East direction is in effect, potentially targeting logistics hubs in Dnipro or Zaporizhzhia.
Zaporizhzhia Grid Degradation (2036Z, Zaporizhzhia OVA, HIGH): Coordinated strikes have forced electricity restrictions across the Zaporizhzhia region; "Zaporizhzhiaoblenergo" is attempting stabilization.
Drone Threat to Kryvyi Rih (2050Z, Nikolaevsky Vanek, MEDIUM): At least one Shahed-type UAV is approaching Kryvyi Rih, threatening already damaged water and power infrastructure.
Operational picture (by sector)
Eastern Axis (Donbas):
Pokrovsk Sector: Combat intensity has reached a peak for the reporting period. The successful repelling of a "massive assault" (2046Z) indicates UAF tactical depth is holding despite sustained RF pressure. The focus remains on preventing a breakthrough toward the H-15 highway.
Dnipropetrovsk Border: The total energy collapse in the oblast (2057Z) severely complicates the logistics for the Pokrovsk front, specifically rail-fed supply lines and repair facilities.
Southern Axis (Zaporizhzhia/Kherson):
Zaporizhzhia: The sector is experiencing secondary effects of the national energy strike. Grid instability is now affecting both the city and the surrounding tactical rear.
Kherson (Occupied): Russian occupation authorities have banned mass gatherings (corporate events/festivals) involving more than 10 people (2037Z). This suggests heightened security concerns regarding partisan activity or UAF precision strikes during the holiday period.
Russian Rear / International:
Socotra Evacuation: The first group of Russian nationals has been evacuated from Socotra via Yemenia Airways to Saudi Arabia (2032Z). This indicates a resolution to the diplomatic/logistical blockage reported earlier.
INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD (IPB)
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW
The operational environment has shifted from "infrastructure pressure" to "infrastructure collapse" in the Dnipro-Zaporizhzhia hub. The "total blackout" in Dnipro (2057Z) is the culminating point of today's aviation and missile surge. Weather conditions remain a critical constraint for both sides; however, the lack of power for municipal heating and water systems creates a 4-8 hour window before pipe-freezing becomes a systemic risk.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS
Intentions (MLCOA): RF will likely follow the TEC strikes with a ballistic salvo (as indicated by the 2049Z alert) to target emergency repair crews or high-voltage switchyards while the grid is in a state of "black start" failure.
Tactical Shifts: The ban on gatherings in occupied Kherson (2037Z) indicates a defensive posture regarding internal security, possibly fearing coordinated strikes on Russian officer concentrations during social events.
Logistics: The previously noted SAR spike at the 260th GRAU Arsenal (18.95) is likely the source of the currently active ballistic threat from the SE.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES
Defensive Posture: UAF maintains high combat effectiveness in the Pokrovsk sector, having successfully transitioned from a mobile defense to a fixed repelling of a massed assault (2046Z).
Civil-Military Coordination: Regional authorities (Lukashuk, 2041Z) are prioritizing civil resilience by advising immediate water storage, anticipating that the power failure will shortly lead to the loss of municipal pumping stations.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
Narrative Shaping: Russian channels (Colonelcassad, 2040Z) are aggressively framing Iranian domestic unrest as a US/Israeli "Libya-style" intervention. This serves to distract from maritime setbacks (Marinera seizure) and align RF domestic sentiment against Western "asymmetric warfare."
Internal Morale: Ukrainian reports of the successful Pokrovsk defense (2046Z) are critical for maintaining morale in the face of the massive energy crisis in the rear.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS
Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): RF maintains the "blackout" through 08 JAN 2400Z by utilizing loitering munitions to strike substation repair teams. The energy failure in Dnipro will likely trigger a suspension of rail logistics to the Pokrovsk front within 12 hours as electric locomotives become immobilized.
Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): RF utilizes the ballistic alert (2049Z) to strike the Dnipro River crossings or the remaining TEC infrastructure in Western Ukraine to achieve a cross-regional grid collapse.
Timeline: The next 4-6 hours (0100Z-0300Z) are the critical period for "Gorvodokanal" survival; if power is not restored to water pumps, the winter freeze will cause permanent damage to the Dnipro municipal water network.
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
Status of Dnipro TPP (TEC): Confirm if the "explosion and flash" (2031Z) caused structural damage to the boiler house or merely the switchyard.
Ballistic Impact Points: Identify the targets of the SE ballistic threat. Are they tactical (front-line) or strategic (grid)?
Pokrovsk BDA: Determine RF casualty and equipment loss rates from the "massive assault" (2046Z) to assess their capability for a follow-on wave.
//ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS//
Logistics Pivot: Immediately transition Pokrovsk-bound supply trains to diesel-electric traction to bypass the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast grid failure.
Water Infrastructure Defense: Deploy portable heating units and generators to Dnipro water pumping stations to prevent system freezing during the restoration period.
Counter-Ballistic Readiness: Prioritize Patriot/S-300 coverage for the Dnipro TEC site, as RF is likely to "double-tap" the facility to ensure permanent decommissioning.
