Massive Energy Grid Failure in Dnipro (2010Z, Operativnyi ZSU, HIGH): A "massive blackout" is reported in Dnipro following coordinated drone and KAB strikes. This marks a significant escalation in the degradation of the regional energy hub.
Red Alert in Lipetsk Oblast (2007Z, Igor Artamonov, HIGH): A "Red Level" drone threat has been declared for Elets and multiple municipal districts in Lipetsk. This follows the previous "air danger" and indicates an active UAF deep-strike operation in progress.
Expanded RF Ground Operations (1958Z, Operatsiya Z, MEDIUM): RF "Center" Group forces are reportedly engaging in combat not only near Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad but also near the administrative borders of the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.
Zaporizhzhia Sector Escalation (2000Z, Voin DV, MEDIUM): Elements of the RF 57th Brigade (5th Army, Group "Vostok") are documented conducting high-intensity operations in the Huliaipole sector, suggesting a widening of the RF offensive frontage.
UAF Deep Strike Sortie (2018Z, TASS, MEDIUM): RU MoD claims to have intercepted nine UAF UAVs over Crimea, Volgograd Oblast, and the Black Sea. This confirms a multi-vector UAF long-range strike effort targeting RF staging areas and logistics.
Persistent KAB Strikes (2015Z/2022Z, AFU Air Force, HIGH): Continued launches of Guided Aerial Bombs (KAB) targeting Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts confirm RF's reliance on standoff aerial bombardment to facilitate ground advances.
Operational picture (by sector)
Eastern Axis (Donbas/Dnipropetrovsk Border):
Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad: Combat remains intense. RF "Center" Group is attempting to capitalize on momentum despite the armored losses reported at 1947Z. The mention of operations "in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast" (1958Z) suggests RF reconnaissance or tactical probes are nearing the H-15/M-04 transit corridors.
Lyman/Northern Donbas: No significant territorial changes; RF focus remains on KAB saturation.
Southern Axis (Zaporizhzhia):
Huliaipole: Increased kinetic activity from the RF "Vostok" Group (2000Z) indicates this sector is no longer secondary. RF is likely attempting to fix UAF units to prevent reinforcement of the Pokrovsk salient.
Infrastructure: The energy crisis has expanded from Kryvyi Rih to include Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia (2017Z), creating a "blackout arc" across the southern rear.
Russian Rear (Deep Strike):
Lipetsk/Volgograd: UAF is maintaining a high-tempo UAV campaign. The "Red Alert" in Lipetsk (2007Z) and intercepts in Volgograd (2018Z) suggest targets include the Lipetsk Air Base and potentially the Volga-Don logistics nodes.
INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD (IPB)
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW
The battlefield geometry is currently defined by an RF effort to isolate the Donbas by striking the Dnipro-Pavlohrad energy and logistics hub. The weather remains the critical short-term factor; the Jan 8 cyclone is imminent. Currently, low-light/night operations are ongoing (confirmed by Fighterbomber imagery at 2019Z), with both sides racing to complete objectives before flight conditions for small UAVs and helicopters deteriorate.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS
Capabilities/Adaptations: RF forces are institutionalizing improvised defenses. Reports of "dandelion" tanks with specialized drone screens (2020Z) and critiques of "Samopal" (improvised) anti-drone weapon mounts (2000Z) show a systemic effort to counter UAF FPV superiority at the tactical level.
Intentions (MLCOA): RF will likely maintain KAB pressure on the Dnipro-Pokrovsk axis throughout the night to prevent UAF from stabilizing the energy grid and to mask further ground probes toward the Dnipropetrovsk border.
Command & Control: An internal critique by an active RF serviceman (2015Z) highlights fundamental readiness deficiencies compared to UAF/Western standards, suggesting that while RF has the volume, tactical efficiency remains brittle and dependent on mass.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES
Posture: UAF is conducting a multi-domain defense. While the 46th OABr holds the line at Pokrovsk, the Air Force is actively managing a high-volume KAB/UAV threat.
Diplomacy as Force Multiplier: Ukraine's engagement with Ghana regarding captured nationals (2027Z) serves as a counter-intelligence and IO tool to discourage Global South recruitment by RF and demonstrate adherence to international law, contrasting with RF maritime actions.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
Escalation Rhetoric: RF political figures (Gurulev, 2024Z) are calling for "Oreshnik" (ballistic missile) strikes on Europe and naval aggression in the Black Sea. This is assessed as a narrative response to the Marinera seizure intended to project strength despite naval passivity in the Atlantic.
Sanctions/Energy Narrative: RF state media (TASS) is focusing on US/Venezuela/UN relations (2011Z/2024Z) to frame US maritime actions as "theft" and "resource control," attempting to build a coalition of "aggrieved" resource-heavy nations.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS
Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): RF continues infrastructure strangulation. With Dnipro now in "massive blackout," expect municipal water failures to follow within 6-12 hours as backup systems are exhausted.
Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): RF utilizes the "Oreshnik" or similar strategic assets for a "demonstration strike" in the Black Sea or a Ukrainian logistics hub to regain the escalatory initiative lost during the Marinera incident.
Timeline: The next 6 hours (until 0300Z) are critical for UAF to stabilize the Dnipro grid before the cyclone complicates repair logistics.
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
Dnipropetrovsk Border Integrity: Urgent need to verify the extent of RF "Center" Group incursions mentioned at 1958Z. Are these recon-in-force or sustained territorial gains?
Lipetsk Damage Assessment: BDA on targets in Elets/Lipetsk to determine if UAF strikes successfully hit the airbase or industrial sites.
Blackout Persistence: Monitor the repair rate in Dnipro; prolonged failure will trigger a humanitarian movement away from the front-line hubs.
//ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS//
Prioritize AA for Dnipro Energy Nodes: Immediate redeployment of mobile AD assets to protect "Gorvodokanal" and regional substations in Dnipro, as they are now primary targets for RF "infrastructure strangulation."
Standardize Anti-Drone Turrets: Acknowledge the RF critique of "Samopaly" (2000Z); UAF should accelerate the distribution of standardized, factory-made electronic warfare (EW) and kinetic anti-drone mounts to frontline units to maintain the "Shadow" unit's reported aerial edge.
Strategic Communication: Leverage the invitation to the Ghana MFA to highlight the presence of foreign mercenaries in RF ranks, targeting recruitment networks in West Africa.
