Sumy Sector Escalation (0734Z, Dnevnik Desantnika, LOW): Russian sources claim a developing offensive in the Hlukhiv district, Sumy region. UNCONFIRMED/LOW CONFIDENCE.
Shift in OWA-UAV Vectors (0730Z-0736Z, UAF AF, HIGH): Shahed-type UAVs are now reported on a southern heading toward Dnipro city from southern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, indicating a multi-axis pincer approach compared to previous northern vectors.
Tactical Success in Kharkiv (0737Z, Operativno ZSU, HIGH): UAF 3rd Separate Assault Brigade ("Crazy Cats" drone group) successfully interdicted RF armor using FPV and heavy bomber drones.
Decrease in UAF Strategic Strikes (0745Z, Voenkor Kotenok, MEDIUM): Following a 24h surge, no significant UAF drone strikes were reported against RF territory in the last 8 hours.
Hybrid/Sabo Activity (0732Z, Dva Mayora, MEDIUM): Reports of arson in Germany; consistent with recent RF hybrid patterns targeting European support infrastructure.
IPB Framework Analysis
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW
The battlefield geometry is expanding toward the Northern Border (Sumy). While the main efforts remain in the Kupyansk and Huliaipole sectors, the reports of activity near Hlukhiv suggest the RF may be seeking to exploit UAF's institutional transition (leadership changes in SBU/OPU) by opening a new pressure point.
Weather: Overcast/Winter conditions; high reliance on UAVs for fire correction.
Key Terrain: The Hlukhiv district serves as a critical junction for the H07 highway; any RF lodgment here threatens the depth of the Sumy defensive line.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS
Capabilities & Intentions:
Sumy Offensive (Hlukhiv): If confirmed, this indicates a shift from "border harassment" to "territorial seizure" intent. The use of VDV-linked channels (Dnevnik Desantnika) suggests the potential involvement of airborne units in a rapid infiltration role.
Aviation/Drone Pincer: RF is maneuvering OWA-UAVs from both the North (Sumy) and South (Dnipropetrovsk) simultaneously to saturate Dnipro’s AD umbrella.
Hybrid Operations: Ongoing arson/sabotage in Germany (0732Z) targets the "German-UA industrial venture" noted in previous daily reports, aiming to disrupt long-term sustainment.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES
Posture & Readiness:
Drone Dominance: The 3rd Separate Assault Brigade (Kharkiv) continues to demonstrate high-efficiency "drone-first" defense, successfully neutralizing RF armor (0737Z). This remains the primary mitigation factor against RF mechanized pushes.
Air Defense: Mobile fire groups are currently vectoring toward Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia (0732Z alerts) to intercept the new southern UAV wave.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
Diversionary Narratives: RF mil-bloggers (Rybar, Colonelcassad) are heavily promoting sensationalist US political claims (Trump/Colombia/Greenland) (0740Z-0743Z). This is a clear cognitive effort to flood the information space and distract from the tactical loss of armor in Kharkiv and the unconfirmed Sumy movements.
Demoralization: Promotion of the alleged death of activist Lana Chornohorska (0737Z) aims to degrade domestic Ukrainian morale.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS
Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): RF will continue the Shahed "shaping" mission over Dnipro for the next 3-6 hours, likely followed by a cruise or ballistic missile strike on the Pavlohrad-Dnipro rail hub to paralyze the movement of UAF reinforcements toward the Oskil River line.
Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): The claimed "Hlukhiv offensive" is a diversion for a larger mechanized breakthrough toward Konotop, aiming to sever the primary supply artery between Kyiv and the Eastern front.
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
Hlukhiv Ground Truth: Urgent requirement for SIGINT/ELINT or satellite imagery of the Hlukhiv border (Sumy) to confirm RF troop concentrations or mechanized columns.
UAV Technical Adaptation: Confirm if the current Shahed wave targeting Dnipro is utilizing the previously identified IR-searchlight/dazzler equipment.
SBU Operational Continuity: Monitor the SBU's "Alpha" drone units for any shift in activity levels during the Malyuk-Budanov leadership transition.
Recommendations:
Border Reinforcement: Immediately deploy elements of the Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) or Border Guard reserves to the Hlukhiv-H07 axis to counter potential "Grey Zone" infiltrations.
AD Vectoring: Reorient mobile AD assets in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to the Southern approaches, as RF has shifted OWA-UAV ingress routes.
Electronic Warfare: Activate wide-spectrum jamming in the Kharkiv sector to protect 3rd Assault Bde positions from retaliatory RF drone strikes following their tank kill.
