KINETIC ENGAGEMENT (POKROVSK SECTOR): RF MoD claims the destruction of two UAF armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) near Krasnoarmiysk [Pokrovsk] (0209Z, TASS/RF MoD, LOW). UNCONFIRMED.
BORDER SECURITY (NORTHERN AXIS): State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (DPSU) reports ~1,400 detentions on the Belarusian border during the 2025 calendar year, highlighting sustained illegal crossing pressure (0207Z, RBK-UA, HIGH).
INTERNAL RF CYBER THREAT: RF Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) issued warnings regarding "Gosuslugi" (government portal) credential harvesting, suggesting a sophisticated social engineering or cyber-campaign targeting Russian citizens (0221Z, TASS, MEDIUM).
Operational picture (by sector)
Northern Sector (Chernihiv/Belarus Border): Activity remains high. While previous sitreps focused on UAV ingress, new data indicates long-term border instability with Belarus. Current detentions suggest the border remains a porous vector for hybrid threats, though no new ground incursions were reported in the last 30 minutes.
Eastern Sector (Pokrovsk/Donetsk): The sector remains the primary kinetic focus. The RF claim of destroying two UAF AFVs near Krasnoarmiysk (Pokrovsk) indicates active engagement near the FEBA (Forward Edge of Battle Area). This aligns with the "contested" status of the Myrnohrad/Pokrovsk grey zone noted in the previous 24h summary.
Rear Areas (Russian Federation): Increased internal security focus on cyber-fraud/Gosuslugi. High Dempster-Shafer belief (0.65) suggests this is a coordinated domestic security priority, potentially linked to broader electronic warfare or mobilization-related data security.
Enemy activity / threat assessment
Ground Operations: RF forces continue to target UAF mobility in the Pokrovsk sector. The use of winter-camouflaged footage by TASS suggests operations are maintaining tempo despite environmental conditions.
Cyber/Hybrid: The MVD warning regarding Gosuslugi codes indicates a vulnerability in RF internal digital infrastructure. This may be a response to UAF-aligned "hacktivist" activity or a precursor to tighter internal controls.
Tactical Adaptation: The RF MoD’s rapid dissemination of engagement footage (armored vehicle strikes) serves to reinforce the narrative of UAF attrition during the ongoing aerial campaign.
Friendly activity (UAF)
Border Management: DPSU is maintaining a high-vigilance posture on the Northern border. The reported detentions (1,400 in 2025) confirm that the Belarus axis requires significant manpower to prevent infiltration and smuggling.
Force Posture (Pokrovsk): UAF remains engaged in defensive maneuvering. The reported loss of two AFVs (if confirmed) indicates high-intensity direct fire or ATGM (Anti-Tank Guided Missile) ambushes in the Pokrovsk outskirts.
Information environment / disinformation
RF Propaganda: TASS/RF MoD are actively pushing localized tactical successes (AFV destruction) to overshadow the failure of the FSB/GRU plot against the RDK commander reported earlier today.
Chronological Discrepancy: RBK-Ukraine’s summary of 2025 border statistics provides context for the persistent threat level on the Northern axis but does not indicate a new tactical shift in the last hour.
Outlook (next 6-12h)
MLCOA (Most Likely): The "Saturation Strike" predicted in the 24h summary remains the primary threat. Expect UAV pathfinding to transition into cruise/ballistic missile strikes targeting the Kyiv/Chernihiv energy infrastructure before 0500Z.
MDCOA (Most Dangerous): RF ground forces in the Pokrovsk sector utilize the psychological pressure of the air raids to launch a mechanized assault on the Myrnohrad city center, attempting to consolidate the "Grey Zone" into a hard-occupied zone.
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (BDA): Urgent confirmation required of the TASS claim regarding the two AFVs near Pokrovsk. Identify the unit affected and the cause of loss (FPV, ATGM, or Mine).
BELARUS INFILTRATION: Determine if current "illegal crossings" involve RF-affiliated Sabotage and Reconnaissance Groups (DRG) or are strictly civilian/economic in nature.
GOSUSLUGI EXPLOIT: Analyze if the cyber-scam warnings in Russia indicate a successful UAF/HUR cyber-operation that could disrupt RF mobilization or logistics databases.
INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD (IPB) SUMMARY
SITUATION OVERVIEW: The tactical situation is bifurcated between a strategic aerial campaign in the North/Center and high-intensity localized attrition in the East. Winter conditions are currently being exploited by RF forces for armored engagements.
ENEMY ANALYSIS: The RF is maintaining a "dual-track" pressure strategy—saturating the air domain while conducting opportunistic strikes against UAF armor in the Pokrovsk salient. Internal RF focus on cyber-security indicates possible domestic instability or vulnerability.
FRIENDLY FORCES: UAF forces in the Pokrovsk sector are facing increased direct-fire threats. Strategic reserves and air defense assets must remain disciplined to avoid premature depletion before the main missile wave.
INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT: Combat footage is being used as a tool of strategic communication to project RF dominance, requiring counter-messaging regarding actual UAF positions in Myrnohrad.
PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS: The 0300Z–0600Z window remains the "Critical Threat Window" for strategic missile strikes. Ground activity in Pokrovsk is likely a fixing operation to prevent UAF redeployment.
