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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2026-01-02 01:36:04Z
1 month ago
Previous (2026-01-02 01:06:05Z)

Situation Update (0135Z 02 JAN 2026)

Key updates since last sitrep

  • NEW INFILTRATION TACTICS (POKROVSK): Ukrainian National Guard reports Russian forces (RF) have shifted to "one-by-one" individual movement patterns to penetrate defenses near Pokrovsk, likely to minimize detection and losses from FPV/artillery (0108Z, RBC-Ukraine, HIGH).
  • ADMINISTRATIVE STRIFE (ZAPORIZHZHIA): Russian state media reports the arrest of Alexander Zinchenko, Deputy Head of Zaporizhzhia (occupation/local administration context), on fraud charges. Likely indicates an internal purge or shift in regional control (0108Z, TASS, MEDIUM).
  • FPV ATTRITION (SECTOR UNKNOWN): Russian Rosgvardia units have released footage claiming the destruction of two UAF pickups and infantry via FPV drones in a semi-rural zone (0119Z, Colonelcassad, MEDIUM).

Operational picture (by sector)

  • Eastern Sector (Pokrovsk/Donetsk): The situation is evolving from heavy bombardment (KAB strikes at 0101Z) to high-granularity infantry infiltration. The "one-by-one" tactic (0108Z) indicates an attempt to saturate the UAF's tactical ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) and FPV capacity by presenting too many low-value targets for precision engagement.
  • Central Sector (Zaporizhzhia): While the "all-clear" (0103Z) remains in effect for the air threat, the arrest of a senior administrative figure (Zinchenko) suggests internal instability or a reorganization of the occupation’s logistical/governance apparatus.
  • Northern/Southern Sectors: No new updates; previous UAV vectors toward Chernihiv and Mykolaiv remain the baseline threat.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

  • Tactical Adaptation: The move to individual infiltration in the Pokrovsk sector is a direct counter-measure to UAF's effective use of cluster munitions and FPV drones against grouped infantry. This increases the burden on UAF frontline "cleanup" operations and necessitates more dense thermal/night-vision coverage.
  • Rosgvardia Engagement: The use of FPV drones by Rosgvardia (0119Z) suggests these units are being moved closer to the line of contact or are being utilized for "rear-area" interdiction of UAF logistics/personnel rotations.
  • Logistics/Command: The arrest in Zaporizhzhia may signal a crackdown on embezzlement within the occupation administration, which often correlates with a shift to more direct military oversight of local resources.

Friendly activity (UAF)

  • Tactical Response: UAF National Guard units are currently adapting to the RF infiltration tactics. High-frequency FPV patrols are likely being redirected to intercept individual soldiers rather than vehicle columns.
  • Force Protection: The loss of two pickups (reported at 0119Z) highlights the extreme vulnerability of unarmored logistical vehicles to RF FPV drones in the "last mile" of the front.

Information environment / disinformation

  • Russian Narrative: RF sources are highlighting "corruption" in occupied zones (Zaporizhzhia) to likely signal a "law and order" phase or to deflect from military stagnation in that sector.
  • Tactical Reporting: UAF-aligned media (RBC-Ukraine) is providing timely warnings of RF tactical shifts, supporting transparency and frontline awareness.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

  • MLCOA (Most Likely): RF will continue the "high-low" pressure: heavy KAB strikes to destroy hard points, followed by individual infantry infiltration to seize trenches. UAV swarms will continue to loiter over Northern/Southern sectors to pin down AD.
  • MDCOA (Most Dangerous): Infiltrating RF groups in Pokrovsk establish a foothold in a key suburb (e.g., Myrnohrad center) under the cover of the night, while a concentrated ballistic strike (Iskander-M) targets UAF tactical reserves.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

  1. Infiltration Origin (P1): Identify the specific staging areas for "one-by-one" infantry movements in the Pokrovsk sector to allow for pre-emptive artillery interdiction.
  2. Rosgvardia Disposition (P2): Confirm if Rosgvardia FPV teams are operating independently or integrated into the 1st/2nd Army Corps to assess the density of the drone threat.
  3. Zinchenko Arrest Impact (P3): Determine if the Zaporizhzhia administrative arrest has disrupted local logistical supply chains to RF frontline units.

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD (IPB) SUMMARY

  1. SITUATION OVERVIEW: The tactical environment is shifting toward decentralized, small-unit actions. The air threat remains a persistent backdrop (UAVs/KABs), but the primary ground development is the RF’s attempt to bypass UAF's drone-dominant kill zones through individual infiltration.
  2. ENEMY ANALYSIS: RF is showing high tactical flexibility in the Pokrovsk sector. By moving soldiers individually, they are testing the limits of UAF's "per-target" ammunition expenditure and surveillance focus. The involvement of Rosgvardia in FPV operations indicates a deeper commitment of "internal" security forces to kinetic frontline roles.
  3. FRIENDLY FORCES: UAF units are facing a high-attrition environment for soft-skinned vehicles. Logistics and rotation security are the current primary vulnerabilities.
  4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT: The narrative is split between RF domestic "cleanup" (arrests) and tactical successes (drone footage), likely intended to maintain morale ahead of a larger planned offensive.
  5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS: The next 6 hours will be critical for UAF's ability to maintain the "Grey Zone" in Myrnohrad. If infiltration tactics succeed, the city center could shift from "Contested" to "Partially Occupied" by dawn.

//ANALYSIS ENDS//

Previous (2026-01-02 01:06:05Z)

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