Situation Report

Situation Update (1005Z 01 JAN 2026)

Key updates since last sitrep

• DEEP STRIKE - TATARSTAN (HIGH): Ukrainian long-range UAVs successfully targeted the "Severny Tovarny Park" (Tatneft) oil facility in Almetyevsk, Tatarstan (~1,000km from border). This marks a significant geographic expansion of the deep-strike campaign (1003Z, 0945Z, ASTRA/Operativnyi ZSU, HIGH).
• ENERGY GRID STRIKE (HIGH): Ukrenergo confirms overnight RF strikes targeted energy infrastructure in three Ukrainian regions, leading to localized damage. Odesa critical infrastructure was also confirmed hit (0947Z, 0842Z, RBK-Ukraine/Voyenkor Russkaya Vesna, HIGH).
• MISSILE INTERCEPTION - CENTRAL UKRAINE (MEDIUM): A high-speed cruise missile transit from Sumy through Poltava toward Kaniv (Cherkasy) was reported "downed" near the Kaniv/Zolotonosha axis (1003Z, Mykolaiv Vanyok, MEDIUM).
• MYRNOHRAD CONTESTED STATUS (MEDIUM): RF sources claim the destruction of a UAF reconnaissance group (DRG) attempting to raise flags in Dimitrov (Myrnohrad), suggesting the urban center remains a highly fluid "grey zone" rather than being under full RF control (1004Z, Operatsiya Z, MEDIUM).
• KAB EXPANSION - DNIPROPETROVSK BORDER (HIGH): Russian tactical aviation has begun launching KABs (glide bombs) targeting the eastern border of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast from positions in Donetsk, confirming the threat to the administrative border (1000Z, Air Force UA, HIGH).
• KHORLY IO ESCALATION (HIGH): Occupation authorities have declared Jan 2-3 as days of mourning in Kherson for the alleged Khorly strike. RF MFA is now baselessly accusing "European special services" of involvement (0942Z, 0956Z, 0959Z, TASS/Alex Parker, HIGH).

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB)

Battlefield Geometry: The operational focus remains the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad axis. The line of contact (LOC) is shifting toward the Dnipropetrovsk administrative border. RF forces are utilizing glide bombs (KABs) to soften defenses ahead of the border. In the rear, the "energy war" has resumed with a multi-region strike overnight targeting the power grid.

Weather/Environmental Factors: Adverse weather in Krasnodar Krai (RF) is causing significant rail logistics delays, with 2,800+ sets of emergency rations delivered to stranded train passengers. This may temporarily slow RF logistical throughput from the southern hub (0954Z, Dva Mayora).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

Capabilities & Intentions:

• Aviation: RF continues to leverage KABs as their primary breakthrough tool. The shift in targeting toward the eastern Dnipropetrovsk border indicates an intent to push combat operations out of the Donbas proper.
• Logistics: Despite the 27.24 SAR score at the GRAU arsenal, the actual delivery of heavy munitions may be hampered by weather-related rail disruptions in the south.
• Course of Action (COA): RF is currently executing a "Retaliation Narrative" COA, framing every strike on Ukrainian energy as a response to the Khorly incident.

Tactical Adaptations:

• Increased use of FPV drones against Ukrainian logistical "soft targets" (quads/pickups) in the Myrne/Vasylivka sector (0959Z).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

Posture and Readiness:

• Air Defense: UAF AD demonstrated high readiness in Central Ukraine, successfully intercepting a cruise missile on a complex vector toward the Kaniv Hydroelectric Power Plant (1003Z).
• Deep Strike: The ability to strike Tatarstan (Almetyevsk) suggests UAF has maintained or improved its long-range UAV flight controllers to bypass increasingly dense RF electronic warfare (EW) and AD in the Russian interior.

Recent Successes:

• Successful kinetic impact on the Tatneft facility (Tatarstan).
• Maintenance of a presence (DRG/Recon) within Myrnohrad despite RF claims of full occupation.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

Disinformation/Propaganda:

• Khorly Narrative: The RF is attempting to internationalize the Khorly incident, using Turkish media reports and MFA statements to link the strike to Western intelligence. This is a clear attempt to drive a wedge between Ukraine and its European partners.
• Swiss Resort Incident: RF state media (TASS) has significantly de-escalated the "Swiss explosion" narrative, now citing "pyrotechnics" and an absence of Russian casualties (0939Z). This suggests the initial attempt to use it as a "Western instability" narrative failed to gain traction.
• Internal UA Friction: Pro-RU channels are amplifying criticisms of President Zelenskyy by MP Mariana Bezuhla to project an image of command-level instability (1001Z).

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): In the next 6-12 hours, RF will continue KAB saturation of the Myrnohrad-Dnipropetrovsk border area. Shahed UAVs currently over Zhytomyr and Odesa will likely attempt to strike substations to complicate New Year power restoration efforts.

Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): A second wave of cruise/ballistic missiles, utilizing the heavy munitions noted in the 260th GRAU Arsenal surge, targeting the Kaniv or Kyiv hydroelectric dams to cause catastrophic infrastructure failure during the winter freeze.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

1. BDA Tatarstan: Satellite imagery required to assess the extent of damage at the Almetyevsk oil facility.
2. LOC Dnipropetrovsk Border: Physical confirmation of RF ground elements' proximity to the administrative border is critical.
3. Khorly Identification: Identification of the specific munitions used in the Khorly incident to debunk RF claims of "purposeful civilian targeting."

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Dnipropetrovsk Defense: Accelerate the hardening of defensive positions and mining of transit routes along the M-04 and E-50 highways at the oblast border.
2. Strategic Communication: Issue a counter-narrative regarding the Tatarstan strike, emphasizing it as a legitimate strike on the RF war chest (oil revenue) to counter the RF "terrorist strike" rhetoric.
3. Internal Security: Monitor for potential RF-backed sabotage groups targeting energy substations in the Zhytomyr/Kyiv/Odesa corridors in coordination with the ongoing UAV transits.

//ANALYSIS ENDS//