AIR DEFENSE SUCCESS - DNIPROPETROVSK (HIGH): Ukrainian air defense units successfully intercepted and destroyed two (2) Russian UAVs over the Dnipropetrovsk region (Dnipropetrovsk ODA, 1502Z, HIGH).
CHORNOMORSK UAV THREAT (HIGH): New UAV ingress detected heading toward Chornomorsk, Odesa region, indicating a widening of the maritime/port harassment vector (Air Force ZSU, 1500Z, HIGH).
HYBRID OPS - DEEPFAKE CAMPAIGN (MEDIUM): A sophisticated deepfake video of Vladimir Putin delivering a cynical New Year’s address has been disseminated by independent/opposition media (ASTRA), marking a high-tier counter-propaganda effort (ASTRA, 1503Z, MEDIUM).
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE (MEDIUM): Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence (SZR) reports the total cost of the invasion to Russian taxpayers has reached approximately $550 billion USD since February 2022 (Operativniy ZSU, 1503Z, MEDIUM).
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW
The operational environment remains under high tension as the "New Year’s Eve" strike window approaches. In the last 60 minutes, enemy activity has shifted toward multi-vector UAV harassment, likely serving as reconnaissance-in-force or saturation tactics to probe Air Defense (AD) density in the Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk sectors. The successful downing of two UAVs in Dnipropetrovsk confirms high readiness levels in a sector previously identified as high-risk due to ground force proximity. The battlefield geometry remains stable but precarious near the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad axis, with no new ground confirmations since the 1500Z report.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS
Capabilities & Intentions
Aerial Harassment: The shift toward Chornomorsk (1500Z) suggests a deliberate attempt to threaten port infrastructure and grain logistics concurrently with the expected inland strikes.
UAV Persistence: The continuous stream of loitering munitions (Shahed/Geran) into Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa reinforces the assessment of a synchronized saturation strike planned for the 1800Z–0200Z window.
Economic Attrition: The $550B cost estimate highlights the long-term sustainability strain on the RF, though this has yet to translate into immediate tactical withdrawal.
Tactics & Adaptations
Saturation Probing: The use of small UAV groups (e.g., the 2 downed in Dnipropetrovsk) appears designed to force UAF AD to reveal battery locations and expend interceptors ahead of the primary cruise/ballistic missile volleys.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (UAF)
Posture & Readiness
AD Effectiveness: Dnipropetrovsk AD assets (Air Command 'East') remain highly effective, successfully neutralizing low-altitude threats.
Strategic Communication: The KMVA and President’s office are focusing on resilience and "steadfastness" (1500Z), prioritizing civilian morale ahead of the anticipated night strikes.
Tactical Successes/Setbacks
Success: Neutralization of 2 UAVs in the Dnipropetrovsk sector (1502Z) mitigates the risk of tactical reconnaissance over sensitive troop concentrations near the administrative border.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
Counter-Propaganda: The emergence of a "Deepfake Putin" video (1503Z) represents a pivot in the cognitive domain, aiming to degrade RF domestic morale and disrupt the Kremlin’s New Year's messaging.
Narrative Contestation: Pro-Russian milbloggers (Colonelcassad, 1500Z) are adopting a somber tone regarding the "4th year of war," potentially signaling exhaustion within the Russian nationalist information space.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS
Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA)
The detected UAVs over Chornomorsk and Dnipropetrovsk are the vanguard of the previously predicted saturation strike. Between 1800Z and 2200Z, expect a transition from "Shahed" harassment to massed missile launches (Kalibr from the Black Sea and Kh-101/555 from strategic bombers) targeting the energy grid and Odesa port facilities.
Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA)
Russian "Group O" forces utilize the AD saturation over Dnipropetrovsk to launch a localized mechanized dash across the administrative border toward Pavlohrad, supported by electronic warfare (EW) to blind UAF tactical communication during the holiday transition.
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
Myrnohrad Ground Truth: Still require visual confirmation of the Line of Contact (LOC) within Myrnohrad following claims of deterioration in the previous cycle.
Launch Platform Tracking: Immediate tracking of Black Sea Fleet (BSF) missile carriers is required following the Chornomorsk UAV ingress.
EW Activity: Monitor for localized GPS jamming or communication blackouts in the Pokrovsk-Dnipropetrovsk border region, which would indicate an imminent ground assault.
