ZAPORIZHZHIA AERIAL BOMBARDMENT (HIGH): New launches of KAB (guided aerial bombs) confirmed targeting the Zaporizhzhia sector as of 1440Z (Air Force ZSU, 1440Z, HIGH).
RF NAVAL TECHNOLOGICAL ADAPTATION (MEDIUM): Ukrainian Naval Forces (VMS ZSU) report that Russia is actively copying Ukrainian maritime drone designs, posing a renewed threat to the Black Sea coastline (RBK-Ukraine, 1441Z, MEDIUM).
DNIPROPETROVSK BORDER PRESSURE (UNCONFIRMED): Pro-Russian sources claim the "Otvažnyje" (Group O) forces are conducting combat operations near the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border, specifically near Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (Operatsiya Z, 1444Z, LOW).
SUMY UAV THREAT (HIGH): New UAV (Shahed) ingress detected heading toward Sumy as of 1450Z, continuing the pattern of loitering munitions saturation (Air Force ZSU, 1450Z, HIGH).
KADYROV HEALTH CRISIS (UNCONFIRMED): Reports suggest Ramzan Kadyrov was urgently hospitalized on Dec 25 and has not appeared in public since, despite pre-scheduled/automated birthday greetings appearing on his Telegram channel (ASTRA, 1456Z; Kadyrov_95, 1439Z, LOW).
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW
The operational environment is characterized by increased Russian aerial pressure in the south and persistent tactical advances toward the Dnipropetrovsk administrative border. The battlefield geometry remains fluid near the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad axis. Weather conditions continue to favor static defense, but Russian "buggy columns" and KAB strikes are being utilized to bypass traditional mud-season mobility constraints. Strategic depth remains contested, with both sides utilizing New Year's Eve as a window for high-impact psychological and kinetic operations.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS
Capabilities & Intentions
Ground Operations: The "Otvažnyje" (Group O) is prioritizing the Pokrovsk/Myrnohrad sector. Claims of fighting within Dnipropetrovsk Oblast suggest an attempt to capitalize on the mass evacuations reported in the previous 24h cycle (Daily Report, 12-30).
Naval Adaptation: RF forces are transitioning from passive defense to active technological replication of Ukrainian Uncrewed Surface Vessels (USVs). This indicates a pivot toward offensive maritime drone operations in 2026.
Indirect Fire: Continuous use of D-30 artillery in the Konstantinovka sector (MoD Russia, 1441Z) aims to suppress UAF logistics supporting the Pokrovsk salient.
Tactics & Adaptations
Information/Hybrid Ops: RF is leveraging POW testimonies (Colonelcassad, 1445Z) and "Poliyruk" media revivals (Basurin, 1456Z) to demoralize UAF defenders before the Jan 3 summit.
Kadyrov Proxy Management: The discrepancy between reports of Kadyrov’s hospitalization (ASTRA) and his channel's activity suggests a potential "continuity of command" charade by the Kremlin to avoid instability in the North Caucasus during the holiday period.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (UAF)
Posture & Readiness
Air Defense: UAF Air Force is maintaining high-tempo monitoring of the Sumy and Zaporizhzhia sectors. However, the continuous KAB launches indicate a need for expanded long-range AD or F-16 patrols to push back RF launch platforms (Su-34s).
Naval Posture: VMS ZSU is pivoting to counter-USV operations, acknowledging that the "drone monopoly" in the Black Sea is closing.
Tactical Successes/Setbacks
Success: Persistent tracking and early warning of KAB/UAV threats have minimized surprise in the Sumy/Zaporizhzhia axes.
Setback (Potential): Pro-Russian claims of progress in the Myrnohrad sector, if corroborated, suggest UAF may be trading space for time to solidify the Dnipropetrovsk defense line.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
Strategic Narratives: Ukrainian sources are highlighting the economic cost of the war to the RF (22 years of health budgets) to counter Russian "inevitable victory" narratives (RBK-Ukraine, 1450Z).
Disinformation: Russian state-aligned channels (Arkhangel Spetsnaza, 1446Z) are escalating anti-refugee rhetoric in Europe, likely timed to influence European public opinion ahead of the Jan 3 diplomatic meetings.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS
Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA)
RF will continue the UAV loitering over Sumy and Odesa to fix UAF AD assets while executing localized ground "spoiling attacks" on the Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia border to disrupt holiday troop rotations.
Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA)
The 33rd Guards Motor Rifle Regiment (GMRR) launches a mechanized breakthrough from the Dobropilsky salient, crossing into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in force, supported by a simultaneous "Oreshnik" or massed ballistic strike on Kyiv decision-making centers between 1800Z and 0000Z.
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
Dnipropetrovsk Ingress: Urgently require GEOINT or drone feed confirmation of RF ground forces across the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative line.
Kadyrov Status: Cross-reference SIGINT/HUMINT from Grozny to confirm if Kadyrov is incapacitated; monitor for potential Chechen Rosgvardia movement shifts.
Russian USV Specs: Identify the technical specifications of the "Russian-copied" maritime drones; specifically, are they equipped with satellite links (Starlink-equivalents) or local RF guidance systems?
Konstantinovka BDA: Assess the validity of Russian MoD claims regarding the destruction of the ammunition depot near Konstantinovka (1441Z).
