MULTI-VECTOR UAV INGRESS (HIGH): New Shahed groups detected entering Mykolaiv Oblast via Berezanka (heading North) and Odesa Oblast via Mayaky (Air Force ZSU, 1338Z, 1357Z).
AERIAL BOMBARDMENT ESCALATION (HIGH): Renewed KAB (guided aerial bomb) launches confirmed targeting Kharkiv from the north and recurring strikes in the Donetsk sector (Air Force ZSU, 1338Z, 1348Z).
CONTESTED ENGAGEMENT: ZAPORIZHZHIA (MEDIUM): Russian sources (Archangel Spetsnaz, Voin DV) report localized "year-end" engagements in Zaporizhzhia under adverse weather. 38th GMRB (35th Army) is actively targeting UAF personnel in this sector (1346Z, 1400Z).
STRATEGIC ATTRITION CLAIM (LOW): UAF specialized drone units (1st OC BpS SBS) released a retrospective claiming $21.5 billion in cumulative damages to Russian infrastructure through 2025 (1349Z, 1353Z).
COORDINATED HOLIDAY IO (HIGH): Simultaneous release of New Year addresses by Putin and regional governors (Bogomaz) matches UAF commander addresses (Presidential Brigade), signaling a transition to "holiday standby" for non-combat units while frontline activity persists (1338Z, 1339Z, 1355Z).
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW
The operational environment is characterized by a "dual-track" tempo: high-intensity psychological/information operations celebrating the New Year, contrasted with persistent tactical pressure. The Zaporizhzhia Sector has seen a localized spike in activity despite deteriorating weather conditions. The air domain is currently the primary theater of active engagement as RF forces attempt to fix UAF Air Defense (AD) assets ahead of the anticipated 1800Z saturation window.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS
Capabilities & Intentions
Aerial Operations: The RF continues a pattern of "shaping strikes" using KABs in the North (Kharkiv) and East (Donetsk). The intent is likely to degrade tactical defenses and prevent UAF from repositioning reserves during the holiday period.
Ground Offensive (Zaporizhzhia): The engagement of the 38th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade indicates the RF is maintaining offensive pressure in the south, likely to capitalize on the weather-induced limited visibility which hampers UAF long-range ISR.
Tactics & Adaptations
Information Saturation: The Kremlin is using the New Year transition to flood domestic and international spaces with imagery of Putin (1339Z) to project stability.
Weather Exploitation: Russian drone units (Archangel Spetsnaz) are explicitly citing "adverse weather" as a factor in recent localized assaults, suggesting a tactical shift toward infantry-heavy or low-visibility operations when UAF drone superiority is naturally mitigated by climate (1352Z).
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (UAF)
Posture & Readiness
Defensive Integrity: The Separate Presidential Brigade and 1st OC BpS SBS maintain high morale, utilizing retrospective media to reinforce the narrative of successful strategic attrition against the RF economy (1338Z, 1349Z).
Tactical Innovation: UAF specialized drone units continue to release evidence of "effective" year-end strikes (1353Z), suggesting that while the ground situation in Pokrovsk remains "grim" (from 1335Z report), deep-strike capabilities remain operational.
Tactical Successes/Setbacks
Setback (Zaporizhzhia): Video evidence from RF 35th Army suggests localized UAF personnel losses in the Zaporizhzhia sector due to FPV and drone-corrected artillery (1400Z).
Success (Logistics): The $21.5B damage claim—though unconfirmed in its specific valuation—highlights a successful 12-month campaign of targeting RF economic nodes, which serves as a critical counter-narrative to Russian territorial gains.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
Propaganda Influx: RF channels (Rybar, Two Majors) are pushing morale-boosting content, including a "special comic" on the Antonovsky Bridge, attempting to romanticize past engagements to mask current stagnation in certain sectors (1346Z).
Domestic Friction (Russia): Reports from Sever.Realii (1404Z) indicate that official Russian policy is now discouraging "inappropriate" corporate parties, suggesting an internal push for a more austere "war-footing" mentality as 2026 approaches.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS
Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA)
RF forces will maintain UAV ingress over Mykolaiv and Odesa to force UAF AD to reveal positions. A massed missile/UAV volley is expected between 1800Z and 0000Z, synchronized with the New Year transition to maximize psychological impact on the civilian population.
Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA)
Exploiting the localized engagements in Zaporizhzhia and the "grim" situation in Pokrovsk, RF forces launch a multi-regimental night assault during the New Year celebrations, supported by a total suppression of the power grid via strategic missile strikes, aiming for a tactical breakthrough while UAF command is distracted by holiday logistics.
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
Zaporizhzhia Combat Power: Determine the current operational readiness of the RF 35th Army; specifically, are the localized strikes (1400Z) precursors to a larger divisional-strength push?
KAB Launch Sites: Identify the specific airfields used for the 1338Z/1348Z KAB strikes to facilitate potential "STING" drone or ATACMS counter-battery fire.
Shahed Vector Analysis: Monitor if the UAVs over Berezanka (Mykolaiv) are heading toward Kryvyi Rih or pivoting toward the Kirovohrad energy hub.
Buryat/38th GMRB Movement: Confirm if additional mechanized assets from the 38th GMRB are moving toward the frontline in Zaporizhzhia or if activity remains limited to drone/artillery harassment.
