TERRITORIAL LOSS - ZAPORIZHZHIA (HIGH): RF MoD and pro-Russian sources confirm the capture of Lukyanivske by the "Dnepr" Group of Forces (1014Z, Colonelcassad; 1019Z, MoD Russia). This validates the previously reported RF push within the 15km perimeter of Zaporizhzhia City.
TERRITORIAL LOSS - KHARKIV (HIGH): RF "Zapad" Group of Forces has reportedly seized Boguslavka in the Kharkiv region (1019Z, MoD Russia), indicating a widening of the offensive beyond the Kupiansk-Oskil axis.
KINETIC ESCALATION - SUMY (MEDIUM): The "Sumy Diversion" has transitioned from an Information Operation (IO) to kinetic reality. GSZSU confirms repelling two Russian assaults in the North Slobozhansky/Sumy direction, while Russian sources report "intensified offensive operations" supported by tactical mapping (1031Z, Dnevnik Desantnika; 1031Z, Liveuamap).
DECEPTION OPERATIONS (MEDIUM): OSINT reports indicate the Kremlin used "canned" (pre-recorded) footage of Putin at least 18 times in 2025 to mask his location or status, reinforcing the narrative that his current location is a "state secret" (1009Z, Sever.Realii).
EQUIPMENT CAPABILITY SHIFT (MEDIUM): RF forces are deploying the "Shleyf" EW system integrated on mobile UGV platforms to provide "small sky" protection against FPV drones (1021Z, Colonelcassad).
REAR AREA ATTRITION (LOW): RF claims to have destroyed 15 units of UAF armored vehicles near Druzhkivka using "Rubicon" specialized drone units. (UNCONFIRMED - LOW CONFIDENCE) (1034Z, TASS).
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)
The operational environment has shifted from a static defense to a multi-vector RF offensive aimed at stretching Ukrainian reserves. The capture of Lukyanivske represents a significant breach in the secondary defensive line south of Zaporizhzhia.
Battlefield Geometry: The "bulge" toward Zaporizhzhia City is consolidating. Simultaneously, a new active front in Sumy is forcing UAF to commit border guard and reserve units that were previously positioned for the Donbas.
Weather/Environmental: No significant changes; freezing conditions are facilitating mechanized movement on firm ground, but increasing the thermal signature of both friendly and enemy assets.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)
Strategic Intent: The Kremlin is intensifying the "Novgorod Attack" narrative (1020Z, Operatsia Z) to frame Ukraine as a non-negotiable terrorist entity, likely to justify a large-scale retaliatory strike or to disrupt the newly established US-UA security framework.
Capabilities & Adaptations:
Tactical EW: Integration of "Shleyf" EW on UGVs indicates an effort to solve the "last mile" drone vulnerability for mechanized columns.
Force Disposition: Deployment of "Dnepr" and "Zapad" groups on separate axes (Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv) suggests RF still possesses sufficient operational reserves for simultaneous pushes.
Logistics: Internal Russian economic pressure is noted with Indo-Russian oil trade at a 3-year low (1007Z), potentially impacting long-term sustainment if non-Rouble revenues continue to decline.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)
Force Posture: UAF is prioritizing the Zaporizhzhia front with advanced UAS delivery. The Zaporizhzhia OVA confirmed a large-scale delivery of EW-resistant FPV drones to brigades on the front (1018Z).
Tactical Successes: Successful repulsion of assaults in the Kursk/Sumy border areas and the Kherson direction (1031Z, GSZSU) indicates that despite territorial losses in Zaporizhzhia, the perimeter remains active and resilient in other sectors.
Constraints: Administrative shifts (e.g., Binance card restrictions, 1025Z) may impact localized volunteer funding and grey-market procurement for tactical units.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)
RF Disinformation: Peskov’s continued focus on the Novgorod residence "attack" (1025Z, Kotenok) is the primary "red line" narrative currently being socialized in the Russian domestic space.
Counter-Deception: The identification of "canned" Putin videos (1009Z) serves as a critical counter-narrative, suggesting Kremlin instability or extreme paranoia regarding the President's physical safety.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)
Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA): RF will use the momentum from Lukyanivske to push toward Marhanets and Zaporizhzhia's southern industrial zone. Air Force warnings of Shahed groups moving toward Marhanets (1032Z) suggest an imminent combined drone/artillery suppression phase.
Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA): RF utilizes the Sumy kinetic probes as a precursor to a mechanized battalion-level breach aimed at severing the H-07 highway, effectively isolating Sumy and forcing a massive UAF withdrawal from the Kursk salient.
Timeline: The next 6-12 hours are critical for the defense of the southern approaches to Zaporizhzhia.
Intelligence Gaps & Collection Requirements
Lukyanivske Verification: Request high-resolution commercial satellite imagery (Maxar/Planet) of Lukyanivske to determine the extent of RF consolidation and the presence of heavy armor.
Sumy Vector Strength: Identify the specific RF units involved in the two repelled assaults (1031Z). Are these regular motorized rifle units or "Storm-Z" expendables used for reconnaissance-in-force?
EW Effectiveness: Monitor SIGINT for feedback on the performance of the "Shleyf" UGV-integrated EW system. Determine if it is susceptible to specific UAF frequency-hopping FPVs.
Binance Impact: Assess the degree to which Binance's card withdrawal restrictions (1025Z) affect the liquidity of UAF tactical-level crowdfunded logistics.
