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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-12-30 07:36:09Z
1 month ago
Previous (2025-12-30 07:06:08Z)

Situation Update (0735Z 30 DEC 25)

Key updates since last sitrep

  • AIR DEFENSE ENGAGEMENT: UAF Air Force reports 52 of 60 UAVs and 1 of 2 Iskander-M ballistic missiles intercepted or suppressed during a massed overnight attack (0711Z, AF UA, HIGH).
  • ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE STRIKE: RF drone strikes in Chernihiv region have successfully hit energy facilities and a village council, causing localized power outages and disrupting railway schedules (0724Z, RBC-UA; 0727Z, ASTRA, HIGH).
  • DONETSK SECTOR ADVANCE: RF "Tsentr" Group claims the "liberation" of Dimitrov (Myrnohrad), suggesting a breakthrough or significant advance in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad sector (0703Z, MoD Russia, MEDIUM).
  • STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT: Video evidence confirms the "Oreshnik" intermediate-range ballistic missile system is now on combat duty in Belarus (0721Z, OperativnoZSU; 0729Z, RVvoenkor, HIGH).
  • POLITICAL SIGNALING: President Zelenskyy stated the war could end in 2026, citing RF’s internal fear of full-scale mobilization (0704Z, RBC-UA, MEDIUM).
  • ZAPORIZHZHIA SECTOR: Pro-RF sources are intensifying fundraising for the 110th Brigade and other units on the Zaporizhzhia front, indicating high operational intensity and sustainment needs (0703Z, 0719Z, Dva Mayora, MEDIUM).

Operational picture (by sector)

Donetsk Sector (Pokrovsk/Myrnohrad Axis)

  • Dimitrov (Myrnohrad): RF MoD reports "Tsentr" Group has concluded combat operations in Dimitrov. If verified, this places RF forces on the immediate outskirts of Myrnohrad, threatening the wider Pokrovsk logistical hub from the northeast. This aligns with the previous report's assessment of eroding flanks.

Zaporizhzhia Sector

  • Huliaipole: The status of Huliaipole remains UNCONFIRMED (LOW confidence). While RF propaganda claimed its fall at 0700Z, no official UAF confirmation or visual evidence from independent sources has emerged.
  • Active Front: Intense activity is noted on the Zaporizhzhia front, with the RF 110th Brigade and "Vostok" groups receiving focused logistical/financial support from pro-RF foundations (0719Z).

Northern Sector (Chernihiv/Sumy)

  • Chernihiv: Kinetic activity has shifted to infrastructure targeting. Successful hits on energy objects near railway lines (0724Z) indicate a deliberate RF effort to degrade UAF logistical throughput to the northern and eastern fronts.
  • Sumy: Following the 47th OMBr's success in drone interception, the sector remains under high aerial threat, but no new ground incursions have been verified despite previous IO claims of RF presence within 20km.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

  • Tactical Course of Action: RF is prioritizing the encirclement/capture of the Myrnohrad-Pokrovsk agglomeration while simultaneously attempting to induce a defensive collapse in Zaporizhzhia via high-decibel IO and localized mechanized pushes.
  • Strategic Signaling (Oreshnik): The confirmed deployment of the Oreshnik system in Belarus (0729Z) is intended to deter Western intervention and complicate UAF/NATO air defense planning. This asset provides RF with a rapid-strike capability against European command nodes from a non-contested (Belarusian) launch area.
  • Hybrid Operations: RF continues to utilize "POW testimonials" (0702Z) and "anti-Bandera" provocations in Lviv involving Polish politicians (0704Z) to erode domestic Ukrainian morale and fracture the UA-Poland alliance.

Friendly activity (UAF)

  • Defensive Performance: UAF Air Defense continues to demonstrate high efficiency (86% intercept rate for UAVs), though the "Iskander-M" penetration in Chernihiv demonstrates the persistent challenge of ballistic missile defense without high-tier Western systems.
  • Counter-Drone Operations: The 3rd Army Corps (including Kraken) remains highly effective in the "active combat zone" (likely Lyman or Donetsk sectors), utilizing FPV drones to disrupt RF armor and personnel movements (0733Z).
  • Strategic Communication: Zelenskyy’s projection of a 2026 conclusion (0704Z) is a counter-IO measure designed to frame RF’s current offensive as a "last gasp" before inevitable mobilization-induced domestic instability in Russia.

Information environment / disinformation

  • Russian Internal IO: Dmitry Medvedev is promoting a narrative of "Victory in 2025" to consolidate domestic support (0705Z). Simultaneously, reports of bank transfer blocks (0729Z) and mandatory work on Jan 2nd suggest economic tightening.
  • False Flag/Provocation: RF media is amplifying a claim by a US analyst (Dmitry Simes) that Russia "must respond" to a purported UAF attack on Putin's Valdai residence (0713Z). Local reports from Valdai suggest no such attack occurred (0732Z, Sever.Realii), indicating this is a manufactured pretext for escalation.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

  • Most Likely COA (MLCOA): RF will maintain high-intensity artillery and FPV pressure on the Huliaipole-Orikhiv line while attempting to consolidate control over Dimitrov. Continued UAV "nuisance" strikes on northern energy grids are expected.
  • Most Dangerous COA (MDCOA): RF conducts a localized, battalion-sized mechanized breakthrough south of Zaporizhzhia city, attempting to reach the 15km threshold claimed by Gerasimov, supported by renewed ballistic missile strikes from Belarus.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

  1. MYRNOHRAD FEBA: Urgent need for commercial satellite imagery or drone recon to confirm the extent of RF control in Dimitrov. Is the UAF conducting a fighting withdrawal to the main Myrnohrad defenses?
  2. RAILWAY IMPACT: Assess the duration of rail disruptions in Chernihiv. Is this affecting the transit of heavy equipment or reserves?
  3. HULIAIPOLE GROUND TRUTH: Confirm if UAF units are still in control of the central administration buildings in Huliaipole to debunk or verify the "liberation" claim.
  4. ORESHNIK TELEMETRY: Attempt to identify the specific training or combat status of the Oreshnik unit in Belarus—is it integrated into the joint RF-Belarus regional force command?

//ANALYSIS ENDS//

Previous (2025-12-30 07:06:08Z)

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