ZAPORIZHZHIA INTENSITY (HIGH): Official reports confirm 715 Russian strikes across 23 settlements in Zaporizhzhia Oblast within the last 24 hours. (0510Z, ZOMA, HIGH).
HULIAIPOLE AERIAL ASSAULT (HIGH): Visual evidence confirms sustained bombardment of Huliaipole by the 11th Air and Air Defense Forces Army. (0510Z, Воин DV, HIGH).
SYZRAN DRONE IMPACT (HIGH): Local and operational sources confirm multiple nighttime explosions in Syzran (Samara Oblast) following a UAF drone wave. (0516Z, Оперативний ЗСУ, HIGH).
DIPLOMATIC BACKCHANNEL (MEDIUM): RF State media reports an agreement for a meeting between Russian parliamentarians and U.S. Congress representatives; timing and location remain TBD. (0515Z, ТАСС, MEDIUM).
DESERTION NARRATIVE (UNCONFIRMED): RF sources claim "entire UAF units" have deserted positions near Huliaipole. No corroboration from friendly channels. (0532Z, ТАСС, LOW).
RF ATTRITION (HIGH): GS UAF reports 1,200 enemy personnel liquidated over the last 24-hour cycle. (0512Z, РБК-Україна, HIGH).
Operational picture (by sector)
Southern Sector (Zaporizhzhia/Huliaipole): This is currently the most kinetic area of operations. The RF is employing a high-volume "fire wall" tactic (715 strikes) combined with 11th Air Army bombing runs. This follows the confirmed loss of Huliaipole and the death of a key volunteer commander (White Rex) noted in the 27 DEC report. The RF objective appears to be the total suppression of any UAF counter-offensive capability in the south.
RF Rear (Syzran/Samara): The Syzran strike is confirmed. Given Syzran’s role as a major rail hub and refinery center, this suggests a continued UAF strategy of "reciprocal attrition" targeting the RF’s ability to sustain the winter offensive.
Rear Areas (Kryvyi Rih): Local administration reports the situation remains "controlled" as of 0535Z, suggesting that despite regional strikes, essential command and control in this hub remains intact. (0535Z, Vilkul, HIGH).
Enemy activity / threat assessment
Tactical Course of Action: The RF has pivoted to a massive saturation of the Zaporizhzhia front. By combining 700+ strikes with heavy aerial bombardment, they are attempting to create a "tactical vacuum" where UAF units cannot regroup or reorganize after recent leadership losses.
Information Operations: The TASS report regarding "mass desertions" at Huliaipole (0532Z) is a classic demoralization effort. This aligns with the Dempster-Shafer belief (0.168) regarding an "AFU Retreat," which likely stems from RF propaganda trying to turn a tactical retrograde into a perceived rout.
Strategic Maneuvering: The announcement of a meeting with U.S. Congress (0515Z) while Lavrov simultaneously threatens Western assets (0530Z) suggests a "good cop/bad cop" strategy. The goal is to create friction between different branches of the U.S. government regarding continued support for Ukraine.
Friendly activity (UAF)
Deep Strike Persistence: Despite the critical infrastructure situation in Kyiv, UAF long-range strike capabilities remain active and effective, as evidenced by the Syzran explosions.
Defensive Resilience: While under extreme pressure in Zaporizhzhia, UAF continues to inflict high attrition (1,200 casualties). However, the internal contradictions in some UAF-aligned reporting (0506Z) suggest potential fatigue or coordination issues within the information/press wings.
Information environment / disinformation
Psychological Target (Volunteer Units): The RF is specifically targeting the morale of volunteer and international detachments in the south following the KIA of Nikitin. The desertion narrative is likely aimed at these specific elements to induce a "collapse of cohesion."
Western Focus: Lavrov’s comments about Western "blindness" to corruption (0530Z) are timed to undermine the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government ahead of the Trump-Zelenskyy meeting and the potential RF-U.S. legislative meeting.
Outlook (next 6-12h)
Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): RF will maintain the 700+ strikes/day tempo in Zaporizhzhia to prevent UAF from stabilizing the line near Huliaipole. We expect a formal RF claim of "securing" the sector within this window.
Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): RF aviation (11th Air Army) expands targeting from Huliaipole to key logistics hubs in Zaporizhzhia city or Kryvyi Rih to capitalize on the perceived momentum and morale dip.
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
Huliaipole Integrity: Urgent need for SIGINT or drone reconnaissance to verify the "desertion" claims. Are UAF units conducting an organized retrograde or is there a genuine breakdown in C2?
Syzran Damage Assessment: Need BDA on the Syzran strike to determine if the target was the refinery (economic) or the rail yard (logistical).
U.S.-RF Legislative Contact: Verification of the TASS claim regarding a meeting with U.S. Congress members through Western diplomatic channels.
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW
The battlefield is currently bifurcated between a high-intensity kinetic suppression in the South (Zaporizhzhia) and a strategic depth exchange (Syzran strikes vs. Kyiv grid failure). The weather remains a force multiplier for the RF’s "blackout and freeze" strategy.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS
Capabilities: The 11th Air Army is demonstrating a high degree of persistence over Huliaipole, indicating that RF has established local air superiority or successfully suppressed UAF AD in that localized pocket.
Intentions: The volume of fire (715 strikes) indicates an intent to physically level defensive positions rather than seize them through infantry maneuvers alone.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES
Posture: UAF is in a "heavy defensive" posture in the south while maintaining an "offensive asymmetric" posture in the RF rear.
Risk: The high attrition of enemy forces is a positive indicator, but the sheer volume of incoming RF fire in Zaporizhzhia creates a risk of "shell shock" and defensive fatigue.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
Belief Analysis: The DS belief for "Propaganda Effort" (0.135) remains a critical factor. RF is successfully flooding the zone with both threats (Lavrov) and "olive branches" (Slutsky) to complicate Western decision-making.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS
Timeline: Within 6 hours, expect further RF air strikes targeting the T0803 highway to cut off reinforcements to the Zaporizhzhia front.
Decision Point: UAF must decide whether to commit reserve AD assets to the Zaporizhzhia front to challenge the 11th Air Army, even at the risk of leaving Kyiv's energy infrastructure more vulnerable.
